Owning Peace
Assessing the Impact of Local Ownership of Police Reforms on Post-conflict Peace

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Abstract

In the aftermath of armed conflict the (re)establishment of well-functioning and legitimate security institutions is touted as fundamental for the development of sustainable peace. Post-conflict police reform, often carried out with considerable involvement from external donor organisations, has become one of the most frequently implemented mechanisms of peacebuilding. Unfortunately, the track record of post-conflict police reform is, so far, mixed at best. Scholars (see, Donais, 2008; Gordon, 2015) argue that donors too often fail to engage local actors during the reform process and ‘impose’ reforms that are neither wanted by the host state and its society, nor befitting of the context. As a result, reform processes fail due to a lack of what is referred to as ‘local ownership’. The overall aim of this study is to provide new empirical and theoretical insights into the effects of local ownership on post-conflict peacebuilding. The overarching research question this study aims to address is: How does the local ownership of post-conflict police reform impact post-conflict peace?

To answer this question, this study takes a mixed methods approach. The first part of the analysis is statistical, and considers the effects of local ownership on police reform in every post-conflict country globally, from 1989-2014. It includes new global data on police reform, external involvement and four types of local ownership based on the engagement of local actors – the executive, parliament, the police and civil society – in post-conflict police reform. New global data on community policing and female representation programs is also presented. The second part of the analysis is qualitative, and was completed through fieldwork in Kosovo, where 23 people were interviewed in relation to local ownership and its effects on the post-conflict police reform process there. The participants were from external donor organisations, Kosovo Police and government personnel, and members of civil society.

The findings of the quantitative study suggest that local ownership plays a vital role in the promotion of post-conflict peace. The strongest association to post-conflict peace pertains to executive ownership, while police and civil society ownership are also demonstrated to have a positive relationship to post conflict peace. The findings from the qualitative study support the quantitative analysis and show that local ownership was significant for the success of Kosovo’s police reform program and for its overall stability, highlighting the importance of executive and civil society ownership in particular. The results also showcase the importance of time, and that local ownership can be separated into ownership of the reform process, and ownership of the reformed institutions. The fieldwork also suggests three factors that have hindered the development of local ownership: corruption, justice and impunity issues, and socio-economic development.

This is the first study to examine the effects of local ownership on any type of post-conflict peacebuilding using large-N global data. It contributes to existing research most notably in
relation to the presentation of new global data on post-conflict police reform and local ownership. This study also reconceptualises the term local ownership and focuses on one aspect of it: the engagement between local and external actors. It also distinguishes between the breadth and the depth of engagement, and concerns itself with only the breadth of local actor engagement in reform processes. Through deepening our understanding of local ownership, the findings of this research shed light on how to improve the implementation of post-conflict police reform processes so that they are better able to meaningfully improve peace in post-conflict societies.

*Keywords:* security sector reform; police reform; gender; human rights; peacebuilding; local ownership; civil society
For my Dad.
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They say that all good things come to an end, so that is where I will leave you. Here’s to what’s next.

Vancouver and Auckland, 2016
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>Confidence Interval (used in Chapter 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRI</td>
<td>Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCAF</td>
<td>The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMB</td>
<td>Executive Management Boards (Sierra Leone)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EULEX</td>
<td>European Union Rule of Law Mission (Kosovo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNP</td>
<td>Haitian National Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>International Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>KP</td>
<td>Kosovo Police</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force (NATO)</td>
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<td>LDK</td>
<td>Democratic League of Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNP</td>
<td>Liberia National Police</td>
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<td>MCSC</td>
<td>Municipal Community Safety Councils</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>MIA</td>
<td>(Kosovo) Ministry of Internal Affairs</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCPR</td>
<td>Post-conflict Police Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDK</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>RGO</td>
<td>Regional Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and Gender Based Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFRY</td>
<td>Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>United Nations Secretary General</td>
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<td>United Nations Women</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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1. Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War the international community has increasingly intervened in countries emerging from armed conflict to assist with the (re) establishment of peace and security. One of the most commonly used practices is the reform or reconstruction of state security institutions, including the police. Though police reforms can be implemented without significant external involvement – a prominent example being South Africa – the material and financial costs associated with large peacebuilding efforts, as well as the loss of human capital and infrastructure as a result of conflict, means that many post-war countries are reliant on a degree of donor support (Blume, 2008; Lee & Özerdem, 2015).

Therein arises a dilemma. On the one hand there are external donor organisations such as the UN, who operate with limited mandates and budgets, and who must fulfil certain requirements on the ground to be deemed ‘successful’ by their constituents. On the other hand there is a complex array of local actors ranging from the government to ex-combatants and civil society – some of which may have participated in the conflict and perpetrated human rights abuses – who are not only grappling with the costs associated with armed conflict, but now must work towards re-establishing peace and security and re-building the state. However, because of time and resource constraints there is an impetus for external donors to implement reforms as timely as possible, which often means transposing them from other places, or ticking-off arbitrary goals in relation to the training of new officers or the provision of technical resources. These circumstances can lead to reforms that are implemented with insufficient engagement form local actors, meaning that they can inherit institutions that do not transplant well into societies with different political histories and cultures. The lack of engagement can lead to reform processes and institutions are not truly ‘owned’ by the people they are meant to serve, resulting in low levels of trust and legitimacy, poor oversight, and perhaps most importantly, poor capacity to maintain and uphold peace (Donais, 2009a).

Both post-conflict police reform and local ownership have received a degree of scholarly attention over the past fifteen years, though several significant gaps remain. Much of the existing research on PCPR tends to focus on single case studies (see, Donais, 2005; Krogstad, 2012), as well as certain aspects of reforms such as community policing (see, Dinnen & Peake, 2013) and ethnic representation (see, Bacon, 2015; Gray & Strasheim, 2016). This single-case study orientation limits our knowledge in that the results are not generalizable across cases. Moreover, much of the existing comparative literature tends to
be policy-orientated and suffers from a lack of replicability. A large portion of the research on post-conflict police reform also exists within the broader security sector reform literature (see, Chanaa, 2002; Knight, 2009; Jackson, 2011), and thus suffers from a lack of nuance concerning PCPR in particular. Moreover, there is a distinct lack of large-N comparative research on police reform, post-conflict or otherwise.

In turning to local ownership, there is very little existing research that links it to post-conflict police reform. At present, local ownership is more often considered in relation to larger SSR programs or to peacebuilding more generally (see, Donais, 2008; Özerdem & Lee, 2015). There has also been little effort made to compare the effects of local ownership within or across cases of post-conflict peacebuilding. Furthermore, the concept of ‘local ownership’ lacks clarity in both policy and practice. Who are we talking about when we say ‘local’ ownership? For some this means only the government, while for others the term includes a much broader cross-section of society. The development of more replicable research on local ownership will help clarify some of the existing limitations of the field by providing a framework that is both conceptually and operationally transparent. Because of the lack of conceptual clarity, as well as a lack of large-N comparative research, the implications of local ownership of post-conflict police reform and post-conflict peace and security remain unclear. To help tackle some of the existing gaps within the field, this study aims to address the following research question: How does the local ownership of post-conflict police reform impact post-conflict peace?

Both quantitative and qualitative methods are used to explore the research question. The quantitative component draws upon new global data on the implementation of post-conflict police reform programs, from 1989-2014. New global data on the involvement of external actors in post-conflict police reform is also presented, as well as on four types of local ownership, based on the variety of local actors that are engaged in PCPR processes, and also, the implementation of post-conflict community policing and female representation programs. The qualitative component consists of a single case study on post-conflict Kosovo. The results are drawn from interviews with twenty-three people carried out between May and August 2014. The participants were recruited from three distinct groups: external donor personnel, local police and government personnel, and members of civil society.

This study is important for several key reasons. First, the international community spends billions of dollars every year on post-conflict police and security reform programs, however they seemingly fail more often than they succeed. Without examining both successful and failed cases of PCPR it is difficult to say whether reforms have been successful or not. It is also difficult to say if or ‘by how much’ PCPR improves the prospects for post-conflict
peace without data on a relatively large and representative sample. Therefore, it is worth exploring the general efficacy of post-conflict police reform and its implications for post-conflict peace.

Second, there are significant knowledge gaps concerning the consequences of external donor involvement in post-conflict peacebuilding. Are post-conflict states better off implementing peacebuilding processes on their own, albeit with potentially less resources and manpower at their disposal? Or, do external donors, and all of the costs and benefits that come with their involvement, have a positive effect on peace and security?

Third, there is a distinct lack of clarity with regards to ‘local ownership’, which has limited our theoretical and empirical understanding of the term, as well as its implications for post-conflict peacebuilding. Local ownership is a multi-faceted concept that consists of several aspects including the ‘engagement’ of local actors in a reform process, and/or the ‘control’ they have over it. This research seeks to refine the conceptualization and measurement of local ownership by focusing solely on one aspect of it: the engagement between local and external actors. In addition, and as will be further discussed in Chapter 2, the bulk of existing studies on engagement (and local ownership more generally) generally focus on its depth or quality, namely ‘how much’ or ‘how well’ local actors are engaged in a reform processes. This study contributes to the literature by establishing a more holistic conceptualization of engagement based on its depth, as well as its *breadth*, or more specifically, whether certain local actors are engaged in a reform process. The focus on ‘breadth’ is important given that it is relatively under-examined within the existing scholarship.¹ In addition, this study makes a theoretical contribution by detailing how the breadth of local actors that are engaged in PCPR processes may influence post-conflict peace. The focus on the breadth of engagement subsequently enables this study to create empirical measures, based on the breadth of local actor engagement in PCPR, for examining local ownership and testing the hypotheses.

Fourth, while the importance of local ownership is touted within existing policy frameworks as well as scholarship, because of the lack of conceptual and operational transparency, as well as of existing large-N data, it is unclear if it actually matters. For instance, does local ownership make police reform more likely to succeed? Is local ownership commensurate with the development of post-conflict peace and stability?

¹ There are some existing studies that examine the inclusiveness of peace processes (see, Nilsson, 2012; Paffenholz & Ross, 2015), as well as a burgeoning interest form the IGO and NGO communities (see, UNSC, 2016; Jadallah & Mrabet, 2016).
It is also important to consider whether the ownership of certain local actors, such as the executive, are more significant for the attainment of post-conflict peace than the ownership of others. Furthermore, even if local ownership does have a positive effect on post-conflict peace, it is unclear whether the effects are linear. It may be that local ownership matters much more for some parts of society than for others. It is theoretically and practically relevant to examine whether the ownership of state-based actors such as the executive and parliament has a stronger relationship to peace and security than say for example, civil society. Expanding our knowledge of these key areas will help fulfill the overall aim of this study, which is to examine how the local ownership of post-conflict police reform programs impacts peace in post-conflict societies. Improving the scientific knowledge concerning what works and what does not, in terms of post-conflict peacebuilding, would seem to be a prerequisite for increasing the effectiveness of peacebuilding processes.

1.1 Key Concepts
Seeing that this study represents the first large-N global analysis of post-conflict police reform and local ownership, several key concepts must be clarified. First, what is police reform? How does police reform implemented in post-conflict countries differ from reforms introduced in other contexts? Seeing that the conditions under which police reform is implemented are always different, there is no singular model of police reform. Within much of the existing literature, police reform is defined by the context in which it is introduced (e.g. post-conflict), the components it comprises of (e.g. training, resource provisions), and/or the goals of the reforms. In taking these facets into account, and in building from existing research (see, e.g. Denham, 2008; UN, 2008; OECD DAC, 2008; Pinc, 2010; GFN-SSR, 2007), police reform is defined as: the attempted transformation of a state’s police organisation so that it is better able to uphold human rights, and provide greater security for its citizens. When police reform is implemented in countries emerging from armed conflict, they must take several additional factors into account such as: mistrust between the state and civil society (including between citizens and the police), enmity between ethnic or social groups and the increased availability of weapons (Wulf, 2011; O’Neill, 2005; Harris, 2005).

While much of the existing research considers local ownership in relation to the depth of engagement that local actors have in a reform process, this study focuses on the breadth of local actor engagement. More specifically, this study focuses on the types of actors that are engaged in post-conflict police reform, as opposed to the depth or quality of their engagement per se. As a result of this focus, local ownership is conceptualised as the

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2 Chapter 4 (Research Design and Methods) provides more detailed definitions.
engagement of local actors – vis à vis external actors – in the design, implementation and management of a post-conflict police reform program. This conceptualization of local ownership rests on the engagement between external donor organisations and local actors.

Engagement between local and external actors is conceptualised as the sustained and institutionalised interaction between local and external actors during and in relation to the reform process. ‘Engagement’ is realised through three key mechanisms: public consultation and the employment of local staff, the provision of resources to local civil society organisations, the through formal institutions set up for engagement and consultation between actors.

To be considered an external actor three criteria must be met. The actor or organisation must be external to the host state, meaning that the organisation in question cannot be an internal state-based actor, or a non-state actor based in the state. Second, the actor must be either an international or regional governmental organisation, or a single, bilateral or group of foreign states. Third, the mandate of the actor or organisation must pertain explicitly to the provision of peacebuilding, security sector reform, or police reform. This requirement serves to exclude actors that do not have mandated or operational experience in post-conflict police reform (PCPR). The most common external actors that engage in PCPR efforts are intergovernmental organisations (e.g. the United Nations), development agencies, and individual and/or coalitions of states.

This study distinguishes between different local actors in order to empirically examine differences in the impact of ‘ownership’ by different local actors on post-conflict peace. Differentiating between local actors also enables this study to consider local ownership as something that varies over time and by context, as opposed to something that either is or is not present. The four local actors included are: the executive, parliament, the police and civil society. The executive is the key decision making body of a state, responsible for governance and administration. In practice, the executive includes the head of state and/or government and their cabinet (World Bank, 2016). Parliament is the formalised venue where public policy is discussed, debated and decided on, and where the legislation of the state is made (Wittmann & Weingast, 2008). ‘The police’ is conceptualised as including high-ranking police officials, civilian administrators, and the officers themselves. Lastly, civil society, with respect to police reform, consists of civil society organisations with mandates that pertain to human rights’, government and/or security sector oversight, or minority and marginalized group rights.

In addition to the four types of local ownership, which are measured via the engagement of local actors in PCPR processes, two types of post-conflict policing programs implemented
to improve ownership of the police, as well as overall stability, are examined. They are community policing, and programs aimed at increasing the representation of women in the police. These types of programs, which centre on relatively large groups in society, also serve as additional measures of the breadth of local actor engagement in PCPR. Community policing is policing that is informed and directed by local community partnerships. ‘Informed’ implies that there is an information-sharing relationship between the police and communities, while ‘directed’ indicates that communities are able to share their policing priorities and concerns with officers. Community policing programs are implemented to improve community-police relations, human rights, and reduce crime (Denney & Kassaye, 2013). Improved community-police relations mitigates the need for civilians to go ‘outside’ of the state apparatus to maintain their security, which subsequently reduces their need to take up arms against the state (Charley & McCormack, 2011). Improved trust in the police and its ability to uphold the rule of law also serves to indicate to people that their grievances and are being heard (Koci & Gjuraj, 2016).

Female representation programs are implemented by a police service or national government and have the explicit aim of increasing the representation of women in the police. Existing research shows that increased female representation helps to moderate the use of force by the police, and that more gender equal police services are better at responding to and investigating women’s rights abuses (UNDP, 2007). Female representation in the police also increases the likelihood that the security needs of women are met. This is because women are more likely to report crimes to other women (True, 2013).

Two indicators make up the conceptualization of post-conflict peace: one-sided violence and human rights. One-sided violence is “the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians” (Eck, Sollenberg & Wallensteen, 2004: 136). This operationalization includes one-sided violence perpetrated by both state and non-state actors. ‘Human rights’ is operationalised through physical integrity rights, namely those entitlements that allow people to organise and assemble, protect and maintain the rule of law, and ensure the autonomy of individuals.

1.2 Theoretical Approach
The theoretical framework that guides this study draws from several avenues of existing literature including post-conflict peacebuilding, security sector reform and local ownership.
**Post-conflict Police Reform**

Two hypotheses are used to explore the general efficacy of post-conflict police reform and external involvement in it. They are included to set the foundation for the second set of hypotheses, which focus on local ownership. First, it is argued that post-conflict police reform positively impacts post-conflict peace, as measured by one-sided violence and human rights. This is intuitive seeing that post-conflict police reform programs are implemented to 1) improve the capacity of police to uphold the rule of the law and maintain security, and 2) increase the accountability and oversight that police operate under (Goldsmith, 2005). Capacity enhancement is carried out through improved training practices and human rights education, changes to recruitment and vetting structures, and improved infrastructure and the provision of technical resources. Police accountability is increased most effectively through the creation and/or strengthening of police oversight and review boards (Pratt & Valasek, 2011). Improving police accountability is a vital aim of post-conflict police reform processes given that during conflict police often commit human rights abuses, or engage directly in the conflict (O’Neil, 2005). It is further claimed that when police are more aware of human rights standards, trained to limit the use of force, and operate under strict oversight and accountability measures, they will be less likely to infringe on human rights (Celador, 2005).

**External Actor Involvement**

Much of the existing literature is critical of external donor involvement, asserting that donors too often ignore or bypass local actors and implement ‘cookie-cutter’ reforms that are inappropriate and unsustainable without continued donor support. These imposed reforms suffer from a lack of local ownership, and subsequently ‘fail’ during or shortly after their completion (Nathan, 2007 & 2008; Donais, 2009a; Donais, 2009b). This study, however, argues that under certain conditions, the involvement of external actors enables the ownership of some local actors and positively impacts post-conflict peace. For instance, security is highly political in post-conflict settings and it is possible that without external involvement, security institutions that were a cause of conflict, will remain intact. External involvement can also enable marginalised groups to participate in and have ownership of PCPR. In fact, in some contexts the ownership of some local actors (e.g. the executive) may need to be overridden so as to ensure the security of a broader cross section of society (Hansen, 2008). The presence of external actors serves as an implicit security guarantee that increases the costs of committing one-sided violence and human rights violations.  

Finally, many post-conflict states lack the necessary resources to implement reforms independently and are therefore reliant on a certain amount of donor support.

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3 Many intergovernmental organisations that participate in post-conflict security reforms have worked to develop greater norms for the protection of civilians and the maintenance of human rights (Bellamy & Hunt, 2013).
Local Ownership
The second set of hypotheses examines the four types of local ownership, conceptualized based on the engagement of four different actors in post-conflict police reform and the implications of their engagement for post-conflict peace. It also considers how increased or improved local actor engagement impacts post-conflict peace.

Without local ownership, reformed security institutions will not “reflect local needs and dynamics” (Nathan, 2008: 20), which in turn can lead to resentment and mistrust, as well as low levels of legitimacy (Goldsmith, 2005). It has been further argued that local ownership can help to reduce antagonism between the state, security institutions, and civil society (Bryden, 2004). This is because local ownership enables local actors (e.g. civil society) to question and have input into the reforms being implemented, and act as a mechanism of accountability and oversight (Scheye, 2008). Both scholars and governmental organizations recognize that local ownership affects the implementation and management of post-conflict security reforms, as well as their long-term effectiveness and sustainability (Nathan, 2007; Donais, 2009b; UN, 2008; OECD-DAC, 2007). In practice, local ownership is important for building consensus around the security needs of the host state. It also helps to direct reform programming and improve the legitimacy of the reforms as well as the reformed institutions (Brzoska & Heinemann-Grüder, 2004; Stiglitz, 1998). And while there are divergent views on how local ownership is advanced, the engagement between local and external actors is considered vital, as it provides local actors with a voice during the implementation of reforms, and helps ensure that external donors cannot impose reforms (Donais, 2009a; Bendix & Stanley, 2008a).

As will be discussed in Chapter 2, most existing studies on local ownership focus on its depth or quality; namely how ‘much’ certain actors are engaged in or have control over a reform processes. In breaking from the bulk of existing research, this thesis focuses on its breadth. Specifically, this research examines the breadth of local actors that are included in post-conflict police reforms, and the effects of their engagement on post-conflict peace. The four types of local ownership are now briefly discussed.

Executive Ownership
The executive is critical because it has the capability to carry out human rights violations and engage in violence against civilians. Existing research suggests that post-conflict security reforms are less likely to succeed when they are imposed from the outside, and
lack executive engagement (see, Nathan, 2008; Donais, 2009b). In practice, executive ownership ensures a minimum amount of national input and oversight into the reform process and it diminishes the ability of donors to impose reforms (Jackson, 2011; Scheye, 2005). Executive ownership also indicates a minimum level of ‘consent’ from the executive, the primary institution with the capacity to employ violence against civilians and abuse human rights. Executive ownership is considered to be crucial for strengthening police oversight, which can deter as well as increase the cost of police perpetrating one-sided violence and human rights violations (Bajraktari, 2006). Conversely, it is also possible for regimes to oppose PCPR efforts and the involvement of external donors, which can result in regimes working against or undermining the reforms.

Parliamentary Ownership
Parliaments are often sidelined in countries emerging from war. This is especially true when it comes to marginalisation by the executive, which is generally the much stronger actor. As a result of this imbalance, external donors often overlook parliaments due to their relative weakness (Nathan, 2007; OECD DAC, 2008). In addition, and due to the relative ineffectiveness of parliaments in post-conflict settings, even when a country’s parliament is engaged in a PCPR, it is unlikely that it will have a strong effect on post-conflict peace. This is because in post-conflict environments, parliaments generally have little capacity and infrastructure for monitoring and oversight (OECD DAC, 2008). Accordingly, it is hypothesised that parliamentary ownership of post-conflict police reform does not impact post-conflict peace.

Police Ownership
The third local actor is the police, the primary internal security provider in most states. Naturally, all post-conflict police reform processes involve the police to a certain degree, as without their involvement there would be no institution to reform. However, not all PCPR efforts have actually engaged the police during the implementation of reforms, which is thought to have been detrimental to their resulting success (Ebo, 2005; Perdan, 2008). Without the input of police into the reforms being implemented it becomes more likely that the reforms will face antagonism from the police. This is especially true given that police are the most likely and able body to reject the implementation of post-conflict security reforms (Holm, 2000). Police ownership is also important for making officers and administrators more aware of public interests and concerns, which is fundamental in post-conflict countries (Holm, 2000). Police ownership also helps ensure that donor support is

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It is argued that additional forms of ownership (e.g. civil society ownership) should reduce that ability of the executive to engage in human rights violations while also ensuring that local ownership does not become “confined to the executive” (Nathan, 2008: 22).
directed towards areas that police identify as important, which is important given that donors are often less familiar with local security concerns and needs.

_Civil Society Ownership_
The final actor through which local ownership is considered is civil society. Based on the engagement between civil society and external donors in post-conflict police reform, it is theorised that civil society ownership positively impacts post-conflict peace, and it is primarily based on two key mechanisms: input and oversight. First, civil society ownership serves as a forum of input into the reform process, which is important for identifying missteps or faults in the reforms. Input can also mitigate potential long-term issues that may impact the ability of police to maintain peace (Villaveces-Izquierdo, 2009). Moreover, input gives people a voice in the protection and maintenance of their rights and allows them to have ‘their voices heard’ by both the government and external donors (Edwards, 2009). In turn, this input lowers the need for people to go outside of the state apparatus for security, which subsequently reduces the need to use human rights violations for coercive purposes (Davenport, 2007a). Second, civil society ownership increases the oversight and accountability under which post-conflict police reforms are implemented. Primarily through the development of human rights organizations, civil society serves as a watchdog that can monitor and prevent violence by the state from taking place (Barnes & Albrecht, 2008). Through increased oversight, civil society ownership also means that governments are more likely to be ‘punished’ (either during elections or by external donors) when they commit violence against civilians and/or human rights abuses (Hultman, 2012a). Finally, civil society ownership promotes engagement between political opponents prior to the use of violence (Barnes, 2009), and by having a ‘seat at the table’ with external donors, civil society engagement also increases the transparency of the reforms, as well as the legitimacy of the reformed institutions (Belloni, 2001).

_Increased Local Ownership_
The final hypothesis relating explicitly to local ownership contends that increased or improved local ownership has a positive effect on post-conflict peace. This hypothesis is based on the logic that when a greater number of local actors have ownership of a PCPR process, there will be increased insight into the security needs of the society and a greater degree of oversight and accountability.

_Community Policing Programs_
Two hypotheses are used to consider the effects of community policing and female representation programs. Community policing programs are implemented to improve relations between the police and their communities as well as to reduce crime. Community policing is also introduced to increase citizen satisfaction in police and improve respect for
human rights (Charley & McCormack, 2011). As a result, community policing increases the ownership of the police by the community, and promotes post-conflict peace and stability. For instance, existing research shows that improved trust between civilians and police makes people more likely to report crimes and potential threats to security (Denney & Kassaye, 2013). Greater trust and relations between police and society also reduces the need for individuals or groups to take security into their own hands and work outside of the state security apparatus by forming organised armed groups (Charley & McCormack, 2011; Koci & Gjuraj, 2016). Moreover, community policing provides communities with input into policing priorities and practices, which in turn helps build trust between police and society in post-conflict settings. It has also been found that community policing leads to more efficient crime control because it helps to reduce the fear of crime within the community and increases police legitimacy (Koci & Gjuraj, 2016).

Female Representation Programs
Within the last fifteen years there has been a noticeable push to increase the role of women in post-conflict peacebuilding and to reduce the prevalence of sexual and gender based violence during and after conflict (see, UNSC 1325, 2000). As a result, it is argued that female representation programs (in the police) positively impact post-conflict peace. It is contended that greater female representation reduces the likelihood that police will use excessive force, and it also helps to ensure police are better able to respond to and investigate violence against women (UNDP, 2007, Bacon, 2015). Seeing that women are also more likely to report crimes to female police officers – de facto increasing women’s ‘ownership’ of the police – the implementation of female representation programs directly increases the likelihood that women’s security needs will be met (True, 2013). These are significant given that women often face increased insecurity during conflict, as well as in post-conflict environments (Human Security Report, 2012; Klot, 2007). It has also been acknowledged that PCPR programs that disregard women’s security are less likely to be sustainable and successful (UNDP, 2007). Existing research also informs us that more gender equal societies have less violence (Caprioli, 2000; Bjarnegård et al., 2015) and are more tolerant to differences between groups (Hudson, et al., 2009).

1.3 Case Selection & Research Design
The overall aim of this study is to examine the effects of local ownership of post-conflict police reform on post-conflict peace and both quantitative and qualitative methods are used to test the hypotheses.
**Quantitative Study**

The universe of cases for the quantitative component of the thesis is based on the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2015 (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Pettersson & Wallensteen, 2015) and spans 1989-2014. Every country that experienced a period of at least one year of intrastate-armed conflict followed by a cessation of hostilities for at least one calendar year is included. Although many of the cases may have not implemented post-conflict police reforms, the general efficacy of post-conflict police reform can be examined by including all post-conflict countries.

Four dependent variables are used to measure post-conflict peace. The first two concern one-sided violence (OSV): OSV by the state and OSV by non-state actors. The second two are human rights related: extrajudicial killings and torture. The data used to measure OSV are taken from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED), version 4.0 (Sundberg & Melander, 2013). Each year of observation for both variables is coded with a value corresponding to the number of deaths that occurred as a result of one-sided violence after the conflict ended. The data used to code extrajudicial killings and torture is from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset (Cingranelli, Richards & Clay, 2014). Each year of observation is coded with a value ranging from ‘0’ to ‘2’, corresponding to the intensity at which either extrajudicial killings or torture occurred.

Nine author-coded independent variables are included in the multivariate regression analyses. The first two consider the general efficacy of PCPR and external involvement. The next five hypotheses focus explicitly on the breadth of local actor engagement in PCPR efforts. The final two hypotheses consider the implementation of community policing and female representation programs.

Post-conflict police reform is coded dichotomously for each year of observation. There must be evidence of a national program implemented with the aim of reforming, reconstructing, or creating a new police service. The program must include both institutional reforms, such as changes to monitoring and oversight, vetting and recruitment, and community relations; as well as tactical reforms, which include changes to education and training, the allocation of resources and equipment, and infrastructure development. External actor involvement in PCPR is coded when three criteria are met: 1) the actor/organisation must be external to the state, 2) it must be an international or regional governmental organisation, or a single, bilateral or group of foreign states, and 3) its mandate must include the provision of security sector reform, or police reform more explicitly.
Five independent variables pertaining to local ownership, measured by the breadth of local actor engagement in post-conflict police reform processes, are included. The first considers executive engagement in PCPR, coded when there is evidence that the executive had decision-making power over the reforms, and when there was regular and formalised interaction between the executive and the external donor actors involved. When the criteria are not met, when there is evidence that the executive was excluded from the reform process, or when there is evidence that the executive either opposed or worked against the reforms, the year is coded with a value of ‘0’. Parliamentary engagement in PCPR is coded when there is evidence that the parliament was engaged in decision-making and oversight of the reforms. Parliamentary engagement can also occur through the implementation of research projects relating to the PCPR process, and joint conferences and workshops with external donors. Police engagement in PCPR is coded when there is evidence that a police service was involved in the planning and implementation of the reforms, as well as the development of policing and security policies/best-practices. Police engagement can also be evidenced by consultation with police representatives during the reform process regarding the mandate and oversight of the police, or more technical aspects such as uniforms and investigative techniques. Civil society engagement is coded when there is evidence showing the provision of support to existing civil society organisations (CSO’s), or for the creation of new CSO’s that focus on police oversight, human rights, or the protection of marginalised groups. There must also be evidence of civil society participation in public forums regarding the police reform process. The fifth independent variable pertaining to local ownership considers the effects of increased or improved local ownership. Each country year of observation is coded with a value corresponding to the number of local actors (out of four) that were engaged in the reform process.

The final independent variables included in this study consider the effects of community policing and female representation programs, implemented to increase the ownership of the police, and to improve the overall quality of policing. Community policing is coded as taking place when there is evidence of an ongoing national (community policing) program with the explicit goal of improving community-police relations, and with staff dedicated to working on it. Female representation programs are coded as ongoing when there is evidence of a national program aimed at increasing the representation of women in the police, both in officer roles as well as within administrative and civilian roles.

Based on previous research and theoretical insight, eight control variables are included in the multivariate analyses: GDP, GDP growth/decline, regime type, conflict intensity,

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5 As will be further outlined in Chapter 4, this study focuses on one aspect of local ownership: the engagement between local and external actors. It further disaggregates and focuses on the breadth (as opposed to the depth) of engagement.
conflict end type, duration of peace, presence of a UN Mission, and whether or not there was a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) program for ex-combatants.

To investigate the hypothesised relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variables used to measure post-conflict peace, negative binomial and ordered logistic regression models are used. Marginal effects and predicted probabilities are also used to further highlight some of the findings. The statistical models are further explained in Chapter 4.

**Qualitative Study**

The qualitative component of the thesis consists of a case study of the post-conflict police reform process in Kosovo. Kosovo is an ideal case because of the insecurity that existed in the country prior to, during and after the armed conflict between the Yugoslav Government and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA/UCK). Post-conflict Kosovo also represents one of the largest and most comprehensive post-conflict peacebuilding and stabilisation missions in history (Lemay-Hébert, 2011). In addition, local ownership was adopted as a key component of the reform process (Eckhard, 2016).

The case study was completed through fieldwork that took place between May and August 2014, during which twenty-three individuals from three different groups were interviewed. Specifically, people from 1) external donor organisations (e.g. the UN, EU), 2) local personnel from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Kosovo Police, and 3) local NGO and think tank staff and civilians. The data were analysed using thematic analysis. More details on the case study analysis can be found in Chapters 4 and 7.

**1.4 Key Findings & Contributions**

**Quantitative Findings**

The results of the quantitative component of this study show that post-conflict police reform has an unclear relationship to post-conflict peace. The only statistically significant coefficient suggests that when ongoing and completed years of PCPR are examined together, as compared to post-conflict states that do not implement PCPR, the likelihood of non-state one-sided violence taking place increases. Similar dynamics have been observed in democratization processes after war (see, Klopp & Zuern, 2007). Though when only completed years of PCPR are considered, the coefficient is no longer statistically significant, meaning that completed post-conflict police reform efforts are not associated with an increase in the use of one-sided violence by non-state actors. These findings are
counter-intuitive given that PCPR is carried out as a means of improving post-conflict peace and security.

The results also indicate that the involvement of external actors in PCPR efforts has an unclear association to post-conflict peace. Most important for this study is that when analysed together, these results demonstrate that the mere implementation of post-conflict police reform, both with and without external donor involvement, is insufficient for the development of post-conflict peace and stability. Moreover, these results highlight that other factors, such as the local ownership of the reforms implemented, may have a greater influence on long-term peace.

With regards to local ownership, the findings suggest that executive ownership has a strong relationship to post-conflict peace. Specifically, the results show that executive ownership is associated with decreased state and non-state one-sided violence, as well as torture, when compared to PCPR programs without executive ownership. In addition, police ownership is correlated with decreased state and non-state OSV, and civil society ownership has a negative and statistically significant relationship to OSV by non-state actors. Conversely, the findings show that parliamentary ownership has an unclear relationship to post-conflict peace, as none of the coefficients are statistically significant. Overall, the results illustrate the significance of local ownership for post-conflict police reform, and may imply the significance of local ownership for other peacebuilding activities.

The strongest result of this study shows that the implementation of programs to increase the representation of women in police are positively associated with post-conflict peace; a result that holds across each of the four dependent variables. This finding has significant implications for existing and future research, as well as practice. Specifically, this result further demonstrates the importance of female participation and gender equality for post-conflict peacebuilding (see, Bacon, 2015). This is important given that women are vastly underrepresented in post-conflict peacebuilding activities, as well as in state security institutions around the world (UNSC 1325, 2000).

**Qualitative Findings**

The first key finding that emerged from the case study research in post-conflict Kosovo details the shift in engagement that took place as the ownership of the Kosovo Police increased. Specifically, the findings show that there was a relatively high degree of engagement between local (Kosovo police personnel and civil society) and external actors during the initial stages of the reforms, but that less engagement was required as the reform process continued, and the local ownership of the ‘reformed’ KP developed. This finding suggests the importance of conducting more nuanced studies of local ownership, as the
focal points shift from first pertaining to local ownership of a process, to then local ownership of institutions. This study finds that high ownership of the reform process in the early stages of reform is beneficial for creating more long-term ownership of the reformed institutions, namely the police.

Additionally, it appears that the engagement between local and external actors focused on broader sweeping security and policing issues during the early stages of the reform effort. As the Kosovo Police gained more civilian trust and legitimacy within the state, the engagement between actors shifted. In fact, it appears that the engagement later began to focus on more specialised areas such as the rights and protection of ethnic minorities, vulnerable people, as well as domestic violence. These findings are meaningful in that they illustrate the progress of local ownership over time, and also the shifts that take place in regards to the amount of engagement between actors, as well as types of issues that their interaction focuses on.

The results from the fieldwork in Kosovo also identify three factors that have impaired the development of local ownership as it pertains to PCPR: corruption, justice and impunity issues, and economic development. These three factors have previously been found to be detrimental for post-conflict peacebuilding in general (see, Cheng & Zaum, 2012; Subedi, 2012). This study demonstrates the same critically negative effects of these factors for local ownership of PCPR in particular.

**Additional Findings and Contributions**

This study contributes to existing research in several additional ways. First, this study enhances our understanding of local ownership; namely its relationship to post-conflict police reform, and its subsequent implications for post-conflict peace. More specifically, this study presents a new conceptualization and operationalization of the term ‘local ownership’ that focuses on the breadth of local actors engagement in PCPR processes. This focus, which breaks from existing research on local ownership (that more often examines the depth of local engagement), allows for it to be statistically examined across cases and over time. This is important given the conceptual fogginess surrounding local ownership within the existing research, as well as in practice (see, Nathan, 2007; Donais, 2009b; Richmond, 2012). In addition, this study distinguishes between four newly developed types of local ownership based on the engagement of local actors in PCPR. This is meaningful as until now, there has been little effort to ‘measure’ local ownership.

Second, this research includes some of the first global data on the implementation of police reform programs in post-conflict countries. Moreover, this is the first global study that considers the effects of post-conflict police reform using large-N statistical analyses. This
study also presents new original data on the involvement of external actors in PCPR processes, which in turn, allows me to examine the effects of their involvement.

Third, this is one of the first large-N studies to consider the role of women, and female representation in particular, in relation to the reform of state security institutions. As a result, it contributes substantially to the existing research on women’s rights and gender equality as it pertains to post-conflict stabilization and peacebuilding.

1.5 Limitations & Future Research
This study presents several avenues for future research, wherein the limitations of the present study could also be addressed. First, future research would benefit from disaggregating between components of PCPR. The present study is limited because it considers PCPR homogenously and does not account for variation across different programs. It is possible that increased attention to oversight and human rights training in PCPR are more important for post-conflict peace than placing emphasis on basic police training and infrastructure development.

Second, this study looks at external actors as a homogenous group, though not all external actors have the same resources available to them. Certain external actors also have more experience participating in PCPR processes, and subsequently, it is possible that certain external actors will be better able to facilitate local ownership and have a more positive effect on post-conflict peace. Therefore, future research would to well to differentiate between the types of external actors that engage in PCPR.

Third, given that this study focuses on the breadth of local actor engagement, it likely only captures a minimal amount of depth or quality of engagement, and it is a somewhat superficial measure. Future research would benefit from adding measures of depth to the data compiled for this study. Though it should be acknowledged that this study represents a ‘first step’ to examining local ownership using Large-N data. Also, while this study operationalised and examined the engagement of four local actors, there is a much larger and more complex number of local actors that could have been included. One example is non-state groups such as ex-combatants. This is a valuable area for future investigation seeing that the relationship between non-state actors and peacebuilding is a burgeoning area of research (see, e.g. Ebo, 2007; Hofmann & Schneckener, 2011). Moreover, some of the local actors that are included could have been further disaggregated. For instance, given the growing literature on civil society engagement in peacebuilding (see, Nilsson, 2012; Pouligny, 2005), the further disaggregation of civil society presents an area for future study.
Finally, the findings pertaining to female representation programs are some of the most important of this study. Future research would benefit from examining the relationship between female representation (in the police) and post-conflict peace qualitatively. This study also does not consider the roles and responsibilities of women in police. It would be interesting to investigate whether the positions women have in a police service (such as in administrative vs. officer roles) affect the results concerning post-conflict peace.

1.6 Structure of this Thesis
The structure of this thesis is similar to that of this chapter. Chapter 2 reviews existing research on post-conflict police reform and local ownership. It also draws on literature from the more comprehensive security sector reform and peacebuilding fields. Throughout the chapter some of the noticeable gaps within the existing scholarship are discussed. Chapter 3 lays out the key concepts and the theoretical framework that guides this study, positioning them in relation to the existing literature. Nine testable hypotheses are also presented. The first two hypotheses relate to the general efficacy of post-conflict police reform and the involvement of external actors in it. The next five hypotheses consider the effects of different types of local ownership, as well as variation in local ownership. The final two hypotheses concern community policing and female representation programs. Chapter 4 illustrates the research design, and the methods used to test the hypotheses. Specifically, the mixed methods research approach, which combines quantitative and qualitative methods, is outlined. Then, the quantitative research design is presented, beginning with the operationalization of the variables, highlighting some of the coding decisions made, as well as the resulting limitations. Next, the means through which the quantitative data were analysed is discussed. Then, the qualitative research design is laid out, including a discussion regarding the selection of Kosovo as the case study, the types of participants that were recruited, the content of the interviews, and the qualitative analysis technique used.

The next three chapters focus on the results of this study. Chapter 5 showcases the descriptive results. Specifically, the prevalence of post-conflict police reform, external involvement, and local ownership, are illustrated over time. Following that, the bivariate relationships between the independent and dependent variables are examined. Chapter 6 presents the statistical findings of the study using multivariate regression analyses, namely ordered logistic regression and negative binomial analyses, as well as some marginal effects and predicted probabilities. Chapter 7 presents the case study on post-conflict Kosovo, and the police reform process implemented there. The fieldwork took place over four months between May and August 2014. During the course of the fieldwork twenty-three individuals were interviewed; a group that consists of personnel from external donor organisations, local security personnel from the Kosovo Police and the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, and members of civil society. Chapter 8 discusses and analyses the findings and conclusions of the study. The chapter begins by briefly presenting and interpreting some of the key findings. Some of the main conclusions and contributions that the study makes are then summarized. Lastly, some of the limitations of the study are addressed, in addition to presenting some potential avenues for future research as well as some implications for post-conflict police reform programs.
2. Previous Research

Police reform has been an established mechanism of post-conflict peacebuilding since the early 1990’s. It has been implemented in a variety of contexts across the globe, engaged in by a variety of external donors, and it has resulted in both successes and failures. At present there remain several questions as to why police reform has been successful in some instances and not in others, a question of importance for scholars and practitioners alike. This chapter reviews research from several fields of study including post-conflict peace, the broader field of post-conflict security sector reform (SSR), police reform more specifically, and local ownership. Its aim is to illustrate the state of the field at present, as well as to identify shortcomings and research gaps. This chapter begins by briefly reviewing the existing research on post-conflict peace and peacebuilding. Then, the focus turns to on studies of post-conflict police reform (PCPR). Following that the literature on external involvement in PCPR, and SSR more generally are examined. Lastly, this chapter looks at the existing literature on local ownership, as it pertains to post-conflict police reform and SSR. As the chapter develops major points of interest are of note: the first is the lack of large-N research on post-conflict police reform, the second is the lack of clarity when it comes to conceptualizing and operationalizing local ownership, and the third is the absence of empirical research on the efficacy of local ownership.

2.1 Post-conflict Peace

Seeing that the focus of this study is on how local ownership of post-conflict police reform effects post-conflict peace, it is worthwhile to briefly examine the state of the literature on post-conflict peace and peacebuilding. Several important quantitative studies have been published on post-conflict peace, including those by Doyle and Sambanis (2000), and Fortna (2004). Doyle and Sambanis (2000) provided the first quantitative study that considered the effects of UN peacekeeping missions on post-conflict peacebuilding. Studying 124 post-conflict cases, the authors find that the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission positively impacts peacebuilding success. They also find that higher levels of

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6 Due to the relative lack of literature focusing explicitly on PCPR, and because police reform is often part of more comprehensive SSR efforts, the literature on SSR is valuable for this research.

7 Several important qualitative studies on post-conflict peace and peacebuilding have also been completed, including those by Bush (2006), Chetail (2009), Chopra & Hohe (2004), Richmond (2006), Mac Ginty (2011), Lidén (2009) and Donais (2012).
conflict-related deaths and displacement reduce the probability of peacebuilding success. Fortna (2004) examines where peacekeepers are deployed and how their deployment impacts the stability of post-conflict peace. She tests her hypotheses on 115 cases and finds that UN peacekeeping missions are less likely to be implemented when conflicts end with a victory of one side over the other(s). Fortna’s finding is important for this study as it is likely that conflict cessations that occur as a result of victory are also less likely to result in the implementation of PCPR processes. Fortna also finds that after the end of the Cold War, the presence of a peacekeeping mission greatly reduces the likelihood of renewed conflict, meaning that peacekeeping can be effective for maintaining post-conflict peace. More recently, Kathman and Wood (2016) have found that increased numbers of peacekeeping troops are effective in reducing violence against civilians. Their study, which uses data from civil wars in Africa during the period 1992-2010, also shows that higher numbers of UN observers (as opposed to peacekeeping troops) actually increases violence directed at civilians.

Although this research focuses on post-conflict peacebuilding, it is of interest to also consider the growing body of literature that examines the role of peacekeeping/building during ongoing conflicts. Hultman (2012) finds that during the period 1989-2006, UN peacekeeping operations were more likely to be implemented in conflicts with high levels of violence against civilians. It has also been found that the presence of a peace operation is associated with higher levels of violence against civilians (by rebel groups), and that only UN peace operations mandated for the protection of civilians are effective in reducing such violence (Hultman, 2010). In addition, research shows that where the UN commits more military and police forces to peacekeeping, violence against civilians is reduced (Hultman, Kathman & Shannon, 2013).

As outlined above, there is a considerable amount of existing quantitative research on post-conflict peace and peacebuilding. However there are at present no existing studies that test the relationship between the implementation of post-conflict police reform programs, or SSR programs more broadly, and post-conflict peace. This research is part of a growing movement towards further refining and disaggregating the mechanisms of peacebuilding. In this case: the role of local ownership in post-conflict police reform, and its effects on post-conflict peace.

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8 It should be noted that peacebuilding missions are often much broader and more comprehensive than just peacekeeping. In practice, peacebuilding missions can include economic and institutional development, justice and reconciliation processes, the provision of basic services and support for safety and security (United Nations, 2012).
2.2 Post-conflict Police Reform

The bulk of existing research on post-conflict police reform is case study orientated, focuses on best practices (Mani, 1999; Celador, 2005) and ‘lessons learned’ (Neild, 2001; Call, 2002), or exists within the broader literature on security sector reform (SSR). Prominent areas of study include the Solomon Islands (Den Heyer, 2010; Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007), Kosovo (Crossley-Frolick & Dursun-Ozkanca, 2012; Gray & Strasheim, 2016), Haiti (Donais, 2005; Walby & Monaghan, 2011; Donais & Burt, 2015), Northern Ireland (Ellison, 2007; Bayley, 2008), and Sierra Leone (Krogstad, 2012; Charley & M’Cormack, 2012). Furthermore, much of the existing case study literature focuses on specific aspects or dimensions of reform processes. Dinnen and Peake (2013) for example, examine community policing in Bougainville, while Charley and M’Cormack (2012) compare different components of police reform in Sierra Leone, and Bacon (2015) looks at the representation of women in the Liberia National Police (LNP) in relation to gender based sexual violence. Bacon finds that although trust in the police has improved, weak capacity and a lack of technical resources have severely hampered the progress made by the LNP. This is different to Ellison, who in writing about the implementation of the Independent Policing Commission recommendations (for police reform) in Northern Ireland, finds that while institutional progress had improved, facets such as police legitimacy and trust have not advanced enough for the police to meaningfully impact positive peace.

These conflicting findings are demonstrative of one of the most significant limitations of single case study research. Though it provides insight into how different areas of police reform impact post-conflict peace, the results are not generalizable across cases, a problem that is compounded given that different studies focus on different aspects of police reform. Moreover, much of the single case study research is neither systematic nor replicable, as it is based on the authors’ interpretations of the cases. For example, in their study on Sierra Leone Charley and M’Cormack (2012) discuss both ‘successful’ and ‘unsuccessful’ reform tactics, and conclude that the process has been “largely successful”. However, ‘success’ is not explicitly conceptualised or operationalised, the selection process of interviewees is not transparently conveyed, and the authors do not make clear how or why they chose the ‘successful’ and ‘unsuccessful’ aspects of the reform process that they include.

In addition to the individual case studies, there are also small-N comparative studies that examine post-conflict police reform. Most of this work focuses on the disconnect between what reforms are meant to achieve in theory, and what is realised in practice (Bayley, 2008). Works by Rauch and Van der Spuy (2006), Stodiek (2006), O’Neil (2005), Dinnen and Peake (2015) and Goldsmith and Dinnen (2007) highlight this tension. Rauch and Van der Spuy (2006, p. 9) look at trends in police reform in 14 post-conflict states in Africa as a
means of identifying “good practices and lessons learned”, Stodiek (2006) focuses on ethnic integration practices implemented by the OSCE in Kosovo, South Serbia and Macedonia, and O’Neil (2005) examines the involvement of the United Nations Development Program and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations using descriptive information from 19 cases including Albania, Indonesia and Somalia. The majority of these literatures (Rauch & Van der Spuy, 2006; Stodiek, 2006; O’Neil, 2005) are however limited by the fact that they are policy papers, and based on the authors’ interpretations. They do not represent instances of systematic comparative research on post-conflict police reform, something that is lacking in the field. While Rauch and Van der Spuy (2006) provide considerable descriptive information on their selected cases, the authors acknowledge that the cases were selected largely based on feasibility and the availability of source materials. Moreover, they offer no methodological section or discussion of how they chose the cases, collected the information, drew their conclusions, and the implications for inference.

To my knowledge, there is at present only one existing large-N study on post-conflict police reform. The Police Reforms in Peace Agreements dataset (Ansorg, Haass & Strasheim, 2016) looks at the provision of police reform programs in peace agreements. The initial release of the data provides several avenues for future research on the subject, though it is restricted to police reform in peace agreements. The authors also acknowledge that police reform has so far, only been addressed in qualitative research.

An additional yet significant portion of the literature on post-conflict police reform exists within the broader research on security sector reform (SSR). Prominent studies include those by Peake and Scheye (2008), Chanaa (2002), Jackson (2011), Toft (2010a), Knight (2009), Bernabéu (2007), and Nathan (2007). While the more comprehensive focus is understandable given that police reform is often implemented as part of SSR efforts, it has effectively limited the depth and scope of research on post-conflict police reform in particular. This is because these studies most often focus on the SSR process overall, as opposed to specific facets or components of it. It is also worth noting that areas such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (see, Theidon, 2009; Dyck, 2011; Wilén, 2012; Phayal, Khadka & Thye 2015), and to a lesser extent military reform (see, Nilsson & Söderberg Kovacs, 2013; Schnabel & Ehrhart, 2005), have received considerably more attention than police reform within the research on SSR.

Finally, and perhaps most important for this study, there is no existing large-N research that I am aware of, that considers the implications of post-conflict police reform processes, such as how it effects peace. Scholars including Call (2002, p. 100) acknowledge this shortcoming, stating that there is an “absence of serious data on the impact of police
reforms”. This shortcoming places several limitations on our knowledge. First, it is unclear how the implementation of post-conflict police reform programs impacts peace and security overall. Seeing that no existing studies look at cases where there was no police reform, there is a considerable knowledge gap concerning how PCPR impacts post-conflict peace, as compared to countries without PCPR. In effect, there is no baseline of comparison. And while it is fine to compare cases against an ideal type of ‘success’, this method does not consider how good or bad post-conflict peace would have been had PCPR not been implemented. Second, several police-related programs, such as community policing, have become increasingly implemented in post-conflict environments. However, how programs like these affect the quality of policing, and/or post-conflict stability and security is unclear.

The sections below illustrate the results of some of the case based research and ‘best-practices’ papers as they relate to post-conflict police reform. The sections are designed to show some of the types of research questions that have been investigated in the field, and to demonstrate the breadth of case based research in the field. While these studies collectively face inferential problems as illustrated above, they offer many theoretical insights that are drawn upon in later chapters. Specifically, the sections that follow touch upon the purpose or aim of PCPR, the recruitment and training of new police officers and staff, the institutional reforms that take place, and the oversight mechanisms that are (theoretically) improved and/or installed during reform processes.

2.2.1 Purpose
The implementation of post-conflict police reform is most often justified by the insecurity and criminality that characterize many post-conflict states, and because civilians often face a greater threat of violence in the immediate aftermath of war than during the conflict itself (Call & Stanley, 2008; Neild, 2001). A police force is also the most visible arm of a government within society, and the means through which police discharge their duties directly impacts public perceptions and confidence in government, as well as national peacebuilding efforts (Celador, 2005; Mani, 1999). In addition, where civilian trust is low, insecurity is exacerbated rather than ameliorated by corrupt and incapable police services (Goldsmith, 2002 & 2005; Sannerholm, 2007). In the Solomon Islands, the Royal Solomon Islands Police were involved in torture, arbitrary shootings and executions even before the conflict began in 1998, and Haiti’s National Police is considered a breeding ground for armed groups, and a source of insecurity (International Crisis Group, 2011). In addition, because police are often “central to the dynamics of conflict,” their reform is also argued to be an important conflict prevention measure (Ellison, 2007: 244).

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9 The recent publication of data by Ansorg, Haass & Strasheim (2016) provides the single caveat to that.
2.2.2. Recruitment

The recruitment of new police officers and administrative staff are two of the most common facets of PCPR, and are seen as a means of ‘wiping the slate clean’, so to speak. However, there is contention regarding how recruitment should be done, and who should be recruited into a reformed (or new) police service. Both Ellison (2007) and Celador (2005) contend that under the ideals of ‘democratic policing’, police institutions should be representative of the societies they exist in, which they argue, impacts legitimacy and minority relations. That being said, police recruitment into a new or reformed service is difficult in any society, let alone one that is emerging from war. It is also theorized that education and personnel standards, and the recruitment of former combatants must be taken into account in the design and implementation of reform programs (Bacon, 2015; Padurariu, 2014; Glebbeek 2001).

Although scholarship is limited, the recruitment of women has been found to positively increase public perception of police. Kosovo is a notable case that has benefited from enlarged female participation, and it is also a case where increased ethnic representation (in the police) has improved public trust (Stodiek, 2006). One of the most ‘successful’ cases of religious integration took place in Northern Ireland. The integration effort has increased Catholic representation in the police service to 30%, and has spurred positive public approval ratings (Bayley, 2008).

Conversely, it has also been found that police officers from visible minority groups can face discrimination within police institutions, especially when filling minority quotas leads to job losses. The United Nations’ minority recruitment policy in Bosnia Herzegovina arguably exacerbated identity issues, and had a counterproductive effect on police development and professionalization (Celador, 2005; Mühlmann, 2008). More large-N studies on recruitment strategies may shed light on the mixed findings observed in this case study literature.

It has been found that the application of education standards to police recruitment helps to expedite training programs, and it is also shown to increase civilian trust in the police (Call & Stanley, 2008; Neild, 2001; Goldsmith, 2005). Rauch and van der Spuy (2006: 100) support this assertion, and note that the reform effort in Namibia was slowed because many recruits lacked the skills needed to perform “basic administrative tasks”.

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10 By 2004, 10% of the Kosovo Police Service identified as ethnically Serb, and a further 6% identified as another ethnic minority (Stodiek, 2006).
11 Prior to reform only 8% of police officers were Catholic, although 44% of the population was (2008).
The literature also raises the question of who should not be able to join or continue service, a dilemma based on the principle that individuals who committed human rights abuses during the conflict cannot legitimately serve as police officers.\textsuperscript{12} Theoretically, their involvement is seen as a poor demonstration of resolve (to peacebuilding) on the part of government, and observations from Haiti and Kosovo support this notion (Call, 2003).\textsuperscript{13} In Namibia, almost 3000 former combatants gained employment in the newly constructed police force, however the impact of their inclusion is debated (Rauch & van der Spuy, 2006).

\textbf{2.2.3 Training}

Post-conflict police education and training is expensive, lengthy, and arduous. Jarman (2004) found that in Northern Ireland, education and training led to lower rates of police brutality, and subsequently increased public confidence. However, the financial, staffing and time constraints of international actors often hamper training efforts, and can lead to personnel being deployed with less knowledge and training than desirable (Call, 2003; Neild, 2001). In Uganda, budgetary and time issues resulted in there being no pre-approved police-training program, which Mushumeza (2008: 14) argues led to a shortage of “properly trained and equipped police officers”.

Practically speaking, ‘police trainers’ often come from diverse backgrounds and different policing cultures, which makes coherent reforms difficult to implement (Sedra, 2010). This observation raises the dilemma that while extensive international assistance is required to train and educate police, it is possible that more actors will decrease the harmony and cohesion of the reforms implemented. In examining police reform in Haiti, Donais (2005) finds that the coherence and coordination between international actors broke down as more actors became involved, and that this had a detrimental impact on training. Although it will be discussed more explicitly in the section on external involvement here below, the literature has not yet examined if and how the volume of external actors/donors involved impacts reform outcomes.

Specialized human rights training for police officers has also been identified as a key instrument for ‘good’ policing, and as such as become a regular feature of police reform processes. The reform effort in Northern Ireland was critiqued early on for being too focused on technical skills, as opposed to human rights, and later saw the introduction of

\textsuperscript{12} In Haiti, Guatemala and El Salvador, external assistance has been shown to add transparency to the documentation of past abuses, and in relation to the screening of new applicants (Neild, 2001).
\textsuperscript{13} Reforms were disrupted when security officials were accused of having committed human rights violations during their respective conflicts.
the human rights focused CAPRA training model developed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Bayley, 2008). However, human rights violations by police are not caused by ignorance of the law, and training alone may not suffice. Several notable scholars argue that training must be carried out in tandem with exercises that bring the police closer to the general population in a positive way, in addition to the creation of oversight bodies (Mani, 1999). Although there is general acceptance that capacity enhancement and human rights training are ‘good’, comparative analysis of different police training activities in post-conflict settings may enable external actors to gain a better understanding of what works and what does not.

2.2.4 Institutional Reform
Analogous to other peacebuilding mechanisms, police reform often faces strong internal opposition from domestic actors who view it as a zero-sum game because of the gains they’ve made prior to or during conflict (Mani, 1999; Stenning & Shearing, 2005). In examining the PCPR program in Haiti, Donais (2005) argues that too much emphasis was placed on the technical facets of policing, and that the failure of the UN to deal with political issues was one of the major causes of the program’s breakdown. Bosnia-Herzegovina provides a similar case in that although policing skills were improved, police reform was impaired because the UN and the EU failed to deal with “fundamental political interests in the policing system” (Mühlmann, 2008: 39). Similarly, the International Crisis Group (2005) notes that the police in Republika Srpska act in accordance to the will of their “political masters”, as opposed to working in line with their mandated responsibilities. Though the significance of de-politicization has only been highlighted in select cases, it demonstrates the importance of international actors approaching police reform with more comprehensive programming goals and long-term objectives, in order to help mitigate some of the associated political issues (ICG, 2005: 2).

2.2.5 Oversight
Evidence suggests that both internal and external police oversight mechanisms can help ensure accountability and discipline, and also increase public trust in police (O’Neil, 2005). It has also been found that oversight can improve police effectiveness and performance (Call, 2003), and that without effective oversight, recruitment and training make little difference to the quality of policing (Neild, 2001; Bayley, 2008; Özerdem & Lee, 2016). It has been identified that the police reform process in Timor-Leste, which has faced considerable setbacks, required extensive oversight strengthening in order to be successful (UNSC, 2006a; Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007). Conversely, the police reform

14 Officers in the Policia Nacional Timor-Leste (PNTL) fired on crowds in April 2006, and there were irregularities in the issuing of police weaponry and uniforms to civilian groups (UNSC, 2006b).
program in Northern Ireland called for the creation of four primary oversight mechanisms.\textsuperscript{15} Oversight can take shape in a variety of ways such as through the creation of internal review boards, regional councils, ombudspersons, the media and civil society involvement (Call, 2003). Although much of the literature touches on the fact that oversight mechanisms may play a key role in the outcome of reform efforts, and therefore post-conflict peace, comparative research on different types of oversight (internal vs. external, public vs. private) may provide increased understanding of which oversight mechanisms are best suited to different contexts.

Operational reforms such as changes to uniforms, vehicles, and the name of police structures (from ‘force’ to ‘service’) are also argued to have positive effects on the perception of police. Examples of these aesthetic changes can be seen in several cases of post-conflict police reform including Northern Ireland and South Africa (Ellison, 2007; Van Der Spuy, 2000).

The sections above illustrate the general state of the literature on post-conflict police reform, focusing on how the research has progressed, while also highlighting its shortcomings and avenues for future research. Although the existing literature on post-conflict police reform is limited, and tends to focus on single case studies and policy reports, it does provide some insight into the efforts and impacts of various reform initiatives in particular environments. However, and as previously discussed, the field suffers from a lack of large-N comparative examination. Notably, if and how the implementation of post-conflict police reform impacts post-conflict peace in general, is unclear.

2.3 Community Policing & Female Representation
Community policing programs, and programs aimed at increasing the representation of women in the police, are two of the most often-implemented components of post-conflict policing. However they are both relatively under-researched at present. The existing literature on community policing programs implemented in post-conflict environments consists mainly of single case studies. Some of the recent studies include those by Koci and Gjuraj (2016), and Deljkić and Lučić-Ćatić (2011).\textsuperscript{16} Koci and Gjuraj (2016) look at the relationship between community policing and human rights in Albania. The authors, who

\textsuperscript{15} These included a policing board, district (policing partnership) boards, an Office of the Police Ombudsman, and a commissioner for covert law enforcement (Ellison, 2007). The author further notes that the relatively low cost and ease of implementation makes said oversight mechanisms easily transferrable to other contexts.

\textsuperscript{16} There is also some existing literature that looks at community policing during conflict (see e.g., Bayley & Perio, 2010; Friesendorf, 2013), as well as in non-conflict affected areas (see, e.g. Murphy, 2005)
conducted interviews with police officers, local government officials and policing experts, find that community policing has not had any positive effect on crime reduction. They do however concede that Albania’s community policing program has positively influenced police legitimacy and respect for human rights. Research by Deljkić and Lučić-Čatić (2011) provides another snapshot of community policing in the Balkans. The authors look at post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina and conclude that its community policing program suffers because many officers do not yet perceive “community trust and confidence” as “prerequisites for effective policing”, and instead opt for more traditional and reactive approaches in the field.

The bulk of existing literature that considers the representation of women in the police is policy orientated. This includes reports by the North-South Institute (2011), and Denham (2008) for the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. There is at present very little academic research that looks at female representation programs in relation to either policing or police reform. One exception is Bacon (2012), who looks at the representation of women in the Liberia National Police, and the implications of their representation on combatting sexual and gender based violence. As previously mentioned, Bacon finds that the increased representation of women was a key driver for improving overall trust in the police. There is however considerably more research on the role of women in other aspects of peacebuilding and democratization, such as parliamentary representation (see, Yoon, 2013), and the effects of having female peacekeepers (see, Karim & Beardsley, 2013; Sion, 2009).

While there are several noteworthy gaps in the literatures on community policing and female representation programs, the most relevant for this study pertains to the lack of large-N comparative research. While it appears that several post-conflict states have introduced community policing and female representation programs, there is uncertainty regarding the general implications they have had on post-conflict peace.

2.4 External Actor Involvement
The design, implementation, and management of post-conflict police reform often requires significant donor assistance in the form of technical guidance, equipment and infrastructure, and the influx of cash. Because of these material and financial costs, international involvement in post-conflict police reform – as well as peacebuilding more generally – is often viewed as a practical inevitability (Blume, 2008). The literature that explores the involvement of external actors in post-conflict police reform is, however, limited. It is primarily driven by individual case studies, and it also tends to focus more on overall security sector reform processes, as opposed to police reform in particular. The individual
case study orientation is problematic because it limits the generalizability of the findings. Many of the studies also suffer from a lack of replicability. For example, Gbla (2006) reviews ‘successes and failures’ of the SSR process in Sierra Leone, touching on the DDR program, police reform, parliamentary oversight and national security policy coordination among others. While the piece takes a comprehensive look at Sierra Leone’s SSR process, the methodological underpinning used to make these inferences is not clear, and the conclusions made are seemingly based on ad hoc and subjective observations of a select number of reform facets. For example, the author states that the reform process has lead to improved efficiency (of the Sierra Leone Police) in containing riots, civil unrest, and domestic violence, but he does not illustrate how these conclusions were made, or if other possible explanations were considered. In addition, the macro focus on SSR processes can allow authors to highlight certain facets of the reform process that line up more with their own expectations, as opposed to painting a more objective and accurate picture of the reforms. As a result of these shortcomings, there is a distinct knowledge gap regarding how the involvement of external donors, such as the United Nations and the European Union, impacts post-conflict police reform. And due to the limitations within the existing research, the bulk of the literature that is drawn upon in this section and in the theoretical framework, is taken from broader field of security sector reform.

Prominent studies that do look at external involvement in SSR include those by Mendelson-Forman (2006), Fitz-Gerald (2004), Loden (2007), Vetschera & Damian (2006), Gbla (2006), Sedra (2006), Abatneh and Lubang (2011), and Narten (2008). Mendelson-Forman (2006) looks at the role and impact of the UN–lead SSR processes in Haiti during the 1990’s. Her findings highlight the poor training that police received (including the lack of human rights training), as well as the lack of coordination between the lead countries as a determinant of failure. Vetschera and Damian (2006) found that international donors largely ignored local actors during the beginning stages of Bosnia’s reform process, and that success was only achieved once external actors started working more with civil society. It has also been found that under certain conditions, such as in Afghanistan, the international community will often trade off long-term goals for more easily attainable short-term outputs such as completed officer training (Sedra, 2006).

2.4.1 Critiquing External Assistance
Even though the need for donor engagement is well documented, several problematic issues can arise as a result of external involvement in post-conflict police reform. In fact, failed post-conflict police reform (and SSR more generally) is often credited to the inability or unwillingness on the part of external actors. For example, Pouligny (2005: 502) argues that the majority of external actors act as though their arrival is “year zero for the country”, and in turn, fail to consider the contextual and historical realities of the receiving state (see also,
Cooper & Pugh, 2002). It has also been found that when external actors fail to take into account the immediate and long-term security needs of the receiving state and its populous, reforms become unsustainable (Paris, 2004; Barnett & Zürcher, 2009).

Coordination problems between actors (external-external, external-internal), such as in relation to their roles/influence within reform processes, have been observed in several cases including Timor-Leste, Kosovo and Afghanistan (Law 2006a). Not only do they hinder the implementation of coherent reforms, they can also lead to disjointed security institutions, and in certain cases, result in external actors being at odds with intended local partners (Ehrhart, Schnabel & Blagescu, 2012; Bryden, 2004; Oosterveld & Galand, 2012; Blume, 2008). In her study on international SSR assistance, Perdomo (2007: 99) notes that in the case of Colombia, the EU, Japan, and the UN engaged in “separate small projects” without coordination, which slowed the overall process. That being said, certain organisations/actors have begun to make a concerted effort to ameliorate coordination problems in policy (UN, 2008; OECD, 2007), although the impact on practice has yet to be examined comparatively.

International organisations and donor governments also have different – and sometimes competing – agendas, as well as various areas of expertise (or a lack thereof) and resources at their disposal. The highly internationalized police reform effort in Afghanistan provides an example of this dilemma, where implementation was flawed by problems relating to the division of labour between various actors (Brzoska, 2006).

Finally, external actors function under time, personnel, and financial constraints based on government and donor cycles, and because of these political realities there is often a large focus on reaching quick deliverables as opposed to long-term goal setting. However, the focus on outputs and measurable progress can have negative implications for long-term reform success because they are often arbitrary and superficial (Oosterveld & Galand, 2012; Donais, 2009b). In his assessment of a select number of cases of post-conflict security sector reform (though not comparative), Nathan (2007) asserts that short and long-term goals must be seen as complementary, because long-term success requires short and medium term goals to be met.

It becomes evident upon reviewing the literature on external actor involvement in both police reform and more comprehensive SSR, that there are very few works that look at the impact of external actor involvement across cases, and that there are no existing large-N studies. This is surprising given that many of the more comprehensive SSR processes have included the involvement of several external actors (e.g. Afghanistan, Liberia, Kosovo), and often times this means that different external actors work on specific components of
SSR such as police reform. Moreover, while some of the existing research (see, Loden, 2007; Mendelson-Forman, 2006) suggests that external involvement has a negative effect on PCPR processes, other studies suggest that external involvement has positive implications (see, Narten, 2008). However, these comparative studies tend to examine cases that ‘received’ external donor assistance, as opposed to comparing cases that received reforms with those that did not. This is problematic given that there is no baseline for what would have happened without external involvement. This study aims to help fill these considerable gaps in the existing research, which limit our knowledge on external actor involvement in post-conflict police reform processes.

2.5 Local Ownership
This section examines the existing research that links local ownership and post-conflict police reform, as well as security sector reform and peacebuilding more generally. Specifically, this section focuses on the research pertaining to how local ownership is conceptualised, as well as the literature that discusses the implementation of local ownership in police reform and other peacebuilding practices.

Within the existing research, local ownership is often touted as being necessary for post-conflict security reforms to positively impact peace and security. The UN (2010: 9) has described local ownership as “an imperative, an absolute essential, if peacebuilding is to take root”, and four of its 10 guiding principles of security sector reform (SSR) are based on local ownership (UN, 2008). Conversely, local ownership is also considered one of the most significant challenges facing external involvement in post-conflict peacebuilding processes, and there is a considerable body of best practices and policy literature that cites the lack of local ownership as a primary reason for failed security reforms (OECD, 2007; Nathan, 2007). In both theory and practice, the concept of local ownership raises questions regarding the competency and will of the actors involved – both local and external – as well as concerns over state sovereignty.

There is at present very little research that explicitly links local ownership to post-conflict police reform. Instead, it is more often examined in relation to SSR or peacebuilding (see, Donais, 2008; Özerdem & Lee, 2015). Moreover, there has been little effort to effectively measure and compare local ownership across cases or countries of observation (Donais, 2009a & 2012; Nathan, 2007; Özerdem & Lee, 2015). These shortcomings illustrate the theoretical and practical confusion that exists. In discussing post-conflict SSR, Panarelli (2010, p. 3) argues that local ownership is “difficult to define, but even more difficult to measure.” Because of the lack of large-N comparative research, the implications of local ownership for post-conflict peacebuilding processes, as well as post-conflict peace and
security are undetermined. Large-N comparative research on local ownership may further advance the field by identifying variables that link local ownership of post-conflict police reform to post-conflict peace and security more generally.

More transparent and replicable conceptualizations of local ownership, as well as means of measuring it, would greatly improve the present state of academic scholarship (see also, Özerdem & Lee, 2015). It could for example allow us to more accurately compare local ownership across cases of PCPR, or to test whether the ownership of certain groups (e.g. civil society) impacts post-conflict peace differently than the ownership of others. Improved conceptualizations of local ownership may also have substantive implications for how police reform processes are implemented on the ground. For many scholars and practitioners, local ownership remains something to strive for as opposed to a practical objective that can be achieved (Reich, 2006; Mobekk, 2010). It is also contended that “full local ownership” is almost impossible to have early on, and that it must be developed over time (Hansen, 2008: 43).

2.5.1 Defining the term
The term ‘local ownership’ suffers from conceptual and operational opaqueness. Some scholars describe local ownership as something that must exist if reforms are to be reflective of the society in which they are implemented and sustainable in the long-term, while others assume that true local ownership can never be achieved so long as the international community ‘intervenes’ in peacebuilding and stabilization activities in the first place (see, Richmond, 2012). To put it simply, different scholars think of local ownership in different ways; some advocate for an ideal type of local ownership, while others espouse more pragmatic conceptualizations. Donais (2009a) offers a more practical and moderate conceptualization, referring to local ownership as the extent to which local actors control the design and implementation of reforms. Conversely, Nathan (2007: 4) provides a more hard-line conceptualization, asserting that reforms must be entirely “shaped and driven by local actors” for local ownership to be realised. The latter more maximalist conceptualization argues that local ownership can only be achieved “when local actors control all peacebuilding initiatives and external actors assume only advisory roles” (Özerdem & Lee, 2015). The lack of conceptual clarity is somewhat understandable given the complexities of post-conflict peacebuilding, as well as the sheer number of local (and external) actors involved. Upon reviewing the existing literature it also becomes noticeable that local ownership is most often conceptualized and studied in relation to the quality or amount of engagement that local actors have in reform or peacebuilding processes. And while this more standard conceptualization is valuable for capturing the ‘depth’ of local ownership, it may be useful to first consider the ‘breadth’ of local actor engagement, or the range of actors involved.
In theory, local ownership reduces polarizations between security institutions, political authorities, and civil society (Bryden, 2004). It is also argued that local ownership is needed to obtain or build consensus on what reform projects should entail, and to ensure the legitimacy and sustainability of reforms (Brzoska & Heinemann-Grüder, 2004; Stiglitz, 1998). However, there are no existing comparative studies that examine the impact of ownership (or a lack thereof) on the outcomes of post-conflict police reform; and as Donais notes, there is in fact no reason to believe that “greater local ownership (of SSR) will actually lead to improved security” (Donais, 2009b: 120). Donais makes this argument based on the assumption that local actors often lack the cohesion, commitment and capacity to engage in long-term structural reforms, and because there is no way that donors can have “sufficient control over the uses, and potential abuses” that their assistance enables. This contention, that we do not know whether local ownership actually leads to improved security, illustrates one of the largest gaps within the current post-conflict peacebuilding scholarship, and it highlights the need for more comprehensive empirical research.

In addition to debates regarding the definition of local ownership, discussions regarding who ‘local owners’ are or should be are also underdeveloped in the literature, even though it is a question of fundamental importance. It is difficult to fully understand local ownership the ‘locals’ that could potentially ‘own’ the reforms being implemented are left undefined. Historically, there has been a distinct focus on political elites as being representative of the ‘local’, although the majority of scholars describe this as ‘national’ rather than ‘local’ ownership. Fortunately, scholars and practitioners have recently moved towards a more comprehensive view of the local in relation to peacebuilding and the implementation of security reforms (Gordon, 2014; Donais, 2015; Donais, 2008). It is commonplace now for civil society to be included in discussion on local ownership, and in many instances the definition also includes non-state actors (Scheye, 2009; Martin & Wilson, 2008). Having said that, what is missing from the literature is research that compares the efficacy of different local actors as owners. This shortcoming is in addition to research that examines the effects of local ownership more generally. It is plausible that executive ownership of police reform may in fact be more meaningful for achieving peace and security related objectives than for example, the ownership of non-state actors such as rebel groups.

2.6 Ownership in Practice
In its transition from theory to practice, a spectrum of approaches to implementing ‘local ownership’ has emerged. The more narrow minimalist approach focuses on governments and security elites, whereas more maximalist approached tends to encompass ownership for
a “broader cross-section of society” (Mobekk, 2010: 231). While the maximalist conceptualization of local ownership is touted in academic and policy literature, it is understandably more challenging to implement in practice. This shortcoming is most often attributed to factors such as limited resources, disregard for local actors, and poor planning on the part of external actors (Nathan, 2008). The political and fiduciary responsibilities of external actors (often to democratic constituents) also make it difficult for them to relinquish control over reform programs, which in turn further stifles the development of local ownership (Scheye, 2009). In fact, Hansen (2008) asserts that the term ‘ownership’ creates unrealistic expectations of influence and participation that are almost impossible to meet in reality.

While touched upon in a limited number of works (see, Hansen, 2008; Brzoska, 2003; Panarelli, 2010), ‘how’ local ownership is fostered in post-conflict settings is largely absent in existing literature. Specifically, there is not yet a sense of the variation in local ownership – as it pertains to PCPR – across cases, seeing as it has not yet been measured. It is likely that some cases realise the more maximalist conceptualization of local ownership on the ground, while others are close to the minimalist. This shortcoming again highlights the need for more rigorous and systematic research that compares the breadth of local ownership and its implications for peace and security in post-conflict settings.

Within the literature on post-conflict police reform and external involvement as it pertains to PCPR, discussions regarding local actors and their conceptualization are rare. One notable exception is Wilén and Chapaux (2011), who conducted interviews in Liberia and Burundi in order to tease out how the term ‘local actors’ is operationalised by UN personnel on the ground (in their SSR/DDR processes). The authors, who conducted interviews between 2007-2010, found that many of the UN personnel operationalised ‘local actors’ heterogeneously, and often grouped governmental actors with civil society representatives. They also found that the background of the UN personnel impacted their collaboration with others, and that more long-term and robust projects had a greater impact on local engagement. However Wilén and Chapeaux’s findings are based on two countries, and cannot be generalized across cases. As previously mentioned, the lack of empirical research that operationalizes local actors in a replicable and transportable way across post-conflict peacebuilding programs is problematic. Comparative research that examines the ownership of different local actors may provide further insight into how local ownership is best achieved, and subsequently, under what conditions it can have the greatest impact on post-conflict peace and security.

The literature regularly emphasizes the importance of context specific reforms based on local political, structural, and historical knowledge (Edmunds, 2002; Mobekk, 2010). The
argument carries that because local actors such as politicians and civil society representatives are more knowledgeable about the context, and aware of public interest, their input is more important in post-conflict environments – especially where public opinion has been oppressed (Pouligny, 2009). Further, Nathan (2007) claims that in practice, local actor involvement can increase the transparency of the reforms through civilian oversight and media, and help promote accountability.

It is important acknowledge that local actor involvement in post-conflict police reform can also be problematic. Both Hansen (2008) and Nathan (2008), point out that shortfalls relating to the willingness, legitimacy and capacity of local actors/owners can derail reform efforts. Oosterveld and Galand (2012) also touch on this by pointing out that conflict and insecurity are often caused by a lack of local capacity (and oversight) needed to manage security and justice needs in the first place. Moreover, it is worth noting that certain local actors (or spoilers) will have a vested interest in derailing the implementation and sustainability of the reforms (Ehrhart, Schnabel & Blagescu, 2002). To mitigate this, Hänggi (2004) argues that ideally, local actors who played a role in the conflict cannot be involved in security reform processes such as of the police, for reasons of credibility and legitimacy.

In addition, without external involvement and/or oversight, post-conflict security reforms may simply re-instil the same or similar inequalities or misrepresentations (unintentional or not) that existed prior to the outbreak of conflict. These dilemmas further highlight the challenge that external actors face in deciding which ‘local owners’ to support and/or engage with during reform programs. Again, comparative research that considers the types of local actors engaged with during police reform processes may provide insight on how best to achieve local ownership, and subsequently, post-conflict peace and stability. A study by Nilsson (2012) supports the importance of research that looks at the inclusion of local actor engagement in peacebuilding. The author looks at the inclusion of civil society actors in post-conflict peace agreements, and finds through statistical analysis that their inclusion increases the durability of peace. She also finds that the inclusion of civil society has a particularly acute effect on prospects for peace in non-democratic societies.

The local ownership debate also raises an important question regarding the implementation and/or imposition of international norms and standards versus local customs and traditions (Oosterveld & Galand, 2012; Stromseth, 2008; Wulf, 2011). Namely, how do local norms and customs best intersect with externally driven peacebuilding processes, which are driven by international regulations and laws regarding security institutions? This is an important

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17 Hansen & Wiharta (2007) raise a similar point.
question because as Panarelli (2010) points out, it is possible that the promotion of local standards risks over-emphasizing the importance of norms that may actually conflict with international standards, and more importantly, basic human rights. The reverse can also be true in that international standards and laws will not always be comprehensible in environments with different cultures and social norms. This disconnect is especially contentious with regards to police training, of which there are several different models that can easily be at odds with local policing mechanisms and traditions.

2.7 Conclusions
This chapter has identified several shortcomings within the existing research on both post-conflict police reform and local ownership. As highlighted throughout the chapter, individual case studies make up the bulk of the literature at present. While these studies have provided a significant knowledge base, the lack of comparative research has limited the generalizability of the findings. These gaps are especially apparent when it comes to large-N comparative research, of which there is only one on police reform – though it focuses on implementation rather than on impact – and none on local ownership. Much of the existing research on both post-conflict police reform and local ownership is also not replicable, and is based on the authors’ interpretations of lessons learned rather than on systematic analysis. Moreover, the bulk of existing qualitative literature conceptualizes local ownership, and more specifically the aspect of engagement, in relation to its depth, which highlights the relative lack of research on the breadth of engagement, or the types of local actors engaged in PCPR. It may be fruitful to ‘take a step back’ and first consider the range of local actors that are engaged in PCPR processes, and allow future research to build from this and examine the depth or quality of their engagement.

Existing research suggests that a lack of local ownership can easily and assuredly plague post-conflict police reform efforts, as well as the development of long-term peace and stability. There is also significant debate on how to improve the implementation of local ownership in post-conflict settings, in addition to bigger questions on whether it is possible to have local ownership at all. However, given the state of the current research, it is worth pointing out that these debates are somewhat premature. The impact of post-conflict police reform in general, as well as how local ownership of post-conflict police reform impacts peace, are indeterminate. A review of the existing research on police reform and local ownership illustrates several points of interest. With further investigation into police reform processes, as well as the types of mechanisms used to develop local ownership, it may be possible to address some of the existing shortcomings, and in turn enable external donors to improve the implementation of PCPR in the future.
The following chapter lays out the key concepts used, and presents the theoretical framework that guides this research. It also presents nine hypotheses that will be tested. The first two hypotheses consider the overarching effects of post-conflict police reform and external actor involvement in it. The next five hypotheses consider the breadth of local ownership by examining the effects of four newly developed types of it, as well as variation in it. The final two hypotheses pertain to post-conflict community policing and female representation programs.
3. Theoretical Framework

This chapter presents the theoretical framework that guides this research. First, there is a brief discussion regarding the universe of cases. Next, the key concepts used throughout the study are presented, namely those pertaining to the independent and dependent variables. Then, the theoretical framework that guides this research is presented, along with the nine hypotheses that will be tested. To examine differences in local ownership as it pertains to post-conflict police reform, a new conceptualization of the term has been developed, based on the engagement between four local actors – the executive, parliament, the police and civil society – and external donors.

3.1 The Universe of Cases

Only countries that have experienced intrastate-armed conflict followed by a cessation in hostilities of at least one calendar year are included in the universe of cases. It is also possible that a conflict can reoccur during the period of observation or that a new intrastate conflict will erupt, meaning that a country can have multiple post-conflict spells. Moreover, while countries that have not experienced civil war also implement police reforms – many people have called for police reform in the United States (Rhodan, 2016) – post-conflict states are of particular interest. This is because police reform programs in post-conflict states are more likely to include external donor actors (O’Neill, 2005; Eckhard, 2016, Bieber, 2010), which in turn raises the issue of ownership.

3.2 The Key Concepts

3.2.1 Post-conflict Police Reform

There is no single or overriding model of what police reform is – what it consists of, how it is carried out, or who implements it. This is because police reform comes in a variety of forms, and the conditions under which it is implemented are often different. The involvement of external donors further increases the complexity of PCPR seeing that they operate under various geopolitical constraints. Most external donor organisations must also

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18 Within the existing literature, police reform is most often conceptualised by the context in which it is prescribed (e.g. post-conflict), the reform components implemented, and/or the goals of the reforms.
answer to their constituencies, which have their own stakes in the reform outcomes. These facets can create an environment where outcomes are prioritized over processes, meaning that programming goals such as the number of police recruited and trained take precedence over the quality of the recruits, and the training they receive. Within the broader framework of security sector reform (SSR), the process of implementing police reform has been described as ‘highly political’ because it provides an unparalleled opportunity for those involved to assert political influence, and because of the sensitivity that often shrouds policing and security issues (UN, 2008b; Chuter, 2008). Building on existing literature (Denham, 2008; UN, 2008; OECD DAC, 2008; Pinc, 2010; GFN-SSR, 2007), police reform is defined as: *the attempted transformation of a state’s police organisation so that it is better able to uphold human rights, and provide greater security for its citizens*. Within this definition, there are three key elements that help me differentiate police reform from non-police reform, as well as from other elements of SSR. First, the conceptualization pertains to ‘attempted’ police reform, whether it is ‘successful’ or not. Second, the target of the reforms is the police, as opposed to other state security actors (e.g. the military). Third, the conceptualization of police reform includes specific goals, namely human rights and the provision of security, so as to exclude other potential reform practices (e.g. the creation of paramilitaries).

The implementation of police reform programs in post-conflict countries is more challenging than in contexts where for instance, reforms are introduced to help curb corruption or to improve community relations. In post-conflict settings police reform must also take into account the legacies of violence that exist. According to Wulf (2011), these include deep societal mistrust, cleavages between groups and the increased availability of weapons and munitions. Moreover, in post-conflict contexts police have “often perpetrated serious human rights violations” and can find themselves ‘removed’ from the societies they are meant to “serve and protect” (O’Neill, 2005: 1). As a result, the provision of basic security becomes fundamental and is of heightened importance in post-conflict settings such as Kosovo, where security forces have been complicit in causing insecurity (Gray & Strasheim, 2016). PCPR efforts must also take into account that there is often a lack of civilian control and oversight over security institutions (O’Neil, 2005; Harris, 2005). Moreover, armed conflict is often severely damaging to infrastructure, which means

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19 For example, police reform in Kyrgyzstan was implemented with the aim of improving relations between the police and local communities, and to bring the police under increased civilian oversight (USAID, 2015; UNODC, 2013).

20 ‘Trust’ is considered an essential component for post-conflict peacebuilding (Svensson & Brounéus, 2013), and for peaceful coexistence in multi-ethnic societies (Varshney, 2002). Conversely, mistrust can play a role in the provocation of armed conflict (Kydd, 2000).
that many post-conflict environments do not have the necessary facilities and infrastructure (e.g. jails, courthouses) to have a functioning policing and security apparatus.

In practice, PCPR processes most often include institutional reforms and training and capacity enhancement programs. Institutional reforms can comprise of changes to recruitment and vetting processes, as well as increased oversight and accountability mechanisms. Changes to recruitment and vetting processes are some of the most commonly implemented facets of post-conflict police reform, with examples such as Mozambique (Rauch and van der Spuy, 2006) and Bangladesh (UNDP). In addition, the implementation or improvement of oversight and accountability mechanisms is considered fundamental for increasing public confidence and trust in police (O’Neil, 2005; Goldsmith, 2005). Sierra Leone’s police reform process, for example, included the establishment of the Police Council as well as strengthening of parliamentary oversight over the police (Republic of Sierra Leone; Bajraktari et al., 2006).

Training and capacity enhancement takes place predominantly through changes to existing training procedures, as well as the addition of new training modules, increased tactical training exercises, classroom teaching, and in many instances, human rights education, as seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Aitchison, 2007). Capacity enhancement can also include support for infrastructural development, such as in Burundi where 17 new police stations were built (Banal and Scherrer, 2009), as well as the provision of technical resources such as computers and forensics equipment, as was the case during Haiti’s police reform process (UNSC, 2006). While these components illustrate ways that reform processes can vary across cases, they are not features that are essential to defining what is and is not police reform.

Conversely, post-conflict police reform does not necessarily include the police receiving military or paramilitary training, or police integration into the military. In addition, while judicial and legal reform processes are often carried out along with police reform processes, they are separate because the institutional target of the reform process is different. One of the most important and debated dimensions upon which post-conflict police reform programs vary is in their extent of ‘local ownership’, which is discussed in the following section.

3.2.2. Local Ownership
Although a buzzword in the post-conflict police reform and peacebuilding literatures, the term ‘local ownership’ is controversial and problematic. At a basic level, local ownership pertains to the influence of local actors over the design and implementation of PCPR. In reality however, local ownership means that the reforms are as “demand driven as possible”,

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and take the socio-economic and political context of the host state and its society into account as much as possible (Brzoska, 2006: 11). For the purposes of this research, local ownership is considered only in relation to the involvement of external actors in PCPR processes. If no external actors are involved, the reforms implemented are de facto locally owned, albeit in many cases by the executive only.21

Understandably, there are varying conceptualizations of local ownership (Donais, 2008b; Richmond, 2012) and they largely relate to differences between more liberal top-down views of peacebuilding, and more communitarian bottom-up views of peacebuilding. The minimalist conceptualization of local ownership stipulates that external donors drive reforms (see, Bendix & Stanley 2008b), albeit with local ‘buy-in’, while the more commonly touted maximalist conceptualization asserts that the reforms must be designed, implemented and managed by locals, albeit with external support (Nathan, 2007). Both conceptualizations however focus on the depth or amount of engagement that local actors have in the reform processes, though according to Lee and Özerdem (2015: 41), neither conceptualization “is fully convincing” on their own.

Local ownership is a multi-dimensional concept that can consist of a number of different elements, including for instance, the engagement between local and external actors during reform processes, and/or the control that local actors have over reform processes. This study focuses on one aspect of local ownership: engagement. More specifically, this study focuses on the engagement between local and external actors. ‘Engagement’ can also be disaggregated in terms of its breadth, as well as its depth or quality. As previously mentioned, the bulk of the existing qualitative literature examines the depth of engagement, or how closely or deeply groups are engaged in a reform process, and its effects on reform outcomes. In moving away from existing research, this study focuses on the breadth of engagement, or the types of groups and actors that are engaged in a reform process. As such, the main variation this research is interested in, pertains to which local actors are engaged in police reform processes at different points in time. For example, though there was considerable executive and police engagement with external actors during the early stages of Serbia’s post-conflict police reform process that began in 2001, civil society was largely excluded until 2004, when the Municipal Safety Councils were developed (OSCE, 2004).

Following the cessation of intrastate conflict, the presence of external actors is often needed for the immediate provision of security and stability. Their involvement is especially

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21 This point also raises the issue of who is ‘local’ when it comes to post-conflict peacebuilding, and what peace means when the term ‘local actors’ is discussed. Conceptualizations of four distinct local actors are presented in the following sections.
important where the state security apparatus has been a cause of insecurity, and while the capacity of local security institutions are being reformed and/or enhanced (Hänggi, 2004; Ball & Hendrickson, 2009). This should not however diminish the role or importance of local actors, and their role as the key decision-makers and primary implementers of reform projects. As a result, this study contends that local ownership is more likely to exist in varying degrees and over time, as opposed to something absolute and zero-sum. Accordingly, I conceptualise local ownership as the engagement of local actors – vis à vis external actors – in the design, implementation and management of a post-conflict police reform programs. ‘No local ownership’ is conceptualised as the lack of engagement between local and external actors as it pertains to the design, implementation and management of a PCPR process. Though this extreme pole of local ownership likely does not exist empirically, it covers very low levels of local ownership where reforms are basically coerced upon the host country.

In order to examine differences in local ownership as it pertains to post-conflict police reform, I examine engagement between external actors and four local actors: the executive, parliament, police and civil society. The types of local ownership, or the breadth of engagement, that I consider range from those that are primarily elite driven via external engagement with the executive, to local ownership that also engages with parliament, the police itself, and civil society. The conceptualization of local ownership has three core concepts: external actors, local actors, and the concept of engagement between local and external actors, it is also necessary for me to further illustrate them. The conceptualizations for ‘external actors’, ‘local actors’, and ‘local-external engagement’ are presented in the subsequent sections.

**External Actors**

External actors have played significant roles in several post-conflict police reform processes including those in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Bosnia and Kosovo. While there are several different types of external actors that can conceivably engage in PCPR, an organisation must meet three criteria to be considered an external actor in this study. First, it must be external to the host state. The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002) for instance defines a ‘state’ as: “either an internationally recognized sovereign government controlling a specified territory, or an internationally unrecognized government controlling a specified territory whose sovereignty is not disputed by another internationally recognized sovereign government previously controlling the same territory”. As such, the organisation in question cannot be an internal state-based actor, or

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22 Pietz and von Carlowitz (2007) examine local ownership as a process and an outcome.
23 This definition is originally from Gleditsch & Ward (1999).
a non-state actor based in the state. For example, if a country’s military were tasked with the implementation of post-conflict police reform, it would not be considered an external actor seeing that it is a state-based institution. On the other hand, the United States, Canada and France are considered external actors in relation to Haiti’s post-conflict police reform process (Donais, 2009c). Second, the actor must be an international or regional governmental organisation, or alternatively, a single, bilateral or group of foreign states. Third, the actor or organisation in question must have an explicit mandate – in whole or in part – regarding the provision of security sector reform (or police reform more explicitly). This requirement removes actors and organisations that do not have mandated and/or operational expertise in police/security reforms, and from this, actors such as religious actors, charitable organisations and general aid donors are excluded. The most common external actors that engage in PCPR are international and regional governmental organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), development agencies such as the World Bank, and individual and coalitions of states.

The term ‘external actors’ is used to delineate the involvement of a broad and diverse typology of actors that engage in post-conflict police reform processes. Many of the external actors that provide assistance to PCPR come with varying institutional mandates, interests, areas of expertise, and resources at their disposal. It is however important to note that there are some factors – including their externality and their mandates – that characterize external actors, and their involvement in post-conflict police reform programs.

The role of external actors in post-conflict police reform is most often related to the provision of technical expertise, assistance, and financial support. This is not to say that all external actors have the same interests and areas of expertise. They will also have different mandates, as well as areas of focus within larger police reform processes, which may in turn lead to them having divergent or competing interests. An example of this is seen in Afghanistan, where the European Union, the United States and Germany have been the largest donors, albeit with additional training programs being implemented by Canada, Italy, and Great Britain. And while each of the donors worked towards improving the capacity of the Afghan National Police, their “differing national policing philosophies and practices” added “another level of confusion to an already bifurcated program” (Perito, 2009: 11).

24 The Charter of the United Nations, for instance, is based on the maintenance of international peace and security.
25 ‘External actors’ is also referred to in the literature with terms such as: external donors, international community, donor community and external assistance providers.
26 This catchall term is also a reflection of the variety of actors, such as IGO’s, INGO’s, individual states, NGO’s and private security companies that engage in post-conflict police reform.
Generally speaking though, by providing support to ‘local’ actors, the aim of external actors is largely to enhance the capacity for national security delivery, as well as the accountability and effectiveness of the police (Law, 2006). Theoretically, external actors also aim to ensure the sustainability of the newly created or reformed police following the conclusion of their involvement (Law, 2006; Martin & Wilson, 2008).

**Local Actors**

The concept of ‘local ownership’ and its variations are dependent on how the term ‘local actors’ is first conceptualised. Within the post-conflict police reform literature, as well as the SSR and peacebuilding literatures, the term ‘local actors’ is often used to cover a diverse group of organisations, agencies and actors. The term ‘local actors’ has been used in previous research to discuss: society at large, civil society and non-governmental organisations, political parties, ethnic and religious groups, business associations and think tanks (see Scheye & Peake 2005, Mobekk 2005, Hansen & Wiharta 2007). However, without properly conceptualizing the term ‘local actors’, it is impossible to explore their involvement in, and the breadth of local actor engagement in PCPR, with empirical rigour.

In order to examine the breadth of local actor engagement, the term ‘local actors’ is broken down into two categories: actors that are part of the government apparatus, and those that are not (non-governmental actors). Distinguishing between local actors and their ownership of the reforms allows me to independently theorise and empirically examine differences in the implications they have on post-conflict peace. It also allows me to examine the breadth of local engagement as something that varies across PCPR programs and over time, as opposed to something that PCPR programs either do or do not have. The first category, which is state-based, includes the executive, parliament, and police personnel – actors that are de jure established and administered by the state. The second category is non-state, and includes civil society.

The executive is conceptualized as the key decision making body of a state, responsible for governance and administration. In practice, the executive includes the head of state and/or government and their cabinet (World Bank, 2016). For example, in Canada the executive consists of the Crown as the Head of State, the Prime Minister as the Head of Government, and the Cabinet (Parliament of Canada, 2016). Actors such as parliament, parliamentary research groups, and civil society are excluded from this conceptualization of the executive.

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27 The terms ‘civil society’, ‘local agents’, ‘local owners’ and ‘civil society actors’ are also used – often interchangeably – with ‘local actors’.
Parliament is conceptualised as the formalized venue within a state where public policy is discussed, debated and decided on; where the laws of the state are made (Wittmann & Weingast, 2008). In theory, parliament serves as a bridge between the executive and society, and provides a forum of public debate over security related issues (Binder, Rhodes & Rockman, 2008). According to Nathan (2007: 40), parliament “approves security legislation and budgets, performs oversight functions in respect of the security services and provides a forum for political parties to deliberate on security policy and activities”. Parliament also provides a check on executive power (ibid). And while not all parliaments will serve these functions entirely, existing research tells us that they still act as a bridge between the executive and society in authoritarian states (Gandhi, 2008). The conceptualization of parliament includes parliament itself, parliamentary committees, security councils and review boards, and parliamentary funded research projects pertaining to security or police reform. Other branches of government including the judiciary are excluded from the conceptualization of parliament.

For the purposes of this research, ‘the police’ is conceptualized as including: high-ranking police officials, civilian administrators, and the officers themselves. The conceptualization of the police does not include parliamentary or executive level police liaisons, or community representatives that work with the police. The police, as a state security actor, are also theoretically subordinate, and answers to both the executive and parliament (Nathan, 2007). It is of course probable that the relationship that police have to both the executive and parliament will vary across types of regimes.

The second category, non-state actors, consists of ‘civil society’. For some (see, Cohen & Arato, 1992), there is no existing theory that is complex enough to fully define civil society, and for others the term is constrained by both history and context (Rosenblum & Post, 2002). However, it is possible to identify some central features of civil society. For example, civil society has throughout modern history been conceptualised as something that exists separately from the state and its institutions, though it may receive support from the state (Hegel, 1991; Gramsci, 1971). Civil society also operates under the rule of law, and is made up of voluntary and associative relations, which make it a sphere for public debate (Setianto, 2007). Civil society is necessary and significant for me to include due to role that it plays in supporting, legitimizing and lobbying for reforms (Bendix & Stanley 2008a). Moreover, civil society is central to the legitimation of a government and its security institutions (Edmunds, 2002), and as such engagement with civil society serves as a reasonable proxy for the more expansive conceptualization of local ownership.

The term ‘civil society’ is often criticized for being vague and difficult to measure (see, Nilsson, 2012). As such, this study restricts the conceptualization to security-related civil
society organisations and local communities. Civil society organisations are formally independent of the state, and they have mandates pertaining to human rights, government and/or security sector oversight, or minority or marginalized group rights. Marginalized groups can include ethnic or religious minorities, women and children, and vulnerable populations. The conceptualization of civil society excludes business associations or trade unions, or external non-governmental organisations, as these organisations do not have mandates related to the provision of security or human rights.

Due to feasibility, as well as the scope of this research, the conceptualization does not fully capture the diversity of civil society within a post-conflict state, nor does it account for the variation in interests, aims and methods of involvement in PCPR. That being said, the aspects of civil society that I focus on are those most relevant to the provision of security. These aspects also allow me to operationalize civil society in the preceding chapter, as external donor actors often state which forms of civil society they engage with. Moreover, the conceptualization of civil society enables me to capture the extent to which external donors move outside of state institutions during the design and implementation of reforms.

The four conceptualizations presented above – the executive, parliament, the police and civil society – are not designed to exclude or devalue the significance of other local actors, but to provide a first, systematic framework for examining the implications of local involvement in post-conflict police reform. Taken together, these four elements of local actors allow me to observe variation in the breadth of local ownership of PCPR across countries, which in turn enables me to quantitatively study its implications for post-conflict peace.

**Local & External Actor Engagement**

In order to develop empirically operational definitions in Chapter 4, this thesis focuses on one aspect of local ownership, the breadth of local actor engagement in reform processes. Engagement between local and external actors can take place across all areas of post-conflict police reform efforts. Ideally, engagement will take place formally within the design and implementation phase of each facet of police reform, as well as in relation to police oversight and accountability.

The relations between external and local actors can be likened to what has previously been referred to as the ‘peacebuilder’s contract’ (Barnett & Zürcher, 2008), in which parties involved often make concessions based on the goals and expectations of others. While much of the early literature on PCPR, as well as on SSR and peacebuilding more generally, discusses the imposition of reforms by external forces, multidirectional dynamics exist
between external and local actors (Narten, 2008) and it is important to consider the agency that locals possess (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013).

This thesis conceptualises local-external engagement as the sustained and institutionalized interaction between local and external actors during and in relation to the reform process. It must also include the formation of a formalized process for engagement between actors. Theoretically, engagement between local and external actors is more likely to lead to decisions that are taken democratically, and under the norm of local input and control, as opposed to simply being dictated or imposed from the outside. It is through engagement that local actors take control over the reforms being implemented, and thus the process and outcomes gain legitimacy (Law, 2006). Engagement between actors also serves as a mechanism for building trust (Allport, 1954), and increasing the legitimacy and strength of a social contract between them and the constituents they serve.

Engagement is realised through three key mechanisms. The first pertains to public consultation and the employment of local staff, the second is through the provision of resources to local civil society organisations, and the third concerns the formal institutions set up for engagement and consolation between actors. Moreover, it is the types of actors that are engaged and/or receive resource provisions that are of significance for this study. In both Timor-Leste and Kosovo it has been argued that the lack of engagement with non-governmental local actors led to “inappropriate and unsustainable solutions” during some stages of their reform processes (Hansen, 2008: 39).

3.2.3 Policing Components
Two often-implemented components of post-conflict police reform programs are also examined: community policing and female representation programs. They are included as independent variables because they have become commonplace within PCPR processes, and more importantly, because they are designed and implemented with the aim of improving local ownership of the police. As will be touched upon in the preceding sections, community policing programs are intended to improve the relationship that local communities have with the police, while female representation programs are meant to improve women’s access to justice, and their overall relationship with police. The following sections touch briefly on the conceptualization of these terms.

Community Policing Programs
In building on existing research (see, Brogden & Nijhar, 2005; Ellison, 2007; Mackenzie & Henry, 2009), community policing is conceptualised as policing that is informed and directed by local community partnerships. “Informed” means that there is an information-
sharing relationship between the police and their communities, and “directed” means that the community is able to share their policing priorities and concerns with police officers. While it will look different depending on the context in which it is implemented, according to Trojanowicz and Bucqureoux (1994) community policing is both a philosophy and an organisational strategy that aims to increase cooperation between police and the communities in which they serve. As such, community policing focuses on problem solving and information sharing with communities in order to both prevent and solve crimes (Blaustein, 2016). The concept of community policing dates back approximately two decades as the general focus of policing globally shifted from an emphasis on crime control and law enforcement to citizen safety and crime prevention (Stenning & Shearing, 2005).

**Female Representation Programs**

I conceptualise female representation (in post-conflict police) as a national program implemented by a police service or national government that aims to increase the representation of women in the police service. The increase in representation must include officer roles in the police, but it can also aim to increase the representation of women in administrative and civilian roles in the police.

Each of the nine explanatory variables included in this study have now been conceptualized: post-conflict police reform, external involvement (in PCPR), local ownership and four types of local ownership based on the engagement between local and external actors (the executive, parliament, the police, and civil society), and two post-conflict policing components (community policing and female representation programs). The following section presents the conceptualization of the dependent variable, post-conflict peace, which is defined by one-sided violence and human rights.

### 3.2.4. Post-conflict Peace

The conceptualization of post-conflict peace focuses on peace and security related measures, as previous research suggests that these are the most meaningful indicators of police effectiveness in post-conflict environments. This focus is based on two main findings in existing literature. First, police are the primary providers of internal security and stability within a given state (Chuter, 2006; Wulf, 2011). Second, police are “the most visible arm of the state in society” (Mani, 1999: 10), and the ways in which they conduct themselves directly impacts the stability of peace, as well as public confidence in the

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28 In some cases, community policing can also include ‘policing’ by civilian members of the community, although that is supplementary to the conceptualization.
quality of peace and governance. Without a functioning police service the transition from conflict to peace is more difficult (ibid).

Post-conflict police reform can also be linked to several macro-level peacebuilding goals such as economic development, democratization and regional integration\(^{29}\), as discussed in the previous chapter, however this study does not consider those aspects as appropriate indicators of the ‘success’ of PCPR for two key reasons. First, they risk over-estimating the actual impact of post-conflict police and other security reforms (Egnell & Haldén, 2009) by assuming, without empirical evidence, that PCPR is linked to broader peacebuilding outcomes (e.g. economic development). Second, the tendency to give failed police reform undue attention may cause policy makers to underestimate its effectiveness as a peacebuilding tool, as was the case with peacekeeping previously (Fortna, 2004).

In post-conflict states in particular, the accountable and effective provision of security through policing is necessary for future conflict prevention and the improvement and maintenance of human rights (Hendrickson & Karkoszka, 2002). Seeing that the primary function of police is the provision of accountable, transparent, and legitimate security, and that this is what most police reform programs set as their benchmark of success, post-conflict peace is conceptualised using two indicators. These indicators are demonstrative of a police service’s ability and, and in some respects will, to provide security. The two indicators this study uses are one-sided violence and human rights. If local ownership is positively related to post-conflict peace, it can be expected that lower levels of one-sided violence and human rights violations will occur.

**One-sided Violence**

One-sided violence is “the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians” (Eck, Sollenberg & Wallensteen, 2004: 136). Seeing that the majority of conflicts since the end of the Cold War have been intrastate and have involved non-state actors, both state and non-state actors –such as the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed in Sudan (Sundberg & Melander, 2013) – can employ one-sided violence. This conceptualization “excludes criminality and personal violence, as well as fatalities caused by general rioting or other types of non-organized social unrest” (Eck & Hultman, 2007: 235).

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\(^{29}\) This comprehensive list is largely based on the fact that PCPR is often instigated as part of larger security sector reform and peacebuilding efforts, and under the assumption that security and development are interlinked (Brzoska, 2003; Schnabel & Farr, 2012; Smith, 2001; Wulf, 2004; Brzoska, 2006).
Previous research indicates that one-sided violence most often takes place in countries that are plagued by civil war. In addition, while more non-state actors commit one-sided violence than governments, governments are on average more deadly perpetrators of OSV (Eck & Hultman, 2007). That is not to say that non-state actors cannot be more deadly than governments in some instances, Shining Path in Peru being an example (Sundberg & Melander, 2013).

**State-based OSV**
The literature on state-based OSV during ongoing-armed conflicts is helpful for explaining why governments perpetrate OSV in post-conflict settings. For instance, autocratic regimes are more likely to kill civilians than democratic regimes (Pape, 2005; Eck & Hultman, 2007). It is expected that the state will engage in OSV when it fears conflict reoccurrence, or when it believes a new conflict may erupt. In such instances, a government may perpetrate one-sided violence in an attempt to weaken the support base of the rebel group, to deter civilian support (Bussmann, 2012), or to dissuade former combatants from picking up arms. Previous studies show that civilian support can shape civil war outcomes (Hultman, 2007; Kalyvas, 2004), and that as a result, both governments and non-state actors try to gain the support of ‘non elites’ (Wood, 2010).30 State-based OSV may also be more likely in contexts where the cessation of hostilities occurs as a result of a ceasefire or peace agreement – seeing that it leaves the rebel group intact – as opposed to a military victory by the state. Governments may also be more ‘trigger happy’ in post-conflict states out of fear of renewed conflict. Because of this fear, it is possible that governments will react quickly and forcibly, if not prematurely, to put down civilian unrest, resistance to the regime, or support for non-state actors. Previous research also shows that pre-emptive repression by the state is possible under certain conditions (Nordås & Davenport, 2013).

**Non-state OSV**
The most likely reason that non-state actors perpetrate OSV in post-conflict settings is to gain concessions (e.g. political power, institutional reforms) from the state. While there may be other avenues available for non-state actors to pursue government concessions, OSV is likely to be used in post-conflict settings because non-state actors are ‘relatively weaker’ than the government (Wood, 2010).31 There are in turn, two capacity-related theories that are useful for explaining why non-state actors perpetrate OSV in post-conflict

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30 Furthermore, Valentino (2014: 94) asserts that civilians play a central and often involuntary role as the underwriters of the “material, financial, and human requisites” of conflict.

31 Many conflict cessations occur as a result of a rebel group being unable to continue the conflict militarily, when cost of further conflict outweighs the expected benefit, or when a respective rebel group is defeated (UCDP).
settings. The first is based on relative military capacity, and the second is based on the capacity to provide goods and services.

Non-state actors who are militarily weaker than the state will turn to OSV when their comparative disadvantage makes it unlikely for them to be able to provide material incentives and/or protection to entice civilian support (Wood, 2010). This is because the “range of strategies” available to non-state actors is reduced when they are relatively weak or in decline (Wood, 2014: 462), and because coercive methods such as violence provide a relatively cheap way to encourage cooperation. This is further supported by recent research by Thomas (2014), which informs us that rebel groups that instigate a greater number of attacks are more likely to gain concessions from governments. Moreover, in some instances the threat of violence or the demonstration of capability may also persuade civilians into supporting a non-state actor (Kalyvas, 2004; Wood, 2003).

Non-state actors are also more likely to engage in one-sided violence in more democratic regimes (Hultman, 2012a). While existing research has so far only explored the relationship between democracy and non-state OSV during conflict (see, Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay, 2004; Wood, 2010), the same linkages may also apply in post-conflict scenarios when non-state actors believe that the conflict will reoccur, or when they seek concessions from the government. In a democracy, the government is dependent on civilian support for legitimacy. If for example, a rebel group is able to impose significant enough costs onto civilians during a post-conflict period, the populous may come to view the regime as weak and incapable of providing security. And if there are enough civilian deaths as a result of non-state OSV, constituents may inflict costs onto the regime during an election (Hultman, 2012a).

In addition to the two main theories regarding capability and goods and services provision, it is also argued that larger (and higher capability) rebel groups are more able to commit atrocities against civilians (Wood, 2014). A relatively small rebel group will simply not be able to instigate the same level of violence against civilians as one that is significantly larger. A greater contingent of soldiers can be equated with more opportunities for them to engage in one-sided violence, especially when they are better armed (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008), and also because a larger force often translates into less troop oversight in the field (Gates, 2002). This should be especially true in post-conflict settings where rebel groups have not received significant enough concessions to lay down arms, or in post-conflict settings where DDR programs for former combatants are not introduced.

It is therefore more likely that non-state actors will use one-sided violence in order to gain civilian support when the state security apparatus is weak, or when the state is unable to
maintain the rule of law and protect its citizens. It may be ‘easier’ for non-state actors to compel civilians into supporting them if the state has a high rate of insecurity or if there is low civilian trust in the state security apparatus.

**Human Rights**
The second measure of post-conflict peace that I use is ‘human rights’. Human rights are an important indicator of post-conflict peace, as it pertains to PCPR, because they are demonstrative of the relationship that a society has with the state and its security actors. Since police reform programs as they are defined here, aim to create respect for human rights, a plausible indicator of success is the extent to which the state actually does respect human rights. If police reform ‘works’, improvements in the state’s respect for human rights should be observed. In practice, the protection of human rights also demonstrates the ability of the state to provide security. For the purposes of this research, human rights is conceptualised as physical integrity rights, namely those rights that allow for organisation and assembly, protect and maintain the rule of law, and ensure personal autonomy. When these rights are ‘respected’, civilians are not subjected to forms of mistreatment such as torture and/or death.

There is a considerable amount of existing research that considers the conditions under which human rights violations (HRV) occur. According to Davenport (2007b), human rights violations (or as the author refers to it, repression) are tactical, and are used to achieve certain ends such as regime survival, political legitimacy, resource extraction and behavioural acquiescence. Davenport (2007b) further asserts that there are four main considerations made before HRV are carried out: the benefits of their use, the costs of committing them, the likelihood that they will lead to successful outcomes, and the availability of alternative methods. In turn, Poe, Tate and Keith (1999, 293) assert that human rights violations are committed when “they are the most effective means” for a regime to achieve its objectives. The question then becomes, what are the conditions that lead a government to engage in human rights violations against its own citizens?

Some research has identified that when regimes are threatened – or at least when they believe that their power is or will be threatened – they are more likely to engage in human rights violations (Davenport & Armstrong, 2004). This threat or threat perception is arguably most true when a regime is faced with the threat of war (Gurr, 1970), or when it has emerged from war and finds its support base divided, and its power challenged by an

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32 What are referred to as ‘human rights violations’ in this study are referred to as ‘repression’ and ‘integrity rights violations’ in other research projects (see, Davenport 2007b; Poe & Tate, 1994).
armed group. Protest is another form of threat that can, in some instances, compel governments to engage in human rights violations (Davenport & Armstrong, 2004).

More democratic regimes are also less likely to engage in human rights violations (Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999; Davenport, 1999; Davenport & Armstrong, 2004; Richards, Webb & Clay, 2015). This is because of the higher costs of engaging in such behaviour for democratic regimes, as well as fewer opportunities to do so, seeing that democratic regimes have a greater number of checks and balances on the use of force than for example, authoritarian or military regimes. In addition, individuals and organisations can punish human rights violators at the ballot box, which also reduces the utility of human rights violations for coercive purposes (Davenport, 2007a). These findings, which so far hold across time and space, point to what is referred to as the ‘domestic democratic peace’ (Davenport, 2000; Davenport & Inman, 2012). Autocratic regimes are more likely to engage in human rights violations because they have fewer mechanisms to gain/maintain influence and civilian support (Arendt, 1951; Geddes, 1999) and face fewer domestic costs when they use repression. It has also been shown that economic development decreases the use of human rights violations, seeing that governments are more able to provide positive incentives or inducements as a means of garnering support (Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999).

3.3 The Framework
This section illustrates how I expect the explanatory variables relating to post-conflict police reform, external engagement in PCPR, local ownership and post-conflict policing programs, to influence the dependent variables: one-sided violence and human rights. I begin by linking post-conflict police reform and external involvement to post conflict peace, in theory. I then focus on the causal mechanisms connecting local ownership and the four different types of it – executive, parliamentary, police and civil society – to post-conflict peace. Lastly, I look at community policing and female representation programs, and present the theoretical linkages between their implementation and post-conflict peace.

3.3.1 Post-conflict Police Reform
In theory, post-conflict police reform is fundamental to the fostering of human rights (Özerdem & Lee, 2016). In practice, it is meant to improve the capacity of police to provide security (den Heyer, 2010), as well as to increase the transparency police operate under, and their accountability to society (O’Neil, 2005; Goldsmith, 2005). ‘Capacity enhancement’ as it is often referred to, is done through three primary means: improving training practices, institutional changes to recruitment and vetting processes, and the provision of technical resources. The introduction of field and classroom training programs are theoretically meant to improve the technical and practical quality of policing in a given
state. For example, the police training implemented in Liberia as part of the reform process, included the advancement of report writing skills, evidence collection, and investigative techniques, in addition to basic field training (Bacon, 2015). It is argued that enhanced training practices improves the ability of police to respond to threats, and prevent violence against the state and its civilians from taking place, which in post-conflict states can be from non-state actors or other aggrieved groups (O’Neill, 2005).

Human rights’ training is another common feature of PCPR efforts, carried out with the aim of making police officers more aware of human rights standards and laws, and more inclined to work within frameworks that support these norms (Sedra, 2010; Call, 2002). This assertion is backed up by the OSCE (2012: 9), who in discussing the role of police reform, notes that: “human rights education makes it possible to transfer skills, knowledge and attitudes about human rights, and make them appropriate and applicable in the daily work of officers”.

Police capacity can theoretically, be further improved through the implementation of institutional changes to recruitment and vetting processes. In Kosovo, institutional changes helped ensure that all police officers have completed high school, and that they are over the age of eighteen (Crossley-Frolick & Dursun-Ozkanca, 2012). In addition, the extensive vetting processes carried out across the security sector helped ensure that individuals who had committed human rights abuses during the war were unable to serve in the newly created institutions. It is argued that these changes have increased the overall institutional capacity of the police, and improved civilian trust. Moreover, by removing known human rights offending or violent members, it is theorized that police become less likely to perpetrate human rights violations (Holm & Eide, 2000).

Finally, the provision of technical resources and improved policing infrastructure is seen an additional means of improving police capacity. Though it still faces significant constraints, the Haitian National Police have benefitted from improved equipment and the construction of specialized reception centres for women and children affected by violence (Baranyi & Salahub, 2011). Conversely, South Sudan is a timely example where a lack of resources needed for equipment and infrastructure has allegedly hindered the ability of the police to maintain security (Abatneh & Lubang, 2011).

The improvement in and/or introduction of police accountability and oversight mechanisms are the second core component of post-conflict police reform programs. Given that police are often involved in conflict through the unlawful detention of political opponents, human rights abuses such as killings and torture, and in some instances direct fighting in the conflict, the introduction or improvement of oversight and accountability structures (with
external donor assistance) have become commonplace in PCPR efforts (O’Neil, 2005). It is theorized that when police are more aware of human rights standards, trained to limit the use of force, and operate under strict oversight and accountability measures, that they will be more likely to uphold human rights as opposed to violate them (Celador 2005).

The most common oversight mechanisms are internal and independent civilian review boards and ombudsmen. In Sierra Leone, it has been found that the establishment of the Police Council helped ensure that there would be increased oversight over the police, which in turn deterred the use of force (Pratt & Valasek, 2011). It is further argued that parliament, civil society, and the media can also serve as additional checks on police corruption and accountability (Ebo, 2006). These oversight mechanisms help punish the use of one-sided violence and human rights abuses, especially in more democratic regimes.

However, and with respect to the above-mentioned goals and objectives of PCPR, it is important to recognize that post-conflict police reform is not carried out under perfect conditions. As outlined in Chapter 2, police reform is considerably more difficult to implement in post-conflict contexts where police are neither operationally nor politically fit to provide security for society at large (Neild, 2001).

In addition to the enormous task of ‘reforming’ an entire police service from scratch, regardless of where it takes place, post-conflict police reform programs must also take into account the effects of violent armed conflict and its lasting implications. These ‘legacies of violence’ can include acute ethnic and/or group cleavages – that are often apparent and damaging prior to the outbreak of war, mistrust between groups within society and between the government and its constituents, and the increased availability of arms (Wulf, 2011). For instance, it was identified in post-conflict Bosnia that all three of the major ethno-religious groups would have to be included in state institutions in order to help increase social cohesion and reduce mistrust (Ansorg & Kurtenbach, 2016). Armed conflict is also severely damaging to infrastructure and service provision, making basic living conditions difficult, let alone the development and/or strengthening of new institutions. The armed conflict in Sudan, for example, resulted in the destruction of almost 4000 villages, along with their schools, health centres, homes and businesses (Ali, 2013). Moreover, police in many conflict settings (and often prior to the outbreak of the conflict itself) perpetrate serious human rights abuses, which can include unlawful detention, torture and extrajudicial killings (O’Neill, 2005). Understandably, police in post-conflict states often lack civil control and oversight (O’Neil, 2005; Harris, 2005), which makes it even more difficult to hold them accountable for their actions.
As a result of these factors, and absent aspects such as external support and security guarantees, and/or local ownership, it is highly plausible that PCPR programs will simply entrench the existing ‘balance of power’ in post-conflict states. As such, it is unlikely that PCPR will have an independent effect on post conflict peace without also accounting for the qualities of the reform effort, especially, as I argue below, provisions for local ownership. Based on the reasoning outlined, I present the first hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: The implementation of post-conflict police reform does not impact post-conflict peace.

3.3.2 External Actor Involvement

Some of the existing literature assumes that externally driven security reforms – those that are not designed, implemented and managed by local actors – will fail due to their lack of local ownership (Nathan, 2007 & 2008; Donais, 2009a). However, this critique overlooks the positive role that external actors can play in providing security in the immediate aftermath of war (Kurtenbach & Wulf, 2012), and in the promotion of local ownership that is not confined to the executive. As a result, it is argued that external involvement in PCPR positively impacts post-conflict peace; the reasoning is outlined below.

Because security is highly political and elite-centric in most countries, there is a possibility that without external involvement post-conflict police reform processes will simply reinforce or reinstall pre-conflict security issues (e.g. corruption, poor oversight).33 There is also a more dangerous risk that domestic actors will be unable to implement the necessary reforms, and that conflict will reoccur. In addition, it is plausible that external involvement actually enables marginalized local actors to participate in PCPR, and have a stake in its outcome by overriding the preferences of the belligerents on the conflict. As such, I contend that under certain conditions external involvement may in fact be the primary reason that a broader cross-section of local actors (e.g. civil society) is able to participate in and have ownership of PCPR.

It is also conceivable that in certain cases some local actors will need to be overridden in order to ensure the security of other groups in society. This could potentially arise in post-conflict contexts where vulnerable or marginalized populations face heightened insecurity, or where there are conflict-related ethnic divisions. It is also possible that local ownership is more difficult to install in contexts where certain elements or groups have never had

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33 In addition, in the immediate aftermath of war, many of the ‘strongest’ local owners are former parties to the conflict, and don’t necessarily have an interest in further developing local ownership as it pertains to the realm of security.
ownership over the security sector. This relates to the temporal dimension and the fact that broad involvement from non-governmental local actors is sometimes impossible during the early stages of PCPR (Hansen, 2008).

In addition to the reasons outlined above, the presence of external actors also serves as a deterrent to the use of one-sided violence and human rights violations by the state and non-state actors. Since the end of the twentieth century, the UN and other international actors have worked to develop systemic norms of civilian protection and human rights standards (Bellamy & Hunt, 2015; Hultman, 2010). Existing research also informs us that the presence of a UN mission deters actors from engaging in one-sided violence and human rights abuses against civilians (Hultman, 2013). The presence of external actors should also increase the costs of perpetrating OSV and human rights violations for the state. External actor involvement should also act as a quasi security guarantee, and in turn, reduce the extent to which governments may prematurely engage in OSV and HRV when threatened.

As a result of the reasons above, namely the role that external actors play in implementing PCPR, encouraging the ownership of local actors, and deterring the use of OSV and human rights violations, the second hypothesis is presented.

**Hypothesis 2:** External actor involvement in post-conflict police reform programs positively impacts post-conflict peace.

### 3.3.3 Local Ownership

Local ownership is often looked at as an outcome or end point of post-conflict peacebuilding efforts (see, Law, 2006) and as such it is often used as a measure of reform success. I however contend that local ownership is something that exists in varying degrees over time. Accordingly, I consider local ownership of post-conflict police reform as an outcome of the interaction between local and external actors, and although the existing theories are relatively weak, a determinant of post-conflict peace. In the following section I establish the overarching theoretical links between local ownership and post-conflict peace, and then develop and present the four types of local ownership that this study is concerned with in more detail. It is worth reiterating that while there are many components or aspects of local ownership, this thesis focuses only on engagement. Specifically, this thesis examines the breadth of local actor engagement in PCPR, and it is therefore primarily concerned with whether or not local actors are engaged in reform processes, as opposed to the quality of their engagement.

It is argued that local ownership directly impacts the effectiveness and sustainability of post-conflict security reforms (Nathan, 2007; Donais, 2009b; UN, 2008; OECD-DAC,
In fact, some consider local ownership to be the panacea of success when it comes to PCPR and consequently attribute ‘failed’ or unsuccessful reform efforts to a lack of it.\textsuperscript{34} Several authors note that without local ownership security reforms are less effective both during and post-implementation, and require continued donor support to be sustainable (Scheye & Peake, 2005; Wulf, 2004; Nathan, 2008; Panarelli, 2010). This is because, they argue, local actors must have ownership over both the processes and the outcomes of reforms if they are to have a vested interest in the maintenance and longevity of them.

In practice local ownership is considered necessary to obtain and/or build consensus regarding the security needs of the host state and its populous, which in turn has important implications for steering reform projects and improving their legitimacy (Brzoska & Heinemann-Grüder, 2004; Stiglitz, 1998). This argument is based on the foundation that local owners will not be committed to reforms if they do not reflect the needs of the society in which they are being implemented. As Nathan (2007) points out, reforms that are donor driven and exclude local actors lead to resentment and inertia within the host state and its populous, as well as mistrust between ‘reformed’ institutions and society. The case of Afghanistan highlights this tension. Sky (2007) finds that the external actors involved tried to impose ‘western’ models of security practices without regard for the needs, capacity and context of Afghanistan, and that this malpractice lead to poorly chosen resource allocations, a lack of capacity enhancement, and an unsustainable reform program. As previously discussed, external donors focused largely on recruitment and infrastructure during Haiti’s police reform process, although it was later discovered that Haitian citizens were most concerned with police receiving human rights training (Donais, 2005).

Local ownership is also considered an important mechanism for building trust between actors, namely civilian trust in the government as well as statutory security institutions such as the police. This is because local ownership allows various local actors to question and debate the reforms, which in turn enables them to act as a mechanism of accountability and oversight over reformed security institutions. It is for these reasons that local ownership is considered important for the provision of security and justice, as well as oversight over the security sector in particular (Nathan, 2008; Scheye, 2008).

While there are divergent views on how local ownership is achieved in post-conflict settings, it is theorized that engagement between local and external donors is of key significance when it comes to the reform of security actors such as the police (see, Donais, 2009a). Bendix and Stanley (2008a) argue that engagement between local and external actors provides local actors with a proverbial ‘seat at the table’ and serves as a

\textsuperscript{34} Nathan (2008: 20) reasons that local ownership is “inimical to development and democracy”.

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demonstration that external forces are not simply imposing reforms. In addition, it is contended that local and external actor engagement also improves the acceptability of the reforms being implemented, as well as the legitimacy of the external actors involved (Talentino, 2007; OECD DAC, 2008). As such, it is argued that the entire reform process should be as consultative as possible, and driven by the security needs of the host state and its citizenry (Bendix & Stanley, 2008a).

If reforms are not ‘owned’ by society, and civilians do not feel that they have a stake in reformed security institutions, it is less likely that they will be inclined to make use of state security actors such as the police. This may lead to victims of certain crimes not coming forward to report them, or worse, the use of extrajudicial methods of conflict resolution (Bajraktari, 2006). Examples of the former were seen in Kosovo, where the ethnic Serb population feared coming forward to the predominantly ethnic-Albanian police force out of fear that they would be mistreated (Gray & Strasheim 2016). Moreover, without local involvement and ownership, reformed police services may suffer from continued or even a heightened sense of mistrust and illegitimacy in the eyes of civilians (Goldsmith, 2005), which could lead to some groups taking security ‘into their own hands’. This may, in turn, heighten the perceived insecurity of the state, leading to greater incentives for the use of repression and human rights abuses.

To summarize, existing theories inform us that overall, local ownership is important for strengthening the effectiveness and sustainability of post-conflict police reform programs, as well as for ensuring the ‘success’ of the reformed institutions. This general framework is based on three key pillars. First, local ownership is crucial for obtaining and/or building consensus concerning the reforms implemented, as well as the role of the institutions being reformed. Second, local ownership is key for reducing polarizations between the state, its security apparatus and civil society. Third, local ownership is necessary for promoting and strengthening the accountability and oversight of the security sector at large.

The theoretical arguments that link local ownership to post-conflict peace and peacebuilding tend to be general and in some instances, lack explicit theoretical connections to outcomes such as one-sided violence and human rights violations. As a result, and in order to more fully understand the effects of local ownership, it is necessary to disaggregate local ownership and consider with more nuance, which local actors actually get some ‘ownership’ over, or have engagement in, the reforms implemented. Now that I have presented the overarching theoretical links between local ownership and post-conflict

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35 It is possible that where multiple local actors are engaged in post-conflict police reform, local ownership will be more challenging to install due to competition for resources.
peace — it is time to take a closer look at the particular types of local ownership this study focuses on. The following section examines the engagement of the executive, parliament, the police and civil society, and the implications of their engagement in post-conflict police reform on post-conflict peace.

**Executive Engagement**

Though seemingly negligible, executive engagement in PCPR is central for the development of post-conflict peace. The importance of executive engagement is in part based on the assertion that reforms will fail if they are ‘imposed’ from the outside and without executive involvement (Nathan, 2008; Donais, 2009b). By ensuring a minimum level of national input and oversight, executive engagement diminishes the degree to which external actors can impose ‘cookie cutter’ and ill-suited reforms that exclude local actors (Jackson, 2011; Scheye, 2005). Moreover, the inclusion of executive engagement in this study also allows me to account for the fact that a minimum degree of capacity and political will on the part of the national government is required for PCPR to be successful (Nathan, 2007).

The primary mechanism through which executive engagement positively impacts post-conflict peace is through the role of accountability that the executive has over reformed security actors such as the police. Executive engagement is useful for strengthening police oversight and monitoring, which makes one-sided violence and human rights violations harder to perpetrate (Bajraktari, 2006; Nathan, 2007). Specifically, Formalized engagement between the executive and externals helps to keep the state security apparatus in check. The strengthening of police oversight is most often done through the establishment of review boards and oversight committees (Call, 2003). For example, donors worked with the Government of Sierra Leone to establish an Executive Management Board (EMB) to serve as a comprehensive policing oversight tool. The EMB consists of an Inspector General, deputies, and assistants to monitor and investigate aspects of the Sierra Leone Police including their professional standards, operations, and training and welfare (Charley & M’Cormack, 2011). Strengthened oversight also makes it more likely that episodes of OSV and HRV will be investigated and that the responsible individuals will be held accountable by externals (O’Neill, 2005; Ansorg & Kurtenbach, 2016), which should deter the perpetration of violence against civilians.

It is also plausible that under certain conditions regimes will oppose PCPR, and work against its implementation. While this is unlikely given that national governments’ generally agree to the introduction of reforms or ask donor actors for assistance
implementing them, it is not impossible.\(^{36}\) One example of where this has occurred is in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); several reports discuss the complete lack of will of the national government to engage in the reform process (see, Chatham House, 2010; Open Society Foundation, 2012). That being said, the presence of open and consensual channels of communication between the international community and the executive significantly increases the costs of antagonistic behaviour on the part of regimes. External donors can also dissuade national governments from (re) rebuilding paramilitaries to use against regime opponents with the threat of withdrawal. Finally, additional forms of ownership such as of the police and civil society also reduce that ability, as well as the likelihood, that ownership is “confined to the executive” (Nathan, 2008: 22). Based on the reasons outlined above I present hypothesis 3, which focuses on executive engagement in post-conflict police reform.


**Parliamentary Engagement**

In well functioning, democratic states, parliament is a forum for “transparency, open debate and the provision of information on government policy”, and it can provide oversight of the executive and its security actors, as well as checks on the use of force (Nathan, 2007: 40). As such, parliament is useful for ensuring that reformed security institutions such as the police are representative of society (to the extent that parliament is representative), and parliamentary engagement helps improve police legitimacy by increasing the transparency under which they operate (Nathan, 2007 & 2008). Parliament also serves as a mechanism for providing information to society, as well as being a platform of public engagement with security actors. In effect, parliamentary engagement makes it more likely that human rights abuses perpetrated by a government will be publicized, which in turn increases the costs of engaging in such behaviour. Moreover, when there is external engagement with parliament, and in seeing that PCPR is designed to meet the needs of a broader cross section of society, individuals should also have fewer motives to resist the government through collective dissent (e.g. violence). This should, in turn, reduce the opportunities that a government has to repress dissent. Combined, parliamentary engagement in a post-conflict police reform process reduces the means and the motive for human rights violations and one-sided violence to occur. Parliament can also provide a system of checks and balances on

\(^{36}\) Only four cases are coded as having ‘0’ executive engagement in one or more years of observation.
government spending and policy pertaining to security reforms and institutions, as well as onto the actions of institutions (Nathan, 2007).\footnote{Nathan (2007) also adds that supporting parliament is a means of educating parliamentarians on more technical and budgetary aspects of reform efforts, which in turn may improve the ownership as well as the sustainability of reforms.}

When parliaments are effective, parliamentary engagement of PCPR most often occurs through the planning and design of reform programs. In cases such as post-conflict Bosnia, parliaments are responsible for debating and adopting police reform plans before they can be implemented (BBC, 2006). Parliamentary engagement is of course also fostered during the implementation of reform processes, through the provision of reform oversight and evaluation. Burundi’s parliamentary commission on security and its Independent Human Rights Commission, which were implemented with external assistance, provided constant feedback and oversight during the reform process, and to the police in the long-term (Baranyi & Salahub, 2011).

In most post-conflict settings, however, the executive is generally the ‘strongest’ actor, and institutions like parliament tend to be ‘side-lined’ (Samuels, 2006). In turn, this marginalization causes external donors to overlook domestic parliaments during post-conflict police reform processes, even though the strengthening of parliament is considered of key importance (UNDP, 2006). An example of this occurred in Liberia, where external donors largely ignored Liberia’s parliament during its PCPR (and overall SSR) process because it was considered to be poorly functioning and weak. However, this exclusion only further weakened the power and legitimacy of Liberia’s parliament as an oversight mechanism of state security institutions (Nathan, 2007). Moreover, and due to the relative weakness of parliaments in post-conflict settings, even when a country’s parliament is engaged in a PCPR processes, it is unlikely that it will have a strong effect on post-conflict peace. This is because, parliaments in post-conflict settings generally do not function well, and have weak capacity for monitoring and oversight, either because the executive has worked to limit their power, or because of a lack of capacity (OECD DAC, 2008). Because of the above discussion regarding parliamentary engagement, the following hypothesis is established:

*Hypothesis 4: Parliamentary engagement in post-conflict police reform does not impact post-conflict peace.*
Police Engagement

Police are theoretically the core providers of security in a given state, and are empowered to maintain internal stability and security. As such, all post-conflict police reform processes involve participation from the police to a certain degree; without their involvement there would be no institutions to ‘reform’. That being said, not all external PCPR efforts have worked towards fostering police ownership by engaging ‘the police’ in the implementation of reforms (Ebo, 2005; Perdan, 2008). The absence of police engagement is usually credited to factors including resource and time constraints, broad demobilisation (making engagement with existing police personnel difficult), a lack of sufficient planning, and/or political will (Ebo, 2005; Perdan, 2008).

Police ownership of PCPR, as measured by police engagement in the reform process, is crucial because without the input and consent of police regarding the reforms being implemented, it is likely that the reforms will face antagonism from the outset. In fact, a police service (in addition to the military) is the most likely and able institution within a state to violently reject the implementation of post-conflict security reforms and peacebuilding in general (Holm, 2000), a reality that makes their engagement even more fundamental.

In theory, police engagement makes police officers and administrators more aware of public interest and security concerns, especially in settings where the executive or elite actors have an interest in bypassing the will and/or needs of the citizenry (Holm, 2000). Police engagement also helps to ensure that donor support is steered towards areas that police identify as important. This is significant in post-conflict settings where external donor actors may be less familiar with local issues and security weaknesses. For instance, police engagement during Kosovo’s PCPR process helped identify the need to strengthen anti-trafficking units (UNMIK, 2004).

Scholars argue that engagement between external donors and local policing personnel serves as a method of ‘norm diffusion’, whereby local police staff are re-trained or ‘reformed’ to respect, as opposed to violate, human rights (Ellison & Pino, 2012). This diffusion of norms helps to (re) orient security actors such as the police away from the roles they performed prior to and during conflict – which often include engaging in violence against civilians, the suppression of civil liberties, and human rights abuses – to norms of civilian protection and the promotion of human rights (Dembinski, Kremel & Schott, 2012; Call, 2003; Neild, 2001). It is further argued that improved training and human rights standards over time, helps to “generate incremental changes among the police trainees regarding the practice of policing” (Donais, 2012: 68). Based on the reasons above the following hypothesis is presented:

Civil Society Engagement

Though much of the causes of war and peacebuilding literatures emphasize the role of the state, civil society can also shape the development of both conflict and peace (Barnes, 2009). Pouligny (2012: 58) argues that civil society is naturally inclined towards peace, and is “more progressive and less compromised than political elites” with regards to peacebuilding efforts. It is further contended that peacebuilding efforts will fail without civil society engagement (Bender, 2011), and as Anderson and Olson (2003: 32) conclude, “people and societies must create the conditions and develop the processes for achieving and sustaining their own peace”. The theoretical framework that links civil society engagement in post-conflict police reform to post-conflict peace is primarily based on two key mechanisms: input and oversight.

Civil society engagement in post-conflict police reform, as witnessed by engagement between civil society and external donors, serves as a forum for input into the reform process, as well as to the actors involved – namely the state, police, and external actors. Input is useful for helping the state and donors identify shortcomings or faults within the reform process, and for ameliorating potential long-term policing issues that may affect the capacity of police to provide security (Villaveces-Izquierdo, 2009). For example, Kosovo’s Municipal Community Safety Councils have helped the Kosovo Police (KP) identify policing priorities (as determined by civil society), and set local strategic aims for crime prevention (Bajraktari et al., 2006). Input also means that individuals can protect and promote their human and political rights, and that they can make their voices heard to the government and external donors (Edwards, 2009).

The second mechanism through which civil society engagement impacts post-conflict peace pertains to the oversight and accountability that it provides. This watchdog function, which is promoted and empowered through engagement with external donors via the creation of human rights organisations and think tanks, serves to monitor potentially violent acts by the state and its security forces, and can prevent them from taking place (Barnes & Albrecht, 2008). Civil society can also deter the government from engaging in one-sided violence and human rights violations by punishing said behaviour via elections (Hultman, 2012a) or nonviolent protest. For example, in Nepal, donors set up an ‘early warning system’ with a

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38 Civil society organizations in particular are also “well-positioned to navigate the tensions between local culture and international norms” (Pouligny, 2012: 58).
network of civil society groups including human rights organisations, to help publicize potential threats to security by both state and non-state actors (Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006).

In addition to the input and oversight roles, civil society engagement in PCPR also increases awareness of the costs of violence, and it can help encourage constructive engagement between political opponents prior to the use of violence or coercive efforts (Barnes, 2009). It also increases the transparency of the reforms implemented, as well as the legitimacy of the reformed actors and institutions (Belloni, 2001; OECD DAC, 2008). In Bosnia, the ‘widening’ of the actors included in the reform planning and implementation was considered necessary for increasing the overall legitimacy and acceptance of the reform process (Perdan, 2008). In effect, civil society engagement means that individuals and organisations have more opportunities to express themselves non-violently in relation to their security needs – as opposed to engaging in violent tactics – which reduces potential threats against the state (Davenport, 2007a), and therefore also reduces the need for human rights violations to be used for coercive purposes. Based on the reasons outlined above, the following hypothesis is established:


Increased Local Actor Engagement

In addition to examining the four local actors and their engagement in post-conflict police reform, it is also important to consider the effects of increased or improved local actor engagement on an ordinal scale. Theoretically, it is expected that if a greater number of local actors have engagement in a PCPR process, meaning that there is ‘greater local ownership’, the likelihood of post-conflict peace should also increase. For example, if in a given year ‘country A’ has executive engagement in its PCPR process, while ‘country B’ has executive, police and civil society engagement, holding all else constant, I would expect that ‘country B’ would be less likely to experience one-sided violence and human rights violations. This is because the greater number of local actors who are engaged in a PCPR process and have ownership over the reforms should be able to provide increased insight into the security issues and needs of the society, as well as oversight over the institutions being reformed.

Similarly, Nilsson (2012) finds that the legitimacy offered by civil society engagement in peacebuilding is crucial for the establishment of durable peace. The author further illustrates that legitimacy is gained when there is dialogue with civil society regarding the implementation of peacebuilding activities.
Hypothesis 7: Increased local actor engagement in post-conflict police reform positively impacts post-conflict peace.

3.3.4 Policing Components

Community Policing
Numerous post-conflict countries including Sierra Leone, Macedonia and Nicaragua have introduced community policing programs, most often as part of larger post-conflict police or security sector reform processes. Community policing is introduced as a means of improving community-police relations, reducing crime, and improving human rights (Denney & Kassaye, 2013). Community policing also implicitly serves to improve the ownership of the police by the ‘community’ it serves. Improved relations between civil society and the police make it more likely that civilians will come forward and report violence and insecurity, as well as potential threats to security, as seen in the case of Ethiopia (Denney & Kassaye, 2013). This could in effect reduce the likelihood of one-sided violence from occurring. More specifically, if people trust the police they are more likely to inform the state regarding potential threats, and this information may make it much less likely that armed groups form in the first place. In addition, by increasing trust in the police community policing also mitigates the need for people to go ‘outside’ of state channels to maintain their security, thus reducing the need for civilians to take up arms and threaten the state with acts of contentious dissent (Charley & McCormack, 2011). The case of Mexico serves as an example where the inability of the state to provide security has led to civilians forming vigilante groups as a means of combatting the drug cartels. However, in several instances the vigilante groups have clashed with state police, and they have also perpetrated one-sided violence against civilians (Grillo & Colorada, 2013; Taylor, 2014).

In addition, improved trust in the police also serves to increase trust in the state and its ability to uphold the rule of law; which in turn means that civilians are more likely to feel that their grievances and security concerns are being heard, further reducing their need to take up arms (Koci & Gjuraj, 2016). These mechanisms should decrease one-sided violence by non-state actors. In addition, non-state OSV should also decrease as a result of civilians having greater input into their security, and not feeling as much responsibility to take security into ‘their own hands’.

Community policing is also a useful mechanism for pre-empting and preventing crime and violence. According to Charley and McCormack (2011: 25), community policing provides

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40 Community policing is formal programming implemented alongside a PCPR process, while civil society engagement in PCPR accounts for the involvement and input that civil society has in a reform process.
communities with a voice in policing priorities and practices. It has also been found that community policing can lead to more efficient crime control because it helps to reduce insecurity within the community and also increases police legitimacy (Koci & Gjuraj, 2016). Community policing can also play an important role in bridging the gap between police and citizens by involving the public in decision-making processes on policing needs for their area. This should in turn help orient police towards maintaining peace rather than “enforcing the law” on their own, which should reduce the likelihood that police will use excessive force or perpetrate human rights violations. For example, Baker (2008) finds that Sierra Leone’s community policing improved citizen safety through the development of community orientated communication, intelligence collection and dispute resolution mechanisms.

Hypothesis 8: The implementation of post-conflict community policing programs positively impact post-conflict peace.

Female Representation
Women often face increased insecurity both during conflict and in its aftermath (Human Security Report, 2012; Klot, 2007). According to the UN OHCHR (2014), women are more often subjected to forms of gender-based violence such as sexual slavery, kidnapping and trafficking, both during and after war. Moreover, it is argued that when post-conflict police reform processes overlook women’s security, it compromises the sustainability and success of the reforms (UNDP, 2007). Bastick (2008: 2) highlights this assertion and contends: “for security services to be representative, trusted and effective, they must include women as well as men”. One of the key instruments that has helped push for the representation of women in police, is United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 (2000). The Resolution, along with several follow-up resolutions (see, e.g. 1820, 1888, 1889, and 1960), calls on countries to increase the representation of women in their security institutions, as well as to look at ways of preventing, investigating and providing justice for sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV).

The main argument that I use to link female representation programs to post-conflict peace is based on the assertion that more gender equal societies have less violence (Caprioli, 2000; Bjarnegård et al., 2015). Existing research informs us that more gender equal societies have norms and behaviours that negate the use of violence to solve conflict.

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41 For example, Bosnia’s community policing program was implemented through four primary mechanisms: increasing community-policing cooperation, improving the transparency of policing, involving the community in decision-making on citizen safety, and decreasing the level and fear of crime (Deljkić & Lučić-Čatić, 2011).
(Caprioli & Trumbore, 2006; Melander, 2005a; Hudson et al., 2009). In fact, it is contended that norms relating to gender equality and gender-based violence may also illustrate a state’s domestic and international behavior (Erchak, 1994; Bjarneård et al., 2015). Furthermore, it has been found that more gender equal societies also tend to be more tolerant to differences among and within groups. According to Hudson et al. (2009), “Gender serves as a critical model for the societal treatment of difference between and among individuals and collectives”.

In turning to the police in particular, it is contended that female representation in the police helps moderate “extremes in the use of force”, and helps to foster a police service that is better able to respond to and investigate abuses of women’s rights (UNDP, 2007: 8). When confronted with a threat the state should in turn be less likely to respond with extreme or indiscriminate force, or violence against civilians. Female representation in the police also helps ensure that the security needs of women are more aptly met, seeing that women are more likely to report crimes to other women (True, 2013). In relation, Bacon (2015) finds that increased representation of female police aids responsiveness to reported sexual and gender-based violence in post-conflict reconstruction.

**Hypothesis 9: The implementation of post-conflict female representation programs in the police positively impact post-conflict peace.**

### 3.3.5 Summing up the Hypotheses

This section briefly reintroduces the hypotheses proposed throughout the chapter. Overall, this study aims to address the question, *how does the local ownership of post-conflict police reform impact post-conflict peace?* The overarching research question is addressed through the use of nine more specific hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1 stipulates that the implementation of post-conflict police reform does not impact post-conflict peace, while Hypothesis 2 contends that external involvement in PCPR positively impacts post-conflict peace. These foundational hypotheses enable the examination of local ownership, as measured by the breadth of local actor engagement, by first considering the effects of post-conflict police reform in general as compared to cases without PCPR, as well as the involvement of external donors. These are important hypotheses to begin the analyses given that this study aims to investigate the effects of local

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42 An example is seen in the Women and Children Protection Section created within the Liberian National Police, which was established with specialized female personnel who have expertise in dealing with SGBV. It was also found that female enrolment in school increased in Liberia, and that many new enrolees expressed that they were inspired by seeing women in the police and the security sector (Cordell, 2010).
ownership, which arises as a result of external donor involvement in post-conflict peacebuilding.

Hypotheses 3-6 consider the four types of local actor engagement in PCPR, and stipulate their implications for post-conflict peace. More specifically, it is hypothesised that executive, police and civil society engagement in PCPR will positively impact post-conflict peace, and that parliamentary engagement does not have an impact. In building on Hypotheses 3-6, Hypothesis 7 stipulates that overall, increased or improved local actor engagement – meaning that more local actors have ownership of the reforms – will reduce the likelihood of one-sided violence and human rights violations occurring.

Finally, hypotheses 8 and 9 contend that both community policing and female representation programs will positively impact post-conflict peace. These are significant seeing that they are two of the most often implanted components of post-conflict policing, and they explicitly work to improve the ownership of women, as well as the broader community.

In addition to outlining the hypotheses that will be tested, this chapter has examined and problematized the key concepts employed in the following chapters of this study. It is also offered conceptualizations for each of the terms, which are operationalised in the research design chapter that follows.
4. Research Design and Methods

The overarching purpose of this study is to investigate the question, *How does the local ownership of post-conflict police reform impact post-conflict peace?* Two methods are used to answer this question: a large-N statistical analysis of post-conflict police reform (PCPR) efforts globally, from 1989-2014, and an in-depth case study on the post-conflict police reform process in Kosovo. This chapter proceeds in three parts. The first section outlines the overall research approach and discusses the benefits and limitations of quantitative and qualitative research, as well as the implications for choosing mixed methods. The second part of the chapter pertains to the quantitative study and outlines the universe of cases included in the analysis, followed by the operational definitions of the dependent, independent and control variables. Lastly, it offers a discussion of the statistical models used to test the hypotheses. The third part of the chapter focuses on the qualitative case study. Specifically, it touches on the case selection of post-conflict Kosovo, as well as the benefits and limitations that its selection offers. Following that, the research design of the case study is outlined, including an overview of the ethical reflections of conducting fieldwork, as well a brief discussion of sample selection, the interview method, and techniques of qualitative data analysis.

4.1 The Approach

According to Höglund and Öberg (2011: 4), social science research is theory driven, and seeks “to explain and understand specific research problems”. At present, the bulk of existing social science research methodologies fit into the category of either quantitative or qualitative research. Quantitative research examines a larger number of cases with statistical methods for making inferences, while qualitative research methods generally involve fewer cases that are analysed with greater depth and detail (King et al., 1994).

‘Mixed-methods’, the combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses, has many strengths (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009; Harwell, 2011; Lieberman, 2005). Mixed-methods allow the researcher to investigate trends within a larger group of cases, and it allows for more in-depth analysis through examining specific facets or portions of the population of cases.
Quantitative research uses statistical methods; it employs numerical measurements of events or phenomena as a means of testing the relationships between variables (King et al., 1994). Moreover, quantitative research abstracts from particular instances to seek general description or to test causal hypotheses”, and “it seeks measurements and analyses that are easily replicable” (King et al. 1994: 3-4). In short, quantitative analysis allows me to consider how changes in an independent variable such as post-conflict police reform, are correlated with changes in a corresponding dependent variable, such as post-conflict peace. It also enables me to control for competing explanations of variations in the dependent variable. For instance, Hypothesis 6 in this study tests whether civil society engagement in post-conflict police reform has a positive impact on post-conflict peace. The use of quantitative methods enables this study to consider the possibility that other variables (e.g. the presence of a UN Mission) may also affect the hypothesized outcome, and be correlated with civil society engagement. That said, with the level of aggregation of the quantitative data, it is not possible to test the causal mechanisms through which the independent variables influence the dependent variables. For example, while the results show that civil society engagement in PCPR is positively associated with post-conflict peace, this study is unable to identify the causal mechanisms that lead to the result. It is possible that through engagement, civilians are more likely to come forward and trust police, reducing their need to seek security outside of the state apparatus, in turn reducing the incentives for them to form dissident groups that subsequently ‘threaten’ the state. However, it is also possible that something else entirely is driving the results.

Qualitative research focuses more predominantly “on one or a small number of cases, to use intensive interviews or depth analysis of historical materials, to be discursive in method, and to be concerned with a rounded or comprehensive account of some event or unit” (King et al. 1994, p.4). Qualitative research can also be exploratory, descriptive or explanatory (Yin, 1994). The use of qualitative research also allows this study to consider how people have conceptualized local ownership, and their perceptions of why it has or has not influenced Kosovo’s post-conflict police reform and post-conflict peace. Specifically, the aim of the qualitative case study is to assess the plausibility of the statistical relationship between the local ownership of post-conflict police reform and post-conflict peace, as well as to generate new theoretical insights (see, Lieberman, 2005).

4.2 Quantitative Study
This section presents the research design of the quantitative component of this study. It begins with a brief discussion on the types of statistical models used in Chapters 5 and 6. Then, there is a discussion regarding the universe of cases this study draws from to test the
hypotheses, followed by the operationalizations of the dependent variables used to measure post-conflict peace and the independent and control variables.\textsuperscript{43}

Several different methods are sufficient to conduct bivariate and multivariate regression analysis. However, it is essential to select an appropriate modeling technique for the data, especially concerning the structure of the dependent variable. An incorrect statistical method can produce misleading or unclear results (King, 1998). The primary objective of this study is to investigate how different types of local ownership of post-conflict police reform (PCPR) affect post-conflict peace. I also explore the general efficacy of PCPR, external involvement in it, and their relationships to post-conflict peace. Moreover, I look at two post-conflict policing components, community policing programs and female representation programs, and the implications of their implementation on post-conflict peace.

Chapter 5 uses bivariate regression analyses to look at the relationships between each of the independent variables included in the study, and the dependent variables used to measure post-conflict peace: state and non-state one-sided violence, extra-judicial killings by the state and torture. Chapter 6 tests the hypothesized relationships introduced in Chapter 3 using a series of negative binomial and ordered logistic regression models. Negative binomial regression models are used for the analyses concerning state and non-state one-sided violence, as they are preferable for count data (in this case deaths in incidents of one-sided violence) that are over-dispersed (Hilbe, 2011). Several studies, including those by Fisk (2016) and Eck and Hultman (2007), use negative binomial models to examine one-sided violence. Ordered logistic regression models are used for the analyses pertaining to extrajudicial killings and torture, as the CIRI data is scaled from 0-2, and because equal unit intervals cannot be assumed (Long, 1997). Existing studies by Davenport (2004), Neumayer (2005), and Piazza and Walsh (2009) use ordered logistic regression to examine human rights violations. All of the results are clustered by country and the robust standard errors for each of the coefficients are shown. The results are clustered in order to account for the fact that the observations are independent across countries, but not within each country.

4.2.1 The Universe of Cases
The previous chapter proposed nine hypotheses relating to the research question: two concerning post-conflict police reform and external involvement in it, five that focus explicitly on local actor engagement, and two that consider different components of post-

\textsuperscript{43} Brief descriptions for each of the variables are included in the Appendix (A1.1), along with an overview of how they are measured and the sources used for their coding.
conflict policing. The hypotheses are tested on a universe of cases that includes every post-conflict country from 1989-2014, established through the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2015 (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Pettersson & Wallensteen, 2015), with the unit of analysis being a ‘post-conflict country year’. ‘Post-conflict year’ was chosen as the unit for analysis for three main reasons. First, the country-year unit of analysis is the most commonly used data structure in the peacebuilding literature (Sundberg & Harbom, 2011). Second, ‘post-conflict country year’ more aptly fits with the data used for several other variables included, such as: regime type, GDP, and human rights. Third, while a more disaggregated data structure such as ‘post-conflict country month’ may have allowed for more variation, it is unlikely that the engagement between local and external actors, and the ownership of reforms, would have changed that rapidly over time. All states that experienced a period of at least one year of intrastate conflict followed by a cessation in hostilities of at least one calendar year are included.\footnote{A country may have also experienced the cessation of one conflict while another conflict remained ongoing. However, if there was an ongoing conflict in the country, it is excluded. This is to ensure that only post-conflict countries are included in the data.} The cessation of hostilities may have occurred as a result of one of three different outcomes: victory, the signing of a peace agreement or a cease-fire, or low\footnote{or inactivity. The UCDP defines intrastate conflict as “a conflict between a government and a non-governmental party” that results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year (UCDP, 2016). States that experienced only interstate conflict and/or one-sided violence are excluded from the universe of cases.} or inactivity. The UCDP defines intrastate conflict as “a conflict between a government and a non-governmental party” that results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year (UCDP, 2016). States that experienced only interstate conflict and/or one-sided violence are excluded from the universe of cases. As a result of the unit of analysis being ‘post-conflict country years’, it is important to point out that police reform programs implemented during ongoing conflicts, such as in Afghanistan, are excluded. It is therefore important to note that the findings of this research may not be applicable to ongoing-conflict settings.

Many cases have not implemented PCPR, but including all post-conflict countries from 1989-2014 allows me to examine the efficacy of post-conflict police reform in general (Hypothesis 1), as compared to post-conflict states that did not implement any PCPR. It also enables me to model any selection bias that would be present if cases were selected based only on them having implemented post-conflict police reform.

The UCDP/PRIO dataset is utilized because of its coding criteria, the timespan that it covers (1946-2015), and because it requires a relatively low death threshold to be reached, meaning that, it includes ‘low intensity conflicts’\footnote{The UCDP/PRIO data allows for the inclusion of post-conflict states that would be excluded if a greater number of conflict-related deaths were required. By comparison, the Correlates of War dataset spans 1816-2007, and requires the number of deaths to reach 1000 in order to be included (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).}. The UCDP/PRIO data allows for the inclusion of post-conflict states that would be excluded if a greater number of conflict-related deaths were required. By comparison, the Correlates of War dataset spans 1816-2007, and requires the number of deaths to reach 1000 in order to be included (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).
In addition to the parameters outlined above, two post-conflict countries that are excluded from the UCDP/PRIO data have been added to the universe of cases: Kosovo and Timor-Leste. The UCDP/PRIO data excludes Kosovo because it was not a sovereign state at the time that the armed conflict took place. The UCDP/PRIO data excludes Timor-Leste because it was not a recognized sovereign country at the time that the conflict occurred (it is included from 2002). This study includes Kosovo and Timor-Leste because they represent two of the largest and most comprehensive peace and state-building missions in history (Lemay-Hébert, 2011), and because both countries implemented post-conflict police reform programs.

The armed conflict in Kosovo took place between 1998-1999. At the time of the conflict, Kosovo was officially a part of Yugoslavia, under the rule of Slobodan Milosevic. However, due to the history of the territory, as well as the actions of Milosevic during the 1980’s and 1990’s, many Kosovo-Albanians did not consider Kosovo a part of Yugoslavia. Following the War, Kosovo was placed under the administration of the United Nations and its Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which held executive, legislative and administrative authority until Kosovo’s parliament declared independence in February 2008 (UNSC Resolution 1244, 1999). Though it is a borderline case, I have chosen to include it. Kosovo’s post-conflict police reform process is also the focus of the in-depth case study (Chapter 7).

Before the political crisis that occurred in 1999 and the violence that took place during it, Indonesia occupied Timor-Leste for almost twenty-five years (Lemay-Hébert, 2011). Timor-Leste’s independence occurred following a national plebiscite that took place in 1999. Severe violence, as well as some episodes of rape and torture, marked the vote. However, 99% of registered voters participated in the plebiscite, and almost 80% of them voted for independence (Goldfinch & DeRouen Jr., 2014). Following the conflict, and until 2002, the UN’s Transition Administration in Timor-Leste (UNTAET), which held legislative and executive power in the country, administered Timor-Leste (UNSC Resolution 1272, 1999; Ingram, Kent & McWilliam, 2015).

4.2.2 Measuring Post-conflict Peace
I use four dependent variables to capture post-conflict peace. The first two dependent variables are one-sided violence by the state, and one-sided violence by non-state actors, such as rebel groups. The second two dependent variables capture post-conflict peace by

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45 Kosovo’s pre-conflict history is further discussed in Chapter 7.
focusing on human rights; they are extrajudicial killings by the state, and torture. There is a
discussion of the operationalizations of all four dependent variables below.

One-sided Violence
The first two variables that I use to measure post-conflict peace focus on the use of one-
sided violence. The first is one-sided violence (OSV) by the state, and the second is OSV
perpetrated by non-state actors. While the vast majority of OSV occurs during conflict, it
still occurs in post-conflict settings. The data used to code both types of OSV are taken
from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED), version
4.0 (Sundberg & Melander, 2013), which spans 1989-2014. The UCDP defines one-sided
violence as “the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized
group against civilians” (Eck & Hultman, 2007). In addition, a formally organized group is
“any non-governmental group of people having announced a name for their group and
using armed force” (Eck & Hultman, 2007).

For state-based one-sided violence, each post-conflict year of observation is coded with a
value directly corresponding to the total number of deaths that occurred because of one-
sided violence by the state. For example, one-sided violence perpetrated by the Government
of Ethiopia in 2013 resulted in eleven fatalities. Therefore, Ethiopia (2013) is coded with a
value of ‘11’. If state-based one-sided violence against civilians did not occur during the
year of observation, the country-year is coded with a value of ‘0’.

One-sided violence by non-state actors is coded similarly, and each year of observation is
coded with a value that directly corresponds to the total number of deaths because of all
OSV events perpetrated by non-state actors. For instance, in Mexico (2014) there were five
casualties resulting from one-sided violence events by non-state actors. As a result, the year
is coded with a value of ‘5’. If there were no fatalities that occurred as a result of non-state
OSV during the year, the year is coded with a value of ‘0’. For the years in which the
cessation of hostilities occurred, meaning the first year of observation for each country
included in the data, OSV is coded only after the calendar day when hostilities ceased. This
is done to exclude one-sided violence that took place during the conflict. Ideally, the data
for state-based OSV would consist of violence perpetrated solely by the police. However,
that information does not exist in the UCDP’s GED data, as the GED data do not
 disaggregate between the different organs of the state security apparatus when it comes to
OSV. I could have done this with the ACLED data (see, Raleigh et al., 2010) though it is
significantly more limited in its temporal and spatial scope.46

46 The ACLED data covers Africa and does not begin until 1997 (Raleigh et al., 2010).
Human Rights
The third and fourth measures of post-conflict peace focus on human rights, and they are extrajudicial killings and torture. Both variables are coded using data from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset (Cingranelli, Richards & Clay, 2014). The dataset spans 1981-2011, and includes annual data on physical integrity rights. I use the data on ‘extrajudicial killings’ and ‘torture’. These two measures of human rights were chosen because they are directly related to the actions of the police and state security institutions, and the provision of security. The role of the police is also explicit in the operationalization of both variables (Cingranelli & Richards, 2014).

CIRI defines extrajudicial killings as “killings by government officials without due process of law. They include murders by private groups if instigated by government”. In addition, extrajudicial killings “may result from the deliberate, illegal, and excessive use of lethal force by the police, security forces, or other agents of the state whether against criminal suspects, detainees, prisoners, or others.” On the other hand, torture “refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, by government officials or by private individuals at the instigation of government officials.” Torture also includes “the use of physical and other force by police and prison guards that is cruel, inhuman, or degrading.”

Practically, both extrajudicial killings and torture are coded based on the same guidelines. Each post-conflict year of observation is coded with a value ranging from ‘0’ to ‘2’, corresponding to the intensity at which the dependent variable, either extrajudicial killings or torture, took place. A value of ‘0’ means that the dependent variable in question did not occur during a year; a value of ‘1’ means that the dependent variable was practiced occasionally during the year of observation; and a value of ‘2’ means that the dependent variable was practiced frequently during the year of observation (Cingranelli & Richards, 2014). The coding is inverted to the original CIRI data. While CIRI’s 0-2 scale ranges from high-low intensity, I have inverted the values so that the 0-2 scale ranges from low-high intensity, so that a higher value represents a higher intensity of the dependent variable.

4.2.3 Independent Variables
As outlined in Chapter 2, there is an absence of large-N empirical research on post-conflict police reform, the engagement of external donors in PCPR processes, and local ownership. Because of these shortcomings, I have collected and coded new data on each of the nine independent variables included in this study. Combined, the collected data represent a new

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47 CIRI has a ‘physical integrity rights’ variable that also includes ‘disappearances’ and ‘political imprisonment’, though neither of them is explicitly conceptualised as pertaining to the actions of police.
empirical contribution to the existing literature on post-conflict police reform, external donor involvement in peacebuilding, and local ownership, as conceptualized and measured via the breadth of local actor engagement in reform processes.

All of the coding of the independent variables is based on secondary sources including reports from international and regional governmental organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union, non-governmental organizations, think tanks and advocacy groups such as Human Rights Watch and International Crisis Group, and academic articles.48 Some of the sources that were most frequently used were reports from the UN Documents Library, which houses reports from the Security Council and Secretaries General, as well as from several UN agencies including the UNDP and the UNHCR. I also consulted several publications from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), which publishes reports on ongoing governance and SSR programs. These sources are arguably less biased and more detailed regarding the engagement between actors than possible alternatives (e.g. blog posts, newspaper articles), as donor organizations are accountable to their constituents and arguably operate under increased scrutiny and transparency. It should, however, be acknowledged that the use of secondary sources is not without limits. It is plausible that donor organizations overestimate their engagement with local actors in order to demonstrate ‘success’ to their constituents. The use of multiple sources in the coding also helps to minimize any potential bias or underlying assumptions made in the secondary source material.

The first independent variable identifies which post-conflict countries have implemented police reform programs, and the second identifies which of those programs have included external donor involvement. Variables three to six are the four distinct types of local ownership, as measured by the engagement of local actors – the executive, parliament, police and civil society – in PCPR. The seventh independent variable considers aggregate variation in local actor engagement across the years of observation. All of the independent variables concerning local ownership are only coded if there was in fact PCPR, and external involvement in the reforms. The final two independent variables pertain to components of post-conflict policing. They are community policing, and female representation programs.

**Post-conflict Police Reform**
The first independent variable is post-conflict police reform (PCPR), which is coded when there is evidence that a national program was implemented with the specific aim to reform, reconstruct, or create a new police service in a post-conflict state, with the goals of

48 The coding of the control variable ‘DDR’ used the same type of source material.
improving the capacity of police to provide internal security and maintain human rights. It can be a standalone program, or it can be part of a larger security sector reform, peacebuilding or stabilization mission. It can also be implemented with or without the involvement or assistance of external actors. The program must however include both institutional reforms, such as changes to monitoring and oversight, vetting and recruitment, and community relations, as well as tactical reforms, which include changes to education and training, the allocation of resources and equipment, and infrastructure development.

For example, Georgia launched a national police reform program in 2004 that included the introduction of a merit-based hiring system, new training procedures for officers, the provision of new equipment and technical resources, increased salaries, and the abolishment of the traffic police (Anti-Corruption Resource Centre 2010; Simons, 2012). Georgia’s PCPR is included because it was a national program that included both tactical and institutional reforms. Countries that implemented only regional police reform programs, or one-off reform facets such as the provision of ethics training, as was done in Romania (Mobekk, 2005), are coded as not having implemented PCPR.

To allow for more nuanced analysis, post-conflict police reform (PCPR) is coded in two ways. The first considers both ongoing and completed post-conflict police reform programs together. For this variable, both ongoing and completed years of PCPR are coded with a value of ‘1’, while years of observation without PCPR are coded with a value of ‘0’. For example, Timor-Leste’s PCPR process began in 2006 as part of UNMIT; it started to wind-down in 2009, and was formally completed in 2012 (Lemay-Hébert, 2009; UNMIT; CIGI, 2009). As a result, Timor-Leste is coded with a value of ‘0’ from 1999-2005, and with a value of ‘1’ from 2006-2014.

The second way that I code post-conflict police reform considers only completed program years, as compared to either no PCPR, or ongoing PCPR. Each year of observation is coded with a value of ‘1’ if the country-year of observation had a completed post-conflict police reform process and with a value of ‘0’ otherwise. The case of Timor-Leste can also serve to illustrate the coding of this variable structure. In this instance, Timor-Leste is coded with a value of ‘0’ from 1999-2011, and with a value of ‘1’ from 2012-2014. The combination of the two coding approaches allows me to separate the effects of ongoing reform efforts from completed reforms.

To be considered a completed PCPR program, there must be documentation from either the government of the host state or the external actors involved, stating that the reform process is complete. This differentiates completed PCPR programs from those that ended for other reasons (e.g. budget constraints, political instability).
**External Involvement**

The second independent variable captures the involvement of external actors in post-conflict police reform. As discussed in the previous chapter, three criteria are required in order for a party to be considered an external actor. First, the actor must be external to the state, meaning that it cannot be an internal state-based actor or a non-state actor based in the state. Second, the actor must be an international or regional governmental organisation, or a single, bilateral or group of foreign states. Third, the actor’s mandate must include the provision of security sector reform, or police reform more explicitly. This requirement means that actors and organizations that do not have mandated and/or operational expertise in police/security reforms, such as religious actors and some aid organizations, are excluded. External involvement in post-conflict police reform is coded dichotomously for every post-conflict year of observation in which there is either an ongoing or completed police reform program. External involvement is not coded in post-conflict country years in which there is no PCPR.

**Local Ownership**

As discussed in the previous chapter, while there are several aspects of local ownership, this study focuses on only one of them: engagement. More specifically, it focuses on the breadth of local actors that are engaged in PCPR, as opposed to the depth or quality of their engagement. The following section moves into the operationalization of the five independent variables that consider the breadth of local engagement in post-conflict police reform efforts. Each of the five variables is coded only when there is evidence of post-conflict police reform taking place, and when there is evidence that there was external actor involvement in the reform process, as operationalised above. The first four independent variables consider the engagement of local actors – namely the executive, parliament, the police and civil society – as it pertains to post-conflict police reform. The fifth independent variable pertaining to local ownership concerns variation in the breadth of local actor engagement, and in the next chapter it is used to look at how increased local actor engagement impacts post-conflict peace.

*Executive Engagement*

Executive engagement in post-conflict police reform is coded dichotomously, with a value of ‘1’ when two criteria are met. First, there must be evidence showing that the executive of the host state had decision-making power over the reforms being implemented. Second, there must be evidence that there was regular and formalized interaction between the executive and the external donor actors involved in the reforms. Executive engagement is seen in the case of Sierra Leone (2004), where the executive and the ministry of internal
affairs worked with the United Nations (UNAMSIL) and other external donor on the recruitment and training of new police officers, as well on the development of a new code of conduct for the police (UNSG 228, 2004). Moreover, additional sources show that UNAMSIL established a close relationship with the executive of Sierra Leone under President Kabbah, and acted only with consent from the executive on the reform process (von Gienanth & Hansen, 2006).

When the criteria for executive engagement are not met, or when there is evidence that the executive was excluded from or marginalized within the reform process, the year is coded with a value of ‘0’. A value of ‘0’ is also assigned when there is evidence that the executive of the host state either opposed or fought against the implementation of the reforms. This was the case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2010). Evidence shows that there was a lack of political will on the part of the executive to work with external donors and local partners on the implementation of reforms, and that there was opposition towards strengthening the police out of fear of a coup attempt (Chatham House, 2010).

**Parliamentary Engagement**

Parliamentary engagement is coded dichotomously, and with a value of ‘1’ when there is evidence that the parliament of the host state was engaged in decision-making and oversight of the reform process. Parliamentary engagement can also be evidenced through the undertaking of research projects relating to the police or the reform process, and joint conferences and workshops with external donors regarding the implementation of the reforms. Burundi (2012) provides an example of parliamentary engagement. While parliamentary engagement had been weak during the initial phase of Burundi’s PCPR process (North-South Institute, 2007), it increased following the creation of two parliamentary commissions on defense and security that acted as a counterpart to both donor organizations and civil society, as well as the strengthening of engagement between parliament, the police and civil society (Baranyi & Salahub, 2011). Moreover, in 2012, Burundi’s parliament participated in joint security workshops with civil society groups and the police that resulted in the creation of new human rights related legislation (Ball, 2014). If there is no evidence of parliamentary engagement in the reform process, or if there is evidence showing that parliament was excluded from or marginalized within the reform process, the year of observation is coded with a value of ‘0’. The absence of parliamentary ownership is seen in the case of Bosnia (1996) where according to Perdan

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49 Though rare, if a country does not have a functioning parliament it is coded with a value of ‘0’, seeing as there is no parliament to have engagement in or ownership of the post-conflict police reform process.
(2008), it’s parliament did not engage or assert itself in the reform effort, or attempt to provide any oversight of the established security institutions, until much later in the process.

**Police Engagement**

Police engagement in PCPR is coded dichotomously, and with a value of ‘1’, when there is evidence that a police service was involved in the planning for the reform process, and in the development of national policing and security policies. Police involvement in PCPR is evidenced by consultation with police representatives during the reform process. These can include consultations regarding the mandate and oversight of the police, to more technical aspects such as uniforms and investigative techniques. Policing and security planning takes place through the creation of joint security apparatuses between external security providers and the police. An example of police engagement is seen in Liberia (2011), where the Liberia National Police (LNP) worked with the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) on evaluating and reprioritizing the reform process on multiple occasions (UNSC Report 958, 2006). In addition, UNMIL continued to provide training assistance to the Liberian National Police (LNP), and partnered with the LNP on the construction and development of a new National Training Academy (UNSC Report 497, 2011). When there is evidence that the police were excluded from the reform process, the year is coded with a value of ‘0’. Police exclusion from the reform process is visible when reforms are carried out without the executive of the host state and the external actors involved consulting police representatives. One example of this is seen in the case of Haiti (2005 & 2007), where several sources (see, Donais, 2005; International Crisis Group, 2011; Meharg & Arnusch, 2010) note that external donors simply implemented reforms without any consultation with the Haitian National Police (HNP). For example, the International Crisis Group (2011) chastised MINUSHTAH and encouraged its personnel to begin engaging with their HNP counterparts in order to foster ownership of the reforms. The Report also discussed that while the HNP was weak and inactive at first, and that the UN had to drive the reforms, that its capacity had improved and the HNP had become active enough to be engaged in the reform process.

**Civil Society Engagement**

To be coded as having civil society engagement in PCPR, two criteria must be met. First, there must be evidence of the provision of support from external donors to existing civil society organizations (CSO’s) – or for the creation of new CSO’s – that focus on police oversight, human rights, or the rights of marginalized groups in relation to security. Second, there must be evidence of civil society participation in public forums regarding the implementation of PCPR. Civil society engagement can also take place through the
completion of needs based assessments and public security surveys, as they serve to gauge the security needs and concerns of society at large (Nathan 2008). The case of Liberia (2013) provides a case of civil society engagement. Before 2011, Liberia’s civil society did not believe that the police reform process or the Liberia National Police (LNP) operated with appropriate civil society engagement, or under enough transparency (Search for Common Ground, 2011). Following that assessment there was a concerted push to strengthen civil society engagement, and it took place through increased funding and cooperation with CSO’s including the National Civil Society Council and the Women’s NGO Secretariat, as well as public outreach regarding the reform process and policing activities (SSR Resource Centre). In 2013, there were over 600 community forums on policing held throughout Liberia (UNSC Report 124, 2013). New security policies and policing programs developed as a result (Search for Common Ground, 2013). Conversely, when there is no evidence that points to civil society engagement during the PCPR process, or when there are reports citing a lack of civil society engagement, the year is coded with a value of ‘0’. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2007), the US and other donor agencies did not engage local stakeholders or community members regarding the reform process, which lead to Congolese civil society lacking a voice in their own security (Nlandu Mayamba, 2013; Oxfam, 2010; Enough Project, 2012).

Increased Local Engagement

To investigate variation in local actor engagement in PCPR and its relationship to post-conflict peace, I include an independent variable that considers the number of local actors that were engaged in a PCPR process. For this variable, each year of observation is coded with a value between 0-4, corresponding to the number of local actors (the executive, parliament, the police, and civil society) that were engaged in PCPR during that year. A value of ‘0’ is assigned if there is no local actor engagement in PCPR during the year of observation, whereas a value of ‘4’ is attributed to post-conflict years of observation in which all four of the local actors were engaged in the reform process. This allows me to test whether there is a cumulative effect of increased local actor engagement.

Community Policing

Community policing is coded dichotomously. Each year of observation is coded with a value of ‘1’ if there was a functioning national community-policing program and with a value of ‘0’ otherwise. To be considered to have community policing, there must be a national program with the explicit goal of improving community-police relations, and dedicated policing staff who work on community policing. If a country only implemented a regional or local community policing program, it is coded with ‘0’, to ensure that I am only
picking up expansive community policing programs. External involvement is not required for community policing to be coded with a value of ‘1’, as they can be both nationally and externally driven programs.

The case of Rwanda provides an example of community policing. In 2007, the Government of Rwanda, along with the Rwanda National Police and some support from external donor actors, launched a national community-policing program aimed at improving police-community relations. The program includes a Community-Policing Commissioner, and Community Policing Committees in each region that are made up of members of each community, who meet regularly with the police to discuss issues of importance (Government of Rwanda; Rwanda National Police). As such, Rwanda (2007) is coded as having community policing.

Female Representation Programs
Female representation is coded dichotomously. Each year of observation is coded with either a value of ‘1’ if there was an ongoing national program aimed at increasing the representation of women in the police service, or with a value of ‘0’ otherwise. For instance, the operationalization excludes ‘gender sensitive policing programs’ if they did not include provisions for increasing the representation of women in the police. To be considered as having a female representation program, there must be a national program aimed at increasing the representation of women within officer roles in the police. The program may also aim to increase the representation of women within administrative and civilian roles in the police. Moreover, the program can be implemented with or without the involvement of external actors.

An example of a female representation program is seen in the case of Rwanda. As part of its 2003 Constitution, Rwanda aimed to increase the percentage of women within the police – as officers and in the administration – to 30%. Rwanda has also initiated training for all of its police officers on UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000), as well as on gender-based violence (UNSC Resolution 1325; UN Women, 2014).

4.2.4 Control Variables
The analyses also include a set of control variables, as it is important to exclude variables that may reduce parsimony in statistical models (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). While some scholars advocate for the “rule of three”, others claim that all possible control variables should be included (see, e.g., Achen, 2002; Achen, 2005; Dunning, 2010; Kadera & Mclaughlin Mitchell, 2005). A set of eight control variables that are either known or suspected confounders of the independent and dependent variables are included (see,
The control variables are: regime type, GDP per capita (logged), GDP growth/decline, conflict intensity, conflict end-type, the duration of peace, the presence of a UN peacebuilding mission, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR).

Regime Type
Regime type likely influences whether or not post-conflict police reform is implemented, as well as what the reform process includes, and the extent of external actor involvement in it. Certain types of regimes, namely autocracies and anocracies, are also more likely to experience intrastate conflict, and to engage in one-sided violence and human rights violations (Hegre et al. 2001, Gurses & Mason 2010, Eck & Hultman 2007). Regime type is coded with data from the Polity IV Project: Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2015 (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers 2016). Each year of observation is coded with a value ranging from +10 to -10. The value +10 represents a regime that is strongly democratic such as Canada, and the value -10 represents a regime that is strongly autocratic such as Bahrain (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers, 2016).

GDP
GDP per capita may reflect the ability of a post-conflict state to implement PCPR independently, or alternatively, the amount of external donor assistance that is required. GDP per capita may also affect the capacity of a post-conflict state to sustain the implemented reforms in the long run, and without continued external assistance. Higher GDP per capita may also illustrate more advanced and diverse civil society institutions, which in turn may affect the local ownership of the reforms implemented, as they would be more able to demand concessions and to be included in the reform process. GDP per capita is coded with data from the World Bank (2015a). Each year of observation is coded with a value that directly corresponds to its GDP per capita (logged).

GDP Growth/decline
GDP growth/decline is controlled for because poor economic growth is associated with a higher likelihood of civil war onset (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006). In addition, positive GDP growth/decline is positively associated with police reform outcomes (Morgan & Winship, 2007). The control variables are: regime type, GDP per capita (logged), GDP growth/decline, conflict intensity, conflict end-type, the duration of peace, the presence of a UN peacebuilding mission, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR).

50 Two additional measures of regime type/level of democracy are included in the robustness checks. The first is a reduced version of the Polity2 data using only a 3-point scale (0-2), and the second is a binary measure of democracy taken from the Quality of Government data (Qu et al., 2017).
51 GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products (World Bank 2015a).
growth may also increase the likelihood that post-conflict police reform is implemented, as well as the sustainability of the reforms. GDP growth is coded with data from the World Bank (2015b). Each year of observation is coded with a value that directly corresponds to its “annual percentage growth rate of GDP” (World Bank, 2015b).

**Conflict Intensity**
To my knowledge, there are no existing studies that link conflict intensity to the success of post-conflict police reform, or security sector reform more generally. However, conflict intensity affects grievances, opportunities for renewed conflict, and the durability of peace (Walter, 2011). There is also literature that shows that more protracted and intense conflicts lead to more difficult conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes (Fortna, 2004, Mason et al., 2011), and that feelings of insecurity prevail when there is a large number of casualties (Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothschild, 2001). Conflict intensity is coded using data from the UCDP Battle-related Deaths Dataset v.5-2015 (UCDP, 2015; Pettersson, 2014). Each year of observation is coded with a value corresponding to the “best estimate” of the total number of battle-related deaths that occurred during the conflict episode before the cessation of hostilities.

**Conflict End-Type**
While there is no existing research that I am aware of that considers conflict end type in relation to post-conflict police reform, the means through which a conflict ends may influence whether or not PCPR is implemented. For instance, post-conflict police reform programs are often mandated for in peace agreements (Ansorg, Haass & Strasheim, 2016). In addition, existing research informs us that conflicts that end with a victory of the government over the other parties are less likely to lead to conflict recurrence (Kreutz, 2010, Toft, 2010b). Conflict end type is coded using data from the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset v.2-2015, 1946-2013 (Kreutz, 2010). Each year is coded dichotomously, and with a value of ‘1’ when the conflict cessation occurs as a result of a peace or ceasefire agreement, and with a value of ‘0’ otherwise.

**Duration of Peace**
The duration of peace is controlled for using data from the UCDP/PRIIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2015 (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Each year of observation is coded with a value that directly corresponds to the number of years since the final year of intra-state armed conflict. It is a count of the number of ‘peace years’ (see, e.g. Walter, 2004). For example, Bosnia’s final year of intra-state conflict took place in 1995. As a result, the year 1996 is coded with a value of ‘1’, and the year 2014 is coded with a value of ‘19’.
UN Mission
The presence of a UN mission may affect whether or not PCPR is implemented, as well as how it is carried out on the ground, and the budget and technical resources available. The presence of a UN mission may also deter actors from engaging in one-sided violence and human rights abuses against civilians, independently (Hultman, 2013). In addition, since the end of the twentieth century the UN has also moved systematically to promote and foster norms of civilian protection (Bellamy & Hunt 2015; Hultman, 2010). Each year of observation is coded dichotomously, and with a value of ‘1’ if there was an ongoing UN mission, and with a value of ‘0’ otherwise. To be considered a UN Mission, there must be an ongoing UN presence with the specific goal of peacekeeping, peacebuilding or stabilization. Conversely, if there were only UN observers or technical advisors without a larger peacekeeping mission, it is coded with a value of ‘0’. As mentioned in Chapter 3, research by Hultman, Kathman and Wood (2013) has found that the more military and police forces the UN commits to a peacekeeping mission during conflict, the less civilian casualties there will be. Additional tests have been run with a control for the size of the peacekeeping mission in the post-conflict period; the results are discussed in Chapter 6.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
The implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is controlled for because it is meant to (among other things) reduce the capacity of rebel groups to engage in violence, namely one-sided violence against civilians (Schulhofer-Wohl & Sambanis 2010). Former combatants that are disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated into society effectively become less of a threat to the government. As such, it is less likely that the government will view them as political opponents, and perpetrate one-sided violence, or human rights abuses against them. Finally, DDR programs often go hand in hand with the implementation of PCPR. Each year of observation is coded with a value of ‘0’ if there was no DDR program, with a value of ‘1’ if there was an ongoing DDR program, and with a value of ‘2’ if the DDR program was complete. To be considered as having DDR, the country must have had a national DDR program, as opposed to a regional or pilot program. It must also have included either a reintegration or a reinsertion program, in addition to both disarmament and demobilization. This control variable was hand coded using the same material as the coding of the independent variables (further outlined in section 4.2.3)

4.2.5 Limitations
While the quantitative component of this study contributes to existing research on post-conflict police reform and local ownership, it is important to acknowledge its limitations.

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52 This is in line with existing research by Hultman, Kathman & Shannon (2014) who find that technical missions actually increase the likelihood of one-sided violence.
First, and as previously discussed, all of the independent variables were coded by the author. Although they represent significant original data, they are all based on secondary sources and are not without potential biases given that donor organizations may overestimate their engagement with local actors. Selection effects may also be an issue. I have tried to deal with this possibility by ‘controlling’ for aspects that might impact which post-conflict countries ‘get’ LO (e.g. Fortna, 2004), but it is possible that variables that are not controlled for will do this better. In addition, while this study takes an important first step in examining local ownership using Large-N data, the re-conceptualization and operationalization of local ownership based on the breadth of local engagement only captures a minimal amount of ‘depth’ or quality. The results are subsequently unable to speak to the quality or depth of local ownership. Second, the dependent variables used only capture ‘negative peace’ (see, Galtung, 1996), namely, the absence of violence. It would be beneficial to develop and test dependent variables that are more intrinsically linked to the quality of policing, the effectiveness of police reform, or social trust in the police. Unfortunately, no existing global data would have enabled that type of analysis. There is at present a lack of existing data on the outcomes of police reform programs. While other measures such as crime rates, were considered, these also have limitations. For instance, higher crime rates may indicate that people feel safer reporting crimes, as opposed to being illustrative of a country actually having a higher rate of crime. In turn, it may be that people in countries with lower crime rates are afraid to come forward to police or other public officials. Finally, due to feasibility and time constraints, I was not able to further refine some of the independent variables. It would have been beneficial to further disaggregate the type of external actors involved in a PCPR process. It would have also been beneficial to disaggregate civil society engagement in order to consider the engagement of minority and vulnerable populations more explicitly.

4.3 Qualitative Study

This second part of the chapter focuses on the qualitative component of the study. Specifically, it discusses the case study of Kosovo’s post-conflict police reform process, and presents the research design through which it investigates the implications of local ownership on Kosovo’s PCPR process. According to Yin (1994: 13), case study research is “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. Moreover, case study research allows for a thorough and empirically rich analysis of a phenomena or event; in this case, the local ownership of post-conflict police reform in Kosovo. In addition, case studies are useful tools for answering questions of ‘how’

53 Selection effects are also considered in Section 6.6 (Additional Robustness checks).
and ‘why’, an important observation given that the overarching research question of this study is: How does the local ownership of post-conflict police reform impact post-conflict peace?

The case study on post-conflict Kosovo includes three different groups of respondents – external personnel involved in the police reform process, local Kosovo Police and security personnel, and civil society – which in turn allows for within case comparison (Yin, 1994). The next section discusses the case selection of post-conflict Kosovo. An overview of the research design, including a discussion of some of the ethical issues that arise from fieldwork is then highlighted, along with the types of participants recruited, an overview of the interviews and the questions asked, and the means through which the interview data was analysed.

4.3.1 Case Selection
There are three main reasons for the selection of post-conflict Kosovo. First, while the conflict between the KLA and the Government of Yugoslavia was not protracted, lasting only from 1998-1999, it resulted in approximately 3,000 casualties and almost 1 million displaced persons (Human Rights Watch, 2001). In addition, there was also a large security vacuum in Kosovo during the immediate aftermath of the war, as many of the Serbian-dominated state institutions were withdrawn by Belgrade, or dismantled (Derks-Normandin, 2014). Second, post-conflict Kosovo has had a large external actor presence since the end of war; some have called it one of the most comprehensive peace and state-building endeavors in modern history (Lemay-Hébert, 2011). The scope and depth of the police reform program implemented in Kosovo has been accordingly extensive, consisting of broad sweeping recruitment and training processes, infrastructure and capacity development, and the installation of several governance and oversight mechanisms (Eckhard, 2016). The reasons above, namely the security vacuum created following the end of the conflict, and the large and relatively long-term presence of external donors, make Kosovo a relatively unique case of post-conflict peacebuilding. In addition, ‘local ownership’ was adopted as a key driver of the overall peacebuilding and reform processes in Kosovo (Pietz, 2011; Eckhard, 2016), making it of central interest to study in more depth. The situation in Kosovo also made it possible to interview international personnel, local security personnel and civilians, and to gain firsthand knowledge of their experiences and perceptions of the police reform process. Finally, to locate Kosovo within the quantitative portion of this thesis, it is worth noting that Kosovo is a case that, over time, developed relatively ‘high’ local ownership and had little one-sided violence and human rights violations. As such, Kosovo can be seen as a ‘success’, and therefore is a case where I am most likely to observe the causal mechanisms at work.
4.3.2 Research Design
The case study used semi-structured, in-depth interviews. Semi-structured interviews allow participants to elaborate on certain aspects or thoughts at their choosing, while also allowing the researcher to keep the questions constant (Brounéus, 2011). In-depth interviews enabled me to examine the engagement between local and external actors with more nuance than in the large-N statistical analysis, and to more accurately gauge the extent to which local ownership was achieved, as well as its implications for Kosovo’s PCPR process. The interviews also provided an opportunity to become aware of other causal mechanisms that might link local ownership of PCPR to post-conflict peace, another benefit of case study research (see e.g., George & Bennet, 2005). While the case study could have been completed by looking only at secondary source materials or conducting surveys, with interviews I was able to consider and answer the research question with information provided first hand by individuals ‘on the ground’ (Brounéus, 2011). As a result, and through interviewing individuals who are familiar with Kosovo’s PCPR program, as well as those that experienced the PCPR process (civil society) and its outcomes (the reformed Kosovo Police), new insights and perspectives on local ownership as it pertains to post-conflict police reform were gained.

The Participants
Sampling from representative groups is an important tool, and is of particular importance for qualitative case study research (Marshall, 1996). For the purposes of this study, snowball sampling, which involves asking participants to suggest additional participants from within their own workplaces, or work and social networks (see, Vogt, 2005), was used to recruit the bulk of the participants. Snowball sampling is effective to “locate, access, and involve people from specific populations” that may not be easily accessed (Cohen & Arieli, 2011). In addition, snowball sampling is also useful for addressing potential mistrust between the interviewer and the interviewees, given that the interviewee is introduced through a trusted social relation (Cohen & Arieli, 2011).

Participants from three groups were recruited: external donor personnel who have worked on Kosovo’s post-conflict police reform process, local personnel working on the PCPR process or for the Kosovo Police, and members of civil society. External donor personnel involved in Kosovo’s PCPR were included because local ownership is in principle, based on the assumption that actors other than ‘locals’ are involved in the reform process, and directly impact whether local ownership is fostered, as well as the quality of it (Nathan, 2007). The theoretical framework presented in the previous chapter is also based on the engagement between local and external actors, thus further necessitating their inclusion.
The second group of participants consists of local personnel who have worked on the PCPR process, namely Kosovo Police personnel, and staff from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This group is important because it represents the local actors who are most directly engaged in the implementation of reforms, as well as the management of the Kosovo Police. They are also a quasi ‘middle ground’ of engagement between external actors and civilians. Moreover, Kosovo Police personnel are ultimately responsible for ensuring the security and stability of Kosovo following the withdrawal of external actors, and in the long-term.

The third group of participants is ‘civil society’, which was important to include because during security reforms they have contact with personnel from both the Kosovo Police and external donor organizations. Civilians are also theoretically responsible for acting as a check on the behavior of security sector institutions, and they are ultimately responsible for providing security sector institutions with legitimacy (Nathan, 2007). Moreover, civil society engagement means that civilians have more opportunities to have their security needs heard non-violently, which reduces potential threats against the state (see, Davenport, 2007a), and subsequently, the need for human rights violations to be used for coercive purposes by the state. It should also be noted that local ownership rests on the tenant that the reforms implemented must include a certain degree of local will, participation and ownership (Donais, 2009a; Sedra, 2006). ‘Civil society’ is further broken down into staff of human rights and security-related NGO’s and think tanks, and local community members.

In total, twenty-three people were interviewed. 54 Seven of the participants were female and sixteen were male. Nine of them were from external donor organisations, 55 six were local security personnel, and eight were from civil society. In addition, seven of the participants from external donor organisations were from intergovernmental organisations and two were from embassies/consulates. With regards to the local security personnel, one of the participants was from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), one was an administrator in the Kosovo Police, and four were KP officers. Finally, of the participants from civil society, five of them worked for NGO’s and think tanks, and three were civilian.

The Interviews
The interviews focused on four key areas. First, the interviewees were asked questions about their general perceptions and understanding of local ownership. Because the focus of

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54 It is important to note that the scope of this study changed after the fieldwork was completed. This study was originally meant to focus on the local ownership of more comprehensive security sector reform processes. However, due to feasibility, the scope of the project changed to focus more specifically on post-conflict police reform.

55 Some of the participants from external donor organisations allowed me to identify their organisational affiliation, and I have done this where possible.
this study is on ‘local ownership’, it was important to first gain an understanding of people’s general perceptions of the term. In the second part of the interviews, I asked participants about their perceptions of the interaction between different groups (e.g. external personnel and civil society) during the PCPR process. The third part of the interviews focused on the respondent’s perceptions of how local ownership has influenced Kosovo’s PCPR process. Finally, I asked the participants about factors they believe have hampered the development of local ownership as it pertains to PCPR in Kosovo.

The interviews lasted between thirty-five and seventy-five minutes, and they were all conducted in English. Eighteen of the interviews were recorded with audio, and five of them were recorded using detailed notes, at the request of the participants. It is also important to note that the individuals interviewed did so voluntarily, so as to better ensure the reliability and validity of the responses provided. Written consent was given by each of the participants prior to the start of their interview, and how the research would be used was clarified, in line with the University of Otago’s Ethics Committee. 

Analysis
After the interviews were complete, the next step was transcription. During the transcription process, it was crucial to ensure that all of the recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim. I then read the transcripts, and made notes and memos in order to get a sense of the overarching themes and trends that came through in the interview data (Rubin & Rubin, 2005; Braun & Clarke, 2006). Then, I turned to the use of thematic analysis – used to identify, analyse and report themes and patterns in data (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Joffe, 2012; Robson, 2011) – to analyse the transcripts. Thematic analysis is beneficial for gaining “a more naturalistic inroad” for understanding “the phenomenon under study” (Joffe, 2012: 212), in this case the local ownership of PCPR. In addition, Joffre (2012: 211) contends that thematic analysis is useful for drawing out the complexity and the subtlety of the results found.

In practice, thematic analysis can be done both through induction and deduction, which means that the results originate from both the theoretical framework created and the raw data available (Joffe, 2012). Thematic analysis therefore also accounts for the role that the researcher plays in identifying themes and recurrences in the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Moreover, thematic analysis is also “driven by the researcher’s theoretical or analytic interest in the area” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 12), and as such, it fits nicely with the scope of this research.

56 Please see Chapter 4 for more information regarding the overall research design and ethical considerations.
Taking into account the research question, and the theoretical framework that guides this research, themes and trends pertaining to the overarching research question were developed (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2008). Specifically, the themes focused on the engagement between local and external actors in the PCPR process, as well as ‘local ownership’ in particular and its relationship to post-conflict peace.

**Ethical Considerations and Transparency**

Conducting in-depth interviews on sensitive topics in post-conflict settings requires careful consideration of ethical issues on the part of the researcher (Brounéus, 2011). Ethics approval from the University of Otago’s Human Ethics Committee was received before fieldwork began. Though as discussed by Brounéus (2011), regardless of the ethics practices required by a university, it is the responsibility of the researcher to be aware of potential ethical issues throughout fieldwork. In undertaking the fieldwork, it was important to provide complete anonymity for all of the participants. Anonymity is necessary in a study such as this due to the sensitive nature of some of the topics being discussed. This is especially true for individuals working directly in the PCPR process, and their subsequent dependence upon employers such as the European Union and the Kosovo Police. Great care was also taken to ensure that the individuals interviewed did so voluntarily, an aspect that is important for ethical considerations, as well as for the reliability and validity of the responses. For instance, if a respondent was pressured into participating (e.g. by their employer), it is plausible that the responses may not be truthful or reliable. As a result, after explaining the purpose of the interview, the voluntary nature of participation was emphasized. Each of the participants was also informed that they were free to stop the interview at any point if they felt uncomfortable.

Given the research tenant to “do no harm” it was also important to consider the participants’ physical and emotional safety (Brounéus, 2011). With regards to the recruitment process, and given that post-Kosovo is a sensitive political environment, it was vital to ensure the security of the participants, and that they would not face a greater risk by participating in the research (Wood, 2006). This was done through confirming the anonymity of the participants and the voluntary nature of the interviews both during the recruitment process and again before commencing with the interview. As for the interviews themselves, they were all conducted in either private offices or in public settings such as cafes, based on the preference and comfort of the participant. Given that it is possible to create psychological and emotional distress by discussing certain aspects of the conflict and post-conflict

57 The University of Otago Ethics Committee reference number for this research is 14/080.
58 The names of the participants are not included in the findings of the fieldwork (Chapter 7).
environments, it was also important to be very careful in selecting appropriate and non-harming interview questions, especially with regards to the local participants. Moreover, it was imperative to ask only questions necessary for answering the research question, in order to mitigate the risk of re-traumatization (Brounéus, 2011).

4.3.3 Limitations
Due to budget and time constraints, the number of people that I was able to interview was limited. Moreover, the participants were based in only two of Kosovo’s municipalities: Pristina and Mitrovica. While it would have been possible to visit other municipalities to try to recruit participants, I had to consider the costs and benefits of venturing to other areas in relation to the number of people I would be able to interview.59 On the other hand, Pristina and Mitrovica were arguably the most substantively interesting places for me to conduct interviews. Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, is the primary location in which external donor organizations and their personnel are based. Pristina is also home to more than twenty-five percent of Kosovo’s population. Mitrovica has arguably had the most tenuous security and policing conditions since the end of the conflict, heightened by its North-South division between ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanians (Bajraktari & Parajon, 2006).

4.4. Conclusions
This chapter has presented the research design and methods used to test the hypotheses established in Chapter 3, and to answer the overarching research question, how does the local ownership of post-conflict police reform impact post-conflict peace? First, the chapter outlined the reasoning for taking a mixed methods approach, highlighting the benefits of both quantitative and qualitative research. The chapter then focused on the research design and methods used in the quantitative study, outlining the universe of cases, presenting the operational definitions of the variables included, and detailing the statistical models used. The third part of this chapter discussed the methodological decisions made relating to the case study on Kosovo’s post-conflict police reform process. The final section also discussed the types or interview participants recruited and the transcription and analysis of interview data.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present the results of this research. Specifically, Chapter 5 shows descriptive statistics that examine the distribution of local ownership and police reform over time. Chapter 6 presents the results of the statistical analysis. Chapter 7 focuses on the

59 Though I believe this research would have benefited considerably from responses from relatively more rural participants, it was not a possibility due to resource constraints and feasibility.
case study of post-conflict police reform in Kosovo, drawing its findings from interviews with twenty-three people.
5. Descriptive Statistics

This chapter presents new global data on post-conflict police reform (PCPR), as well as on the involvement of external actors in PCPR processes. It also introduces new global data on the engagement of local actors in PCPR processes. In addition, this chapter examines trends in community policing and female representation programs that arise from these data. The following chapter (Statistical Analysis) moves from examining descriptive trends to more multivariate statistical models.

This chapter proceeds in four parts. First, trends in post-conflict police reform are charted over time and by region. It then looks at the bivariate relationship that PCPR has with the dependent variables used to measure post-conflict peace: state and non-state one-sided violence, extrajudicial killings by the state and torture. The second section focuses on the involvement of external donors in PCPR, and look at trends in external donor involvement over time and by region, before examining its bivariate relationship to the dependent variables. The third section focuses on local ownership, which is constrained to the aspect of ‘engagement’, and considers the prevalence of each of the four types of local actor engagement, and their bivariate relationships to post-conflict peace. In the final section, the prevalence of community policing and female representation programs are considered, as well as their relationships to the dependent variables. This chapter represents a significant original contribution to the literature, as it is the first time that global trends in post-conflict police reform (PCPR) and local ownership have been described together, and over time.
This chapter begins by looking at the general occurrence of post-conflict police reform processes over time and by region. Figure 5.1.1 is relatively intuitive, illustrating that the initiation and implementation of PCPR programs has increased over time, most noticeably from the mid-1990s through 2006-2007, during which the peak number of programs (18) were ongoing. The rise in implementation is likely because as the Cold War ended, the international community became more involved in post-conflict peacebuilding, as well as more concerned with issues such as human security. This period also saw the termination of several conflicts including those in the Balkans (e.g. Bosnia & Herzegovina, Macedonia, Croatia, and Slovenia) as well as in Lesotho, and Guatemala (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Figure 5.1.1 also details that the number of completed PCPR programs increased from 2007 onwards, while the number of post-conflict countries that have not implemented any PCPR – which is also the majority of post-conflict states – has remained relatively constant during the past fifteen years.
Figure 5.1.2 – Post-conflict Police Reform (1989-2014), by Region

Figure 5.1.2 examines regional variation in the prevalence of post-conflict police reform. While Africa has had the most years of PCPR (90) overall, it also has the highest number of post-conflict years in which police reform programs have not been introduced (345). Conversely, it appears that PCPR is more likely to occur in Europe and the Americas. Finally, Figure 5.1.2 indicates that no PCPR programs have taken place in the Middle East, although there are relatively fewer years of observation in the region (26), as compared to the other four. This result is likely due to the fact that there have been very few post-conflict years in the Middle East, although significantly more ongoing conflict years (Gleditsch et al., 2002).

Table 5.1.1 – The Effects of Post-conflict Police Reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No PCPR</th>
<th>PCPR</th>
<th>p.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>State-based</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSV (%)</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n. 1080)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-state</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSV (%)</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n. 1080)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kill</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n. 827)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Torture</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60.3%</td>
<td>58.9%</td>
<td>(n. 827)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.1 shows us the results of chi-square tests of the relationships between post-conflict police reform and the dependent variables used to measure post-conflict peace. From Table 5.1 it appears that PCPR positively impacts post-conflict peace, as both state and non-state one-sided violence (OSV), as well as extrajudicial killings, occur less frequently in post-conflict years that have either ongoing or completed PCPR than in years without PCPR. Non-state OSV, for example, happens in approximately 19% of post-conflict years without PCPR, while it takes place in 15% of post-conflict years that have either ongoing or completed PCPR. Overall, these results show that post-conflict police reform positively impacts post-conflict peace. However, they do not tell us whether PCPR has an independent impact on any of the dependent variables in question. It is plausible for instance, that the implementation of PCPR coincides with other peacebuilding mechanisms (e.g. peacekeeping, DDR), and that the effects of their implementation are driving the results. These limitations highlight the importance of further statistical analysis.

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60 Each of the dependent variables is coded dichotomously for the purposes of this introductory analysis.
61 The results pertaining to post-conflict police reform and torture are not statistically significant. This result may be due to a lack of variation in the dependent variable; torture remains relatively similar across the two categories.
5.2 External Actor Involvement

*Figure 5.2.1 – External Involvement in Post-conflict Police Reform, 1989-2014*

Figure 5.2.1 shows that the majority of post-conflict police reform programs involve external donor actors. This observation is expected given the costs associated with carrying out large peacebuilding and stabilization programs. It also appears that the incidence of external actor involvement in PCPR increased steadily from the late 1990’s onwards (in line with an overall increase in PCPR programs), and more dramatically beginning in 2003. Figure 5.2.1 also illustrates that while the prevalence of PCPR programs carried out *without* external actor involvement also rose from around 2000, it decreased during the period 2011-2014.
Figure 5.2.2 - External Involvement in Post-conflict Police Reform (1989-2014), by Region

Figure 5.4 looks at the involvement of external actors in ongoing post-conflict police reform programs by region. Figure 5.4 shows that almost all years of PCPR in Europe have had external actor involvement. In fact, of the 67 years of observation (of ongoing PCPR) in Europe, only 11 did not include external actor involvement, such as in the case of Russia. Similarly, 77% of the years of PCPR in Africa include the involvement of external donors, and 74% of the observations of PCPR from Asia include external actor involvement. One of the most interesting observations from Figure 5.4 is that ‘the Americas’ is the only region where there have been more years of PCPR implemented without external involvement than with. An example is seen in the case of Guatemala during the late 1990’s. There are several plausible explanations for this observation. One claim is that many countries in Latin America have fewer needs for external donor support (Johnson, Mendelson Forman & Bliss, 2012). Finally, there are no years of observation for the Middle East, as there have been no PCPR programs implemented in the region (see, Figure 5.1.2).

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62 Completed post-conflict police reform programs cannot include external actor involvement in the reform process, as they are ‘complete’ and no longer ongoing. As a result, these years are excluded from this analysis.
5.3 Local Actor Engagement

In line with the primary focus of this thesis, the breadth of engagement of local actors in PCPR as one aspect of local ownership, this section looks at the incidence at which local actors have been engaged in post-conflict police reform efforts. As discussed previously, the engagement of four local actors is considered: the executive, the police, parliament and civil society, both over time and regionally. The relationships between the engagement of each of the four local actors and the dependent variables are also examined.

Figure 5.3 – Local Actor Engagement in Post-conflict Police Reform, 1989-2014

Figure 5.3 illustrates that the prevalence of local actor engagement in post-conflict police reform processes has increased over time. The increase in local actor engagement coincides with the increasing awareness from both scholars and donors of the importance of local actors in externally driven peacebuilding efforts. Figure 5.3 illustrates that the executive of the host state is involved in the majority of PCPR processes, and that the occurrence of ‘no executive engagement’ is relatively rare. This means that it is unlikely for

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63 This Figure only includes ongoing years of post-conflict police reform with external actor involvement; completed years of PCPR are excluded.
external actors to try to bypass the executive of the host state during PCPR, or for the executive of the host state to actively work against the implementation of reforms. Figure 5.3 also indicates that parliamentary engagement in post-conflict police reform processes (with external involvement) seems to have increased rapidly from the mid-2000s. In fact, no countries are coded as having parliamentary engagement before 2004. External actor engagement with police seems to have been relatively non-existent during early reform efforts, and that it remained rare until 2004. This finding supports some of the existing research (see, e.g. Pouligny, 2005; Cooper & Pugh, 2002) that touches on the lack of engagement with security actors during early reform processes. Finally, it appears that civil society engagement (in PCPR) also increased from the mid-2000s. Though as expected, ‘civil society’ appears to be the least engaged of the local actors included.

Table 5.3.1 – Executive Engagement & Post-conflict Peace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Executive Engagement</th>
<th>Executive Engagement</th>
<th>p.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State-based OSV (%)</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>0.000 (n. 192)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state OSV (%)</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>0.001 (n. 192)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kill</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>0.017 (n. 126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>67.8%</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
<td>0.041 (n. 126)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3.1 presents the results of the chi-square tests regarding the relationship between executive engagement in post-conflict police reform processes and the dependent variables used to measure post-conflict peace. It appears that executive engagement positively affects post-conflict peace, given that it reduces state and non-state OSV, as well as extra-judicial killings and torture. Moreover, the ‘p values’ for each of the tests are statistically significant. For example, approximately 35% of the years of observation without executive engagement in PCPR experienced one-sided violence by the state and non-state actors. Those figures are significant reduced, to approximately 10%, in the years of observation with executive engagement. However, as before, it is important to recognize that these results do not tell us whether there is an independent effect between the variables in question.
Table 5.3.2 – Parliamentary Engagement & Post-conflict Peace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State-based OSV (%)</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>0.001 (n. 192)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state OSV (%)</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>0.000 (n. 192)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kill</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>0.030 (n. 126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>0.000 (n. 126)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the results in Table 5.3.2, it appears that parliamentary engagement may have a positive effect on post-conflict peace, as measured by the dependent variables. For instance, Table 5.3.2 shows that less than 5% of the years with parliamentary engagement in PCPR experienced either state or non-state OSV, whereas the prevalence increases to 21.8% and 23.6% in years without parliamentary engagement. In addition, though approximately 31% of post-conflict years with parliamentary engagement in PCPR experience torture, the percentage increases to almost 65% when reforms are implemented without parliamentary engagement. These preliminary results go against Hypothesis 4, although further analysis is needed in order to gauge the independent effects of parliamentary engagement in post-conflict police reform.

Table 5.3.3 – Police Engagement & Post-conflict Peace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Police Engagement</th>
<th>Police Engagement</th>
<th>p.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State-based OSV (%)</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>NS  (n. 192)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state OSV (%)</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>0.046 (n. 192)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kill</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>0.003 (n. 126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>61.3%</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
<td>NS  (n. 126)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3.3 examines the relationships between police engagement in PCPR and post-conflict peace, and presents the results from chi-square tests. The results suggest that police engagement in PCPR has a mixed relationship to post-conflict peace. While the p values concerning non-state OSV and extrajudicial killings are statistically significant, those regarding state-based OSV and torture are not. Specifically, Table 5.3.3 shows that extrajudicial killings take place in 34% of the years of observation without police engagement in PCPR, a figure that is reduced to 12% when there is police engagement. Similarly, state-based OSV takes place in almost 20% of the years of observation without police...
engagement, yet only 12% of the years of observation that have police engagement. Overall, these results suggest the importance of police engagement in PCPR efforts.

**Table 5.3.4 – Civil Society Engagement & Post-conflict Peace**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Civil Society Engagement</th>
<th>Civil Society Engagement</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>State-based OSV (%)</strong></td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(n. 192)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-state OSV (%)</strong></td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(n. 192)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kill</strong></td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(n. 126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Torture</strong></td>
<td>56.9%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(n. 126)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the results in Table 5.3.4 it appears that civil society engagement in post-conflict police reform positively impacts post-conflict peace. Table 5.3.4 and the results of the chi-square tests illustrate that overall, civil society engagement reduces the prevalence of state and non-state OSV occurring, as well as torture.\(^{64}\) The results pertaining to extra-judicial killings point to similar conclusions, however the p value is not statistically significant. The results pertaining to state and non-state one-sided violence are the strongest, as less than 6% of the years of observation with civil society engagement in PCPR experienced either form of OSV, while this figure rises to approximately 20% of years both without civil society engagement and also without any PCPR. While these results provide some initial support for Hypothesis 6, it is important to acknowledge that they do not illustrate an independent relationship between civil society engagement and the dependent variables included. One possibility is that the engagement of other local actors, such as the executive, is driving the results.

**5.4 Community Policing & Female Representation**

Lastly, I look at some additional aspects of the global data that I have collected, which focuses on community policing and female representation programs in post-conflict countries. This section begins by exploring the prevalence of these programs over time, and then looks at the bivariate relationships between them and post-conflict peace.

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\(^{64}\) One caveat to this is that non-state OSV occurs more frequently in post-conflict years without police reform, than in years with police reform that do not have civil society engagement.
Figure 5.4 illustrates the increased introduction of community policing programs in post-conflict states throughout the past two decades. While it appears that the implementation of community policing was infrequent during the 1990’s, it became more commonplace from 2004. Figure 5.4 also highlights that there has been a steady rise in the implementation of programs aimed at increasing the representation of women in police, a result that is especially noticeable over the past ten years. This may have been spurred on by the international community’s emphasis on gender equality in peacebuilding, namely through Security Council Resolution 1325 (United Nations 2000).

Table 5.4.1 – Community Policing & Post-conflict Peace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Program</th>
<th>Community Policing</th>
<th>p.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State-based OSV (%)</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n. 1080)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state OSV (%)</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n. 1080)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kill</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n. 827)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>61.7%</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n. 827)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.4.1 examines the bivariate relationships between the implementation of community policing programs and the dependent variables used to measure post-conflict peace. Based on the results of the chi-square tests, it appears that community policing programs positively impact post-conflict peace. Specifically, Table 5.4.1 illustrates that post-conflict years in which community policing programs have been introduced experience less one-sided violence (both state and non-state), extra-judicial killings by the state, and torture when compared to post-conflict years in which community policing is not introduced. However, it is important to acknowledge that while these results point to a general relationship between the implementation of community policing programs and the dependent variables, they do not tell us about its independent impact, which will be further investigated in the following chapter. It is possible for instance, that the presence of a UN mission is driving the results.

Table 5.4.2 – Female Representation Programs & Post-conflict Peace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Program</th>
<th>Female Representation</th>
<th>p.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State-based OSV (%)</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(n. 1080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state OSV (%)</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(n. 1080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kill</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(n. 827)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>62.6%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(n. 827)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The impact of national programs to increase the representation of women in the police is explored in Table 5.4.2. The preliminary results from chi-square tests show that female representation programs reduce the likelihood of state and non-state OSV, as well as extra-judicial killings and torture, taking place. Many of the results are quite striking, and each of them is statistically significant. For example, only 2% of the years of observation with female representation programs experienced state-based OSV, while over 20% of the years without female representation programs did. Again, it is important to remember that these results are not demonstrative of the independent effect that female representation programs have, they only point to the general relationship between the variables. It is possible that programs to increase the representation of women in the police are more often implemented under regimes that are already relatively less repressive. Chapter 6 explores the effects of female representation programs in more detail.

5.5 Conclusions

This chapter explored the distribution of post-conflict police reform, external involvement and local actor engagement in PCPR over time and by region, as well as some of the
bivariate relationships with post-conflict peace. In particular, this chapter considered the four different types of local actors: the executive, the police, parliament and civil society, and the impact of their engagement in PCPR on the measures post-conflict peace. Finally, the prevalence of community policing and female representation programs were also considered, along with the implications of those programs for post-conflict peace.

The findings from this descriptive chapter illustrate several noteworthy trends. First, post-conflict police reform seems to improve post-conflict peace, as it decreases the prevalence of state and non-state one-sided violence, as well as extrajudicial killings by the state. In turning to the data on local actor engagement, it appears that, overall, each of the four types of local actor engagement improves post-conflict peace. The tables show that each type of local actor engagement decreases the prevalence of each of the four dependent variables occurring. Finally, Tables 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 show that community policing and female representation programs positively impact post-conflict peace. Both variables decrease the likelihood of state and non-state OSV, extra-judicial killings and torture taking place, as compared to post-conflict countries without community policing and female representation programs. Chapter 6 further investigates some of the relationships discussed in this chapter via more in-depth statistical analysis.
6. Statistical Analysis

This chapter tests the hypothesised links between local actor engagement in post-conflict police reform and post-conflict peace using statistical models. As discussed in the research design chapter, post-conflict peace is measured using four variables: one-sided violence by the state, one-sided violence by non-state actors, extrajudicial killings and torture. The analyses pertaining to state and non-state one-sided violence use negative binomial regression models, while ordered logistic regression models are used to examine extrajudicial killings and torture. Standard errors in each of the models are clustered by country, and the robust standard errors are shown in parentheses below the coefficients. All of the models were completed using STATA 14.1, and the CLARIFY package was used (Tomz, Wittenberg & King 2003) to produce marginal effects and predicted probabilities for selected relationships. The confidence intervals for each are shown in parentheses. All of the predicted probabilities and marginal effects presented in this chapter were obtained by holding regime type, GDP, GDP growth, conflict intensity and peace duration at their median values, and by maintaining that the conflict ended as a result of a cease-fire/peace agreement, that there was a UN mission, and that there was a DDR program.

6.1 Summary Statistics & Correlation Matrices

This chapter begins with a summary table of the four dependent variables and an additional table showing the correlations between the independent and dependent variables to remind the reader of what was found in the previous chapter. The chapter then proceeds in four parts. The statistical analysis begins by examining the general relationship between post-conflict police reform (PCPR) and the four dependent variables. This is done to illustrate the overall impact of PCPR on post-conflict peace and to set the stage for further analysis. Then, the involvement of external actors in post-conflict police reform programs and the effects of their involvement on post-conflict peace are considered. This is done for two reasons: as a general examination of the impact of external involvement in post-conflict police reform programs, and also as a means of transitioning to the third component of the analysis, which focuses on local actor engagement in PCPR programs with external involvement. Next, the four measures of the breadth of local actor engagement are examined, as well as the implications of their engagement for post-conflict peace, followed by an examination of increased local actor engagement in particular. The final section of
this chapter pertains to two often-implemented post-conflict policing programs: community policing and female representation.

Table 6.1.1 – Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State-based OSV (N = 1079)</th>
<th>Non-state OSV (N = 1080)</th>
<th>Extrajudicial Killings (N = 827)</th>
<th>Torture (N = 827)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observations (N)</td>
<td>1079</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>23.495</td>
<td>46.552</td>
<td>1.005</td>
<td>1.544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td>197.309</td>
<td>274.359</td>
<td>.719</td>
<td>.599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max</td>
<td>4141</td>
<td>3740</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1.1 presents the summary statistics from the four dependent variables; it shows that the range of values concerning state and non-state OSV are much larger as compared to extrajudicial killings and torture. That is because the variables concerning OSV are continuous and reflect the number of fatalities that occurred as the result of OSV, whereas the values regarding killings and torture are ordinal, and are scaled between 0-2 based on the level of intensity. There are also fewer observations for the extrajudicial killings and torture variables, as the CIRI data end in 2011.

Table 6.1.2 – Correlation Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State-based OSV (n = 1079)</th>
<th>Non-state OSV (n = 1080)</th>
<th>Extrajudicial Killings (n = 827)</th>
<th>Torture (n = 827)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PC Police Reform</td>
<td>-.0573</td>
<td>-.0295</td>
<td>-0.0344</td>
<td>0.0096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Involvement</td>
<td>.0581</td>
<td>.0661</td>
<td>-0.2527</td>
<td>-0.2050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Engagement</td>
<td>-.2426</td>
<td>-.3407</td>
<td>-0.3043</td>
<td>-0.1700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>-.1154</td>
<td>-.1607</td>
<td>-0.3967</td>
<td>-0.3307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement</td>
<td>-.1631</td>
<td>-.2315</td>
<td>-0.2805</td>
<td>-0.1416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>-.1011</td>
<td>-.1400</td>
<td>-0.3572</td>
<td>-0.2589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased Local</td>
<td>-.1911</td>
<td>-.2585</td>
<td>-0.4138</td>
<td>-0.2803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor Engagement</td>
<td>-.0543</td>
<td>-.0378</td>
<td>-0.0927</td>
<td>-0.0601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policing</td>
<td>-.0440</td>
<td>-.0606</td>
<td>-0.1836</td>
<td>-0.1462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Representation</td>
<td>.0040</td>
<td>.0070</td>
<td>.0080</td>
<td>.0010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1.2 presents the correlations between the nine independent variables and the four dependent variables included in the statistical analysis. A full correlation matrix with all of the independent, dependent and control variables can be found in the Appendix (A2). As
expected the bulk of the correlations are negative, which implies that there is an inverse relationship between the variables in question. In practice this means that as one variable increases, the other decreases. For example, the first column on the top left of Table 6.1.2 shows that when a post-conflict state implements police reforms, the likelihood of state-based one-sided violence decreases. The only positive correlations shown in the table pertain to PCPR and its relationship with torture, and external involvement in PCPR with both state and non-state one-sided violence. While the table (6.1.2) illustrates the general correlations between the independent and dependent variables, the statistical relationships between the variables, along with the addition of control variables, are tested in the subsequent sections.

### 6.2 Post-conflict Police Reform

This section investigates the relationship between post-conflict police reform and the dependent variables used to measure post-conflict peace: one-sided violence by the state, one-sided violence by non-state actors, extrajudicial killings, and torture. For Table 6.2.1, post-conflict police reform is coded dichotomously with the value ‘1’ representing both ongoing and completed PCPR programs, while ‘0’ represents no post-conflict police reform effort. The variable is coded this way in order to examine the overall impact that post-conflict police reform has on the dependent variables. Alternatively, Table 6.2.2 considers only completed PCPR programs. The sample for both tables includes every post-conflict country year included in the dataset.
Table 6.2.1 – Post-conflict Police Reform & Post-conflict Peace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State-based OSV</th>
<th>Non-state OSV</th>
<th>Extrajudicial Killings</th>
<th>Torture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCPR</td>
<td>-1.622</td>
<td>-.593</td>
<td>-.418</td>
<td>1.758**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.883)</td>
<td>(.675)</td>
<td>(.778)</td>
<td>(.560)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>-.115</td>
<td>-.028</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td>-.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.082)</td>
<td>(.090)</td>
<td>(.030)</td>
<td>(.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (logged)</td>
<td>-.429</td>
<td>-.285</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>-.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.277)</td>
<td>(.408)</td>
<td>(.208)</td>
<td>(.246)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td>-.023**</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.012)</td>
<td>(.007)</td>
<td>(.015)</td>
<td>(.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>-.000</td>
<td>-9.255</td>
<td>.000*</td>
<td>.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Agreement</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>-.299</td>
<td>-.517</td>
<td>-.830*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.639)</td>
<td>(.924)</td>
<td>(.349)</td>
<td>(.376)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of Peace</td>
<td>-.196**</td>
<td>-.270**</td>
<td>-.101**</td>
<td>-.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.048)</td>
<td>(.060)</td>
<td>(.255)</td>
<td>(.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>.292</td>
<td>1.411</td>
<td>.219</td>
<td>-.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.369)</td>
<td>(.796)</td>
<td>(.409)</td>
<td>(.425)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>-.482</td>
<td>-1.104*</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.335)</td>
<td>(.462)</td>
<td>(.248)</td>
<td>(.277)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.421**</td>
<td>6.589**</td>
<td>3.947**</td>
<td>6.255*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.427)</td>
<td>(1.771)</td>
<td>(.392)</td>
<td>(2.649)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N                  | 1079            | 990           | 1080                   | 991     | 827    | 792    | 827    | 792     

*p < .05. **p < .01.

Overall, the results in Table 6.2.1 provide support for Hypothesis 1, that post-conflict police reform in general does not have a positive relationship to post-conflict peace. Models 1-4 examine the relationship between PCPR and one-sided violence by the state and non-state actors, and show the results from negative binomial regression analyses. Models 5-8 illustrate the results concerning extrajudicial killings and torture, as tested through the use of ordered logistic regression analysis.

Only one of the eight coefficients pertaining to post-conflict police reform is statistically significant, and it is also positive. Model 4 tells us that post-conflict police reform increases one-sided violence by non-state actors, as the coefficient is positive and statistically significant when the control variables are included. At first glance this result is unexpected given that post-conflict police reform is meant to improve the quality of policing, which should in turn reduce the likelihood of one-sided violence being used against civilians. However, it may be reflective of two additional factors. The first being the volatility of post-conflict states in the immediate aftermath of war, and when the state does not yet have a monopoly on the use of force, making it ‘easier’ for rebel groups to employ violence against civilians. Second, it may also reflect a type of commitment problem, that when non-state actors such as rebel groups know that they will face a strengthened police
service in the future, they may seek to strengthen their position within the state in the short-
term, while the state security apparatus is comparatively weaker (Mattes & Savun, 2009; Fores & Norruddin, 2011; Hultman, Kathman & Shannon, 2016). Based on the results shown in Models 5-8 it does not appear that post-conflict police reform has a clear relationship to either extrajudicial killings or torture.

In turning to the control variables, some results are of note. The coefficients concerning the ‘duration of peace’ are statistically significant and negatively related to three of the dependent variables – state and non-state OSV, and killings – meaning that longer peace durations lead to more peace, a finding that speaks to existing research by Walter (2004). It also appears that DDR reduces OSV by non-state actors, which may be intuitive and somewhat expected given that theoretically, DDR is meant to reduce the likelihood of ex-combatants picking up arms and perpetrating violence (Kilroy, 2010). However, this is an important finding for the DDR literature, as this study represents the first time that DDR has been examined in a large-N empirical analysis.

| Table 6.2.2 – Completed post-conflict police reform & Post-conflict peace |
|---------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|                                 | State-based OSV | Non-state OSV  | Extrajudicial Killings | Torture |
| Model                           | 9              | 10             | 11              | 12             | 13              | 14              | 15              | 16              |
| Comp. PCPR                      | -5.902**       | -2.193         | -4.811**        | 1.982          | -0.661          | -1.37           | -0.332          | -0.197          |
|                                 | (.985)         | (1.354)        | (.729)          | (1.597)        | (.363)          | (.582)          | (.441)          | (.676)          |
| Regime                          | -.145          | -.032          | -.000           | -.011          |
|                                 | (.081)         | (.055)         | (.030)          | (.017)          |
| GDP (logged)                    | -.245          | -.034          | .036            | .057           |
|                                 | (.316)         | (.354)         | (.228)          | (.095)          |
| GDP Growth                      | -.013          | -.034**        | .010            | .026*          |
|                                 | (.013)         | (.011)         | (.011)          | (.012)          |
| Conflict Intensity              | -.000*         | -.0000         | .000**          | .000**         |
|                                 | (.000)         | (.000)         | (.000)          | (.000)          |
| Peace Agmt.                     | .138           | -.888          | -.384           | -.857*         |
|                                 | (.639)         | (.770)         | (.402)          | (.203)          |
| Peace Dur.                      | -.182**        | -.321**        | -.095**         | -.036          |
|                                 | (.052)         | (.053)         | (.027)          | (.016)          |
| UN                              | 1.023**        | 3.142**        | .968            | 1.028          |
|                                 | (.389)         | (1.121)        | (.553)          | (.384)          |
| DDR                             | -1.128         | -5.14          | .166            | .220           |
|                                 | (.421)         | (.598)         | (.278)          | (.129)          |
| Constant                        | 3.428**        | 5.198**        | 3.947**         | 4.612*         |
|                                 | (.427)         | (1.912)        | (3.392)         | (2.235)         |
| N                               | 842            | 796            | 843             | 797            | 651             | 637             | 651             | 637             |

* p < .05. ** p < .01.
In moving from Table 6.2.1 that considers both ongoing and completed post-conflict police reform, Table 6.2.2 focuses solely on the impact of completed PCPR programs. As such, the sample excludes ongoing years of PCPR, and the comparative category is post-conflict years without PCPR. It is relevant to examine the impact of completed PCPR in particular, as the results are plausibly more illustrative of the long-term and lasting impact of completed post-conflict police reform processes.

None of the coefficients concerning completed PCPR are statistically significant when the control variables are included in the models, though completed PCPR does have a negative and statistically significant relationship to state and non-state OSV when the controls are excluded. The changes in statistical significance are likely due to the effects of certain control variables. For instance, the results indicate that the duration of peace decreases one-sided violence by state and non-state actors, as the coefficients in Models 10 and 12 are negative and statistically significant. It is plausible that excluding factors such as external involvement and/or local ownership, that the duration of peace has a greater independent effect on post-conflict peace than the implementation of post-conflict police reform. None of the coefficients concerning extrajudicial killings and torture are statistically significant, either with or without the control variables, which is also the same as in Table 6.2.1. These results may indicate that the implementation of PCPR is insufficient for reducing the likelihood of extrajudicial killings and torture, and that potentially, local actor engagement and the accountability and oversight that it brings is required in order to see improvements.

6.3 External Involvement in Post-conflict Police Reform
This section looks at the relationship between external involvement in post-conflict police reform programs and post-conflict peace. For the purposes of this analysis, external involvement is coded dichotomously with a value of ‘1’ if there was external involvement in post-conflict police reform programs, and with a value ‘0’ if there was no external involvement. Both ongoing and completed years of PCPR are included. By including completed years of PCPR, ‘how’ the involvement of external actors has impacted the success of completed PCPR programs can be examined, as opposed to just those that are ongoing.65 Years without either ongoing or completed PCPR programs are excluded from this analysis.

---

65 When PCPR programs are completed with external involvement, the cases are also coded with a ‘1’.
Table 6.3.1 – External Involvement in PCPR & Post-conflict peace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State-based OSV</th>
<th>Non-state OSV</th>
<th>Extrajudicial Killings</th>
<th>Torture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Actor Inv.</td>
<td>1.507 (1.021)</td>
<td>1.377 (1.231)</td>
<td>-3.429 (2.593)</td>
<td>-.893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>-0.022 (0.236)</td>
<td>.333 (0.213)</td>
<td>-.104 (.111)</td>
<td>-1.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (logged)</td>
<td>.748 (.529)</td>
<td>-2.251 (1.249)</td>
<td>-.574 (.326)</td>
<td>-0.541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>-.233* (.116)</td>
<td>-.119 (.152)</td>
<td>-.116** (.038)</td>
<td>-.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>.000 (.000)</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Agreement</td>
<td>.936 (1.266)</td>
<td>1.215 (1.757)</td>
<td>-.445 (.804)</td>
<td>-.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of Peace</td>
<td>-.301** (.087)</td>
<td>-.071 (.130)</td>
<td>-.046 (.064)</td>
<td>-.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>-.058 (.839)</td>
<td>.914 (1.035)</td>
<td>-.646 (.577)</td>
<td>-1.262*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>-.845 (.541)</td>
<td>-3.262** (.655)</td>
<td>-.500 (.491)</td>
<td>-.585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.429 (.329)</td>
<td>9.672* (5.019)</td>
<td>2.619** (0.855)</td>
<td>21.589*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05. **p < .01.

The results from Table 6.3.1 do not provide support for Hypothesis 2, that external actor involvement in post-conflict police reform positively impacts post-conflict peace. None of the coefficients regarding external actor involvement are statistically significant, with or without control variables included in the models. These results likely reflect that external involvement in post-conflict police reform generally, and perhaps peacebuilding more generally, is ‘not enough’ to positively impact post-conflict peace, and that factors that reflect the ‘quality’ of the reforms such as local ownership may have a greater effect. It is possible that the category of ‘external involvement’ captures well resourced and designed programs as well as poorly resourced and designed programs, and that the net effect is not significant when they are included together. Put another way, these could be a countervailing effect in that some external efforts in PCPR positively impact peace, while others decrease it, though together they produce a nil effect. These results may also be driven by the observation that external actors most often engage in peacebuilding following the ‘most violent’ conflicts, where insecurity is high and the development of sustainable peace is more challenging, although the UN and conflict intensity variables should capture some of these selection issues (Fortna, 2004).

In briefly turning to the control variables included in Table 6.3.1, some results are of note. First, DDR programs are shown to reduce non-state OSV, as the coefficient in Model 20 is
negative and statistically significant. This result also comes through in Table 6.2.1, and further demonstrates the role that DDR programs play in reducing one-sided violence by non-state actors. As previously mentioned, this finding is important given the normative purpose of DDR, and it also supports existing research on DDR (see, e.g. Levely, 2014, Dzinesa, 2007; Muggah, 2008). In addition, it appears that the presence of an ongoing United Nations mission reduces torture, as the coefficient is negative and statistically significant. This may be a result of the fact that the UN acts as a de facto watchdog on the use of torture by the state.

6.4 Local Ownership
This section examines the impact of local ownership on post-conflict peace, and tests hypotheses 3-7. As discussed in Chapter 4, this study is concerned with one aspect of local ownership: engagement, and it focuses on the breadth of local actor engagement in PCPR. Specifically, it examines whether or not certain local actors or groups were engaged in a PCPR process. The four local actors that are of interest for this study are: the executive, parliament, the police and civil society. This chapter also looks at how increased local actor engagement in post-conflict police reform – as measured through an ordinal variable – impacts post-conflict peace. It is important to acknowledge that the only years of observation included in the analyses of local actor engagement are those with external involvement in post-conflict police reform. Years without post-conflict police reform, or without external involvement in PCPR, are excluded from the analyses. This is done to ensure that I am only looking at how different types of local actor engagement, as well as increased local actor engagement, impacts post-conflict peace for observations that were at a non-zero probability of receiving some level of engagement. Recall from the research design chapter that the indicators of local actor engagement were measured only when there was external involvement in post-conflict police reform. The comparative category for the models is both ongoing and completed years of post-conflict police reform with external involvement that did not have the respective type of local actor engagement.

6.4.1 Executive Engagement
The first variable through which the effects of local ownership are considered is the executive. Specifically, the section examines the effects of executive engagement in post-conflict police reform on post-conflict peace, as measured by state and non-state one-sided violence, extrajudicial killings, and torture. Negative binomial regression analyses are used to test the effects of executive engagement on the number of civilians killed in one-sided violence events, and ordered logistic regression analyses are used for the tests on killings and torture. The comparative category for this analysis is post-conflict police reform.
programs with external involvement that do not have executive engagement in the reform process.

Table 6.4.1 – Executive Engagement in PCPR & Post-conflict Peace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State-based OSV</th>
<th>Non-state OSV</th>
<th>Extrajudicial Killings</th>
<th>Torture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>-3.491**</td>
<td>-3.173**</td>
<td>-3.678**</td>
<td>-5.735**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.043)</td>
<td>(1.070)</td>
<td>(1.034)</td>
<td>(1.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>.185</td>
<td>.142</td>
<td>-.046</td>
<td>-.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.122)</td>
<td>(.226)</td>
<td>(.110)</td>
<td>(.129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (logged)</td>
<td>-1.511*</td>
<td>-1.364**</td>
<td>-1.613*</td>
<td>-2.112**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.365)</td>
<td>(.521)</td>
<td>(.731)</td>
<td>(.548)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>-.105</td>
<td>-.035</td>
<td>-.102</td>
<td>-.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.108)</td>
<td>(.079)</td>
<td>(.068)</td>
<td>(.110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>-.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Agreement</td>
<td>-.473</td>
<td>-1.955</td>
<td>-.928</td>
<td>.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.213)</td>
<td>(1.334)</td>
<td>(1.172)</td>
<td>(1.136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of Peace</td>
<td>-.708**</td>
<td>-.992**</td>
<td>-.007</td>
<td>.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.193)</td>
<td>(.270)</td>
<td>(.112)</td>
<td>(.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN DDR</td>
<td>-1.477</td>
<td>.593</td>
<td>-1.299*</td>
<td>-2.301*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.809)</td>
<td>(.886)</td>
<td>(.577)</td>
<td>(.975)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.744**</td>
<td>14.224**</td>
<td>5.448**</td>
<td>18.467**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.837)</td>
<td>(2.522)</td>
<td>(.873)</td>
<td>(3.592)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05. **p < .01.

The results presented in Table 6.4.1 provide strong support for Hypothesis 3, that executive engagement in post-conflict police reform positively impacts post-conflict peace. The table illustrates that executive engagement in PCPR has a negative relationship to one-sided violence by the state and by non-state actors, both with and without the control variables included, as well as the use of torture. None of the coefficients pertaining to extrajudicial killings are statistically significant. To make the regression coefficients more meaningful and to further illustrate some of the results, predicted probabilities and marginal effects have been calculated. For instance, there is 76% probability that there will be no deaths caused by state-based OSV, even without executive engagement in PCPR, with a lower bound on the 95% confidence interval of 29% and an upper bound of 98%. However, the probability increases to 96% in states that do have executive engagement in post-conflict police reform, with a lower bound on the 95% confidence interval of 89% and an upper bound of 99.8%.
The results in Table 6.4.1 also illustrate that executive engagement in post-conflict police reform is related to a reduction in the use of torture, when the control variables are included. Without executive engagement in PCPR there is an 88% probability of torture being “practiced frequently”, with a lower bound of 64% and an upper bound of 98% on the 95% confidence interval. The figure is reduced to 30% when there is executive engagement in PCPR, with a lower bound on the 95% confidence interval of 41% and an upper bound of 74%. Neither of the coefficients pertaining to extrajudicial killings is statistically significant.

6.4.2 Parliamentary Engagement
Table 6.4.2 examines the relationship between parliamentary engagement in post-conflict police reform processes and the variables used to measure post-conflict peace. This analysis includes all post-conflict years that had either an ongoing or completed post-conflict police reform program with external involvement. The comparative category is post-conflict police reform programs with external actor involvement, but no parliamentary engagement in the reforms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>State-based OSV</th>
<th>Non-state OSV</th>
<th>Extrajudicial Killings</th>
<th>Torture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parlament</td>
<td>-4.585**</td>
<td>-1.447</td>
<td>-7.231**</td>
<td>-3.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>.101</td>
<td>.237</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (logged)</td>
<td>-1.861</td>
<td>-2.027</td>
<td>-1.311**</td>
<td>-1.539**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>-.187</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>-.110</td>
<td>-.151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>-.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Agmt.</td>
<td>1.358</td>
<td>.755</td>
<td>-1.210</td>
<td>.556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of Peace</td>
<td>-.780**</td>
<td>-1.050**</td>
<td>-.082</td>
<td>-.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>-1.075</td>
<td>-.109</td>
<td>-1.255**</td>
<td>-1.922**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>.413</td>
<td>-2.217**</td>
<td>-.564</td>
<td>-1.349**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.743**</td>
<td>14.290</td>
<td>4.434**</td>
<td>17.530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05. **p < .01.
The results in Table 6.4.2 provide support for Hypothesis 4, that parliamentary engagement in PCPR does not impact post-conflict peace. Without the control variables, all four of the coefficients concerning parliamentary engagement are negative and statistically significant. However, and though they remain negative, none of the coefficients are statistically significant when the control variables are included.

These findings may be explained by the control variables used. For instance, the results show that the presence of a UN mission decreases extrajudicial killings and torture, and that DDR decreases both non-state OSV and torture. The results also indicate that the duration of peace decreases one-sided violence by both the state and non-state actors, which is significant given that the duration of peace is also highly correlated with parliamentary engagement (see, Appendix A2). Based on these findings, it is plausible that parliament gets engaged ‘late’ in the implementation of reforms, and that as a result, other variables have the independent effect on post-conflict peace.66

It is also conceivable that the engagement of other local actors has a greater impact on post-conflict peace. For instance, Table 6.4.1 indicates that executive engagement has a relatively strong relationship with the dependent variables, and parliamentary engagement is also highly correlated with civil society engagement (see, Appendix A2). Furthermore, and as previously discussed, parliaments in post-conflict settings are often weak and are unable to act as a strong oversight mechanism of the state and its security apparatus, regardless of engagement with external donors (OECD DAC, 2008; Samuels, 2006).

6.4.3 Police Engagement
This section examines the impact of police engagement in post-conflict police reform on post-conflict peace. The models in Table 8 include all post-conflict years that had either an ongoing or completed post-conflict police reform program with external involvement, and the comparative category is years of PCPR with external actor involvement, but no police engagement in the reforms.

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66 As such, it is plausible that a larger sample might reveal parliamentary ownership to have a significant effect on state and non-state OSV.
Table 6.4.3 – Police Engagement in PCPR & Post-conflict Peace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State-based OSV</th>
<th>Non-state OSV</th>
<th>Extrajudicial Killings</th>
<th>Torture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 41</td>
<td>-2.765**</td>
<td>-1.967*</td>
<td>-2.981**</td>
<td>-3.892*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.038)</td>
<td>(0.794)</td>
<td>(1.034)</td>
<td>(1.773)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 42</td>
<td>-1.129</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>-1.967*</td>
<td>-0.631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.044)</td>
<td>(0.794)</td>
<td>(0.794)</td>
<td>(0.580)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 43</td>
<td>-2.981**</td>
<td>-1.129</td>
<td>-2.981**</td>
<td>-3.892*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.034)</td>
<td>(1.044)</td>
<td>(1.034)</td>
<td>(1.773)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 44</td>
<td>-3.892*</td>
<td>-1.129</td>
<td>-3.892*</td>
<td>-1.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.773)</td>
<td>(1.044)</td>
<td>(1.044)</td>
<td>(0.658)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 45</td>
<td>-1.044</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>-1.044</td>
<td>-1.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.658)</td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
<td>(1.235)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 46</td>
<td>-1.773</td>
<td>-1.129</td>
<td>-1.773</td>
<td>-0.770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.034)</td>
<td>(1.235)</td>
<td>(1.235)</td>
<td>(1.235)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 47</td>
<td>-1.467*</td>
<td>-1.129</td>
<td>-1.467*</td>
<td>-1.792**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.580)</td>
<td>(1.235)</td>
<td>(1.235)</td>
<td>(1.439)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 48</td>
<td>-1.792**</td>
<td>-1.129</td>
<td>-1.792**</td>
<td>-1.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.896)</td>
<td>(1.235)</td>
<td>(1.235)</td>
<td>(1.235)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05. ** p < .01.

Table 6.4.3 provides mixed support for Hypothesis 5, that police engagement in post-conflict police reform positively impacts post-conflict peace. All of the coefficients pertaining to state and non-state one-sided violence (Models 41-44) are negative and statistically significant. These results illustrate that police engagement in PCPR reduces one-sided violence by both the state and non-state actors, as compared to PCPR programs with external involvement but without police engagement.

As above, the predicted probabilities and marginal effects of some of the relationships are shown in order to make more intuitive sense of the results. For example, when police are engaged in PCPR there is a 96% probability of no deaths occurring as a result of non-state OSV, with a lower bound on the 95% confidence interval of 79% and an upper bound of 99.9%. Conversely, there is a 78% probability that no deaths will result from non-state OSV in post-conflict states that do not have police engagement, with a lower bound of 34% and an upper bound of 98% on the 95% confidence interval. None of the coefficients pertaining to extrajudicial killings or torture are statistically significant with or without the control variables are included, though they are negative.
6.4.4 Civil Society Engagement

The fourth independent variable pertaining to local ownership focuses on civil society, and the relationship between civil society engagement in post-conflict police reform processes and post-conflict peace. The comparative category for the models included in Table 6.4.4 is ongoing and completed years of post-conflict police reform with external involvement that did not have civil society engagement in the reform process.

Table 6.4.4 – Civil Society Engagement in PCPR & Post-conflict Peace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>State-based OSV</th>
<th>Non-state OSV</th>
<th>Extrajudicial Killings</th>
<th>Torture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>-4.404** (1.196)</td>
<td>.487 (3.066)</td>
<td>-5.318** (1.164)</td>
<td>-4.511** (1.293)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>.081 (2.222)</td>
<td>.370 (3.55)</td>
<td>.002 (1.095)</td>
<td>.058 (2.222)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (logged)</td>
<td>-1.919 (1.169)</td>
<td>-2.201 (2.771)</td>
<td>-1.339** (1.630)</td>
<td>-1.769** (1.463)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>-.240 (.179)</td>
<td>-.081 (.075)</td>
<td>-.114* (.069)</td>
<td>-.156** (.097)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>.000 (.000)</td>
<td>.000 (.000)</td>
<td>.000 (.000)</td>
<td>.000 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Agreement</td>
<td>1.552 (.210)</td>
<td>1.13 (2.66)</td>
<td>-1.250 (.094)</td>
<td>.637 (.094)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of Peace</td>
<td>-.870** (.1377)</td>
<td>-.856** (.756)</td>
<td>-.071 (.576)</td>
<td>.056 (.719)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>-.554 (1.377)</td>
<td>.280 (.796)</td>
<td>-1.117 (.576)</td>
<td>-1.687** (.719)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>.169 (1.207)</td>
<td>-3.572** (1.263)</td>
<td>-.647 (.691)</td>
<td>-1.473** (.380)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.641** (.834)</td>
<td>14.679 (8.291)</td>
<td>4.328** (.873)</td>
<td>19.383 (18.473)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05. **p < .01.

The results shown in Table 6.3.4 provide limited support for Hypothesis 6, that civil society engagement in PCPR positively impacts post-conflict peace. Specifically, the table demonstrates that civil society engagement has a negative, statistically significant relationship with OSV by non-state actors when the control variables are included (Model 52).

Without civil society engagement in PCPR there is a 75% probability of no deaths occurring as a result of non-state OSV, with a lower bound on the 95% confidence interval

---

67 The original standard error when not clustered by country is 1.694.
of 29% and an upper bound of 99%. And while that percentage is relatively high, it increases to a 97% probability of no deaths occurring in states that do have civil society engagement in PCPR, with a lower bound of 81% and an upper bound of 99.9% on the 95% confidence interval. Moreover, based on the results there will be ‘9.71’ deaths per year from non-state OSV in post-conflict states that implement PCPR without civil society engagement (with a lower bound of ‘0.01’ deaths and an upper bound of ‘75.1’ deaths on the 95% confidence interval), yet only ‘0.05’ deaths in post-conflict states that have civil society engagement, with a lower bound of ‘0.00’ deaths and an upper bound of ‘.42’ deaths on the 95% confidence interval.

These findings are plausibly a reflection of the role that civil society plays as a connection between the state and potential rebel groups, and that civil society engagement in post-conflict police reform means that the state has or is establishing better alternatives to violent dispute resolution. Research by Nilsson (2012) also highlights the importance of civil society engagement in peacebuilding efforts. It should also be noted that civil society engagement has a negative and statistically significant relationship with both state based OSV and extrajudicial killings when the control variables are excluded.

6.4.5 Increased Local Engagement

The final table in this section considers how increased breadth of local actor engagement, measured by the number of local actors engaged in PCPR, impacts post-conflict peace. For Table 6.4.5, the independent variable is ordinal and is coded with a value ranging from 0-4, which directly corresponds to the number of local actors engaged in the PCPR process. The comparative category is years of post-conflict police reform with external actor involvement, but without local actor engagement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.4.5 – Increased Local Engagement &amp; Post-conflict Peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Eng.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.301)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (logged)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.638)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.1.591)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The results in Table 6.4.5 provide mixed support for Hypothesis 7, which claims that increased local actor engagement in post-conflict police reform positively impacts the quality of post-conflict peace. While the coefficients for extrajudicial killings and torture are not statistically significant when the control variables are included, Table 6.4.5 shows that increased local actor engagement is associated with reduced one-sided violence by the state and non-state actors. Specifically, the results show that there will be ‘8.70’ deaths per year as a result of non-state OSV in countries that implement PCPR without engagement from any of the local actors, with a lower bound of ‘03’ deaths and an upper bound of ‘59.4’ deaths on the 95% confidence interval. However, when two of the local actors are engaged in the reform process, the expected number of deaths is reduced to ‘0.096’ per year, with a lower bound of ‘0.00’ deaths and an upper bound of ‘.57’ deaths on the 95% confidence interval. Moreover, when all four of the local actors are engaged in PCPR there will be ‘0.004’ deaths per year, with a lower bound on the 95% confidence interval of ‘0.00’ deaths and an upper bound of ‘.03’ deaths.

**The Control Variables**

Several results pertaining to the control variables included in Tables 6.4.1-6.4.5 are of interest. The coefficients for DDR and its relationship to both non-state one-sided violence and torture are negative and statistically significant in all of the tables. These results further demonstrate the importance of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programs in post-conflict societies (see, e.g. Levely, 2014; Dzinesa, 2007; Muggah, 2008). Similar results are seen with regards to the duration of peace and the dependent variables that look at state and non-state one-sided violence. In addition, the presence of a UN peacebuilding mission is shown to have a negative and statistically significant relationship to both extrajudicial killings and torture in each of the five tables, with the one exception being in Table 6.4.4 with regards to extrajudicial killings. As previously discussed, these results may reflect the role of large UN peacebuilding missions as both a watchdog and a deterrent to regimes that may be more inclined to engage in human rights violations. Finally, several of the Tables indicate that GDP per capita has a negative and statistically significant relationship to all four of the dependent variables, though as previously discussed, GDP per
capita is also positively correlated with all four types of local actor engagement (see, Appendix A2).

6.5 Community Policing & Female Representation Programs

The following section considers the impact of two facets of post-conflict policing and their implications for post-conflict peace. As mentioned in previous chapters, these facets of post-conflict policing are community policing and female representation programs, implemented to increase the representation of women in the police. The sample size used in Tables 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 includes all post-conflict country-years in the data, regardless of whether or not post-conflict police reforms were implemented. This is because community policing and female representation programs can be introduced alongside or as part of PCPR, though they can also be introduced independently in states that do not implement larger PCPR programs. That being said, both community policing and female representation programs are highly correlated with the implementation of post-conflict police reform (see, Appendix A2). Community policing is coded dichotomously with a value of ‘1’ if there was an ongoing program, and with a value of ‘0’ otherwise. Female representation is also coded dichotomously, and along the same guidelines.
Table 6.5.1 – Post-conflict Policing Programs & One-sided Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State-based OSV</th>
<th>Non-state OSV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Policing</td>
<td>-2.694**</td>
<td>-.873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.830)</td>
<td>(.622)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Representation</td>
<td>-6.361**</td>
<td>-4.656**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.604)</td>
<td>(.705)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>-001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.050)</td>
<td>(.108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (logged)</td>
<td>.410</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.243)</td>
<td>(.502)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td>-.022*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.012)</td>
<td>(.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>-.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Agreement</td>
<td>-.082</td>
<td>.222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.628)</td>
<td>(1.219)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of Peace</td>
<td>-.193**</td>
<td>-.268**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.048)</td>
<td>(.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>.408</td>
<td>1.656*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.331)</td>
<td>(.665)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>-.423</td>
<td>-.867*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.317)</td>
<td>(.542)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.361**</td>
<td>3.284*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.92)</td>
<td>(3.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.533**</td>
<td>3.946**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.533)</td>
<td>(1.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.965**</td>
<td>(3.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.097)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1079</td>
<td>1079</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05. **p < .01.

The results shown in Table 6.5.1 illustrate the relationships between community policing and female representation programs with one-sided violence by the state and non-state actors. The results were obtained using negative binomial regression analyses. Models 65 and 66 look at the independent effects of community policing and female representation on state-based OSV, whereas Model 67 compares the two alongside the control variables. Models 68 and 69 do the same with regards to non-state OSV, while Model 70 is comparative.

Both community policing and female representation programs are shown to be associated with reduced one-sided violence by the state when analysed independently, as compared to post-conflict states that do not implement community policing or female representation programs. However, only the coefficient for female representation is statistically significant when the two are compared including the control variables (Model 67). This result may be due to the fact that the implementation of community policing and female representation programs often coincides. According to the correlation matrix (Appendix A2), the two variables are highly correlated.
As in previous sections, predicted probabilities and marginal effects are calculated in order to further illustrate some of the key findings. For instance, post-conflict states that do not have female representation programs may have ‘5.34’ deaths per year as a result of one-sided violence by the state, with a lower bound of ‘.86’ deaths and an upper bound of ‘17.8’ deaths on the 95% confidence interval. Conversely, the number decreases to ‘0.05’ deaths per year as a result of state-based OSV in post-conflict countries that do have female representation programs, with a lower bound of ‘.012’ deaths and an upper bound of ‘.149’ deaths on the 95% confidence interval. This result provides support to a growing body of literature that emphasizes the importance of female representation in peacebuilding (see, e.g. Bacon, 2015).

Table 6.5.1 also shows that female representation is associated with reduced one-sided violence by non-state actors, as both of the coefficients are negative and statistically significant. Neither of the coefficients concerning the impact of community policing on non-state OSV are statistically significant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Extrajudicial Killings</th>
<th>Torture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Policing</td>
<td><strong>.460</strong> (1.410)</td>
<td><strong>.553</strong> (1.449)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Rep.</td>
<td><strong>-1.205</strong> (1.466)</td>
<td><strong>-1.090</strong> (1.380)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td><strong>-0.09</strong> (1.014)</td>
<td><strong>-0.09</strong> (1.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (logged)</td>
<td><strong>.019</strong> (1.026)</td>
<td><strong>-0.089</strong> (1.231)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td><strong>.002</strong> (1.014)</td>
<td><strong>.020</strong> (1.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td><strong>.000</strong> (1.000)</td>
<td><strong>.000</strong> (1.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Agreement</td>
<td><strong>-.610</strong> (1.387)</td>
<td><strong>-.923</strong> (1.347)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of Peace</td>
<td><strong>-.098</strong> (1.025)</td>
<td><strong>-.046</strong> (1.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td><strong>.415</strong> (1.386)</td>
<td><strong>.252</strong> (1.434)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td><strong>.115</strong> (1.225)</td>
<td><strong>.159</strong> (1.236)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>827 827 792 827 827 792</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05. **p < .01.
Table 6.5.2 looks at the relationships between community policing and female representation programs with the final two dependent variables: extrajudicial killings and torture. All of the models in the table were conducted using ordered logistic regression analysis. Models 71 and 72 look at the independent effects of community policing and female representation programs on extrajudicial killings, and Model 73 compares community policing and female representation alongside the control variables. Models 74 and 75 do the same with regards to torture, while Model 76 is comparative.

The results show that female representation programs are associated with reduced levels of extra-judicial killings and torture, as the coefficients are negative and statistically significant. And with regards to predicted probabilities – which I present to highlight some of the results – there is a 16% probability (with a lower bound of 6% and an upper bound of 33% at the 95% confidence interval) that extra-judicial killings will be happen frequently in post-conflict countries that implement female representation programs, a number climbs to a 35% probability in post-conflict states that do not introduce female representation programs (with a lower bound of 16% and an upper bound of 59% at the 95% confidence interval).

There is also a 60% probability that torture will be used frequently in post-conflict states without female representation programs (with a lower bound on the 95% confidence interval of 35% and an upper bound of 82%), a figure that improves to 26% probability (with a lower bound of 11% on the 95% confidence interval and an upper bound of 46%) in post-conflict states that do have female representation programs. In addition, there is a 19% probability (with a lower bound of 7% on the 95% confidence interval, and an upper bound of 37%) that torture will not occur in post-conflict states with female representation programs, though only a .4% probability (with a lower bound of 1.4% on the 95% confidence interval and an upper bound of 12.5%) that torture will not occur in states without female representation programs. None of the coefficients pertaining to community policing are statistically significant, though they are negative.

Overall, the results presented in Tables 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 do not provide support for Hypothesis 8, that community policing positively impacts post-conflict peace, as none of the coefficients are statistically significant when the control variables are included in the models. However the results provide strong support for Hypothesis 9, that female representation programs positively impact post-conflict peace. The results demonstrate that

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68 As discussed in Chapter 4, the CIRI data is scaled from 0-2, with each of the three values corresponding to the prevalence of human rights violations, namely extra-judicial killings and torture. According to the CIRI data the human rights abuses that I include can be “practiced frequently”, “practiced occasionally” or that they “did not occur” (Cingranelli & Richards, 2014).
female representation programs decrease state and non-state one-sided violence, as well as extrajudicial killings and torture.

### 6.6 Additional Robustness Checks

Supplementary tables are included to test the robustness of some of the key results. These robustness checks include the use of country fixed effects, as well as tests to further account for ‘time’, local ownership, regime type/level of democracy, and the size of the UN Mission. For the robustness checks using country-fixed effects, as well as those using lagged control variables (as part of the robustness checks for ‘time’), all of the statistical models presented in Chapter 6 have been re run. The remainder of the models included as part of the additional robustness checks represent some of the strongest and most substantively interesting findings of the quantitative study.

#### Country-fixed Effects

The first group of supplementary tables (Appendix A3.1) consider the results from the statistical analysis using country-fixed effects\(^{69}\), in order to check for country-specific confounding factors. By and large, the results presented (A3.1) do not challenge the previously presented findings, though some changes in statistical significance are of note. First, the results concerning completed PCPR and its association to both state and non-state one-sided violence become statistically significant. Similarly, the relationship between external involvement in PCPR and torture also becomes statistically significant (and negative). With regards to local actor engagement, the findings show that when country-fixed effects are used, the association between executive engagement and extrajudicial killings becomes statistically significant, while the relationship to torture is no longer statistically significant, though the coefficient remains negative. In addition, the relationships between police engagement and increased local actor engagement with regards to state-based one-sided violence are no longer statistically significant when country-fixed effects are used. However, the coefficients remain negative. And finally, the tables (Appendix A3.1) show that the relationship between female representation in the police and torture is not statistically significant (though still negative), while the relationship between community policing and non-state OSV becomes statistically significant (and negative) when the models are run using country-fixed effects.

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\(^{69}\) Due to feasibility, the country-fixed effects models for extrajudicial killings and torture were not run using ordered logistic regression models, as done in Chapter 6, they were run using ordinary least squares (OLS).
Time
The second set of supplementary tables, which include controls for the ‘year’ of observation (A3.2), models using a lagged dependent variable (A3.3), and models using lagged control variables (A3.4), are included to further account for the issue of ‘time’. These supplementary tables are included in addition to the ‘duration of peace’, which is used as a control variable throughout the analysis.

The ‘year’ of observation is controlled for because it is likely that with time and experience, intergovernmental and regional organizations such as the UN and the OSCE have developed improved ‘best practices’ for the implementation of post-conflict police reform, as well as the development of local ownership. The ‘year’ of observation, important to control for given that external donors are consistently working to do better peacebuilding, does not challenge the previously presented results. Table A3.2 in the Appendix illustrates that the effects of police engagement in PCPR on state-based OSV, and civil society engagement on non-state OSV actually increase, while the effects of executive engagement on torture remain relatively unchanged.

A lag of the dependent variable is included to control out temporal dependence between levels of one-sided violence. Similar results are found when a lag of the dependent variable is included as a control variable. Table A3.3 in the Appendix shows that the effects of female representation programs and police engagement on one-sided violence by the state remain negative and statistically significant. The effects of civil society engagement on non-state OSV do not remain statistically significant, though the coefficient is still negative. The lagged dependent variable is not statistically significant in any of the models.

Finally, the issue of time is examined by re-running all of the statistical models presented in Chapter 6 using lagged control variables. These are included to further and more firmly account for possible endogeneity between the dependent variables and the control variables. Overall, the results presented (Appendix A3.4) do not challenge the previously presented findings, though some changes in statistical significance are of note. First, the results concerning post-conflict police reform and state-based OSV become statistically significant while staying negative. The relationship between executive engagement and torture continues to be negative but becomes statistically significant when the control variables are lagged. Similarly, the results for parliamentary engagement and its relationship to both non-state OSV and torture become statistically significant (while remaining negative) when the controls are lagged. Notably, the results for police and civil society engagement stay largely unchanged, as do the findings concerning female representation and community policing programs.
Local Ownership

Two additional tests are included in order to further assess the relationship between local ownership of post-conflict police reform and the measures of post-conflict peace. These are included given that it is likely that the four types of local actor engagement are highly correlated. The full correlation matrix presented in the Appendix (A2) indicates that executive and police engagement are especially highly correlated, as well as parliamentary and civil society engagement. Though the variation in the sample is significantly reduced in these tests, they are a first-step at disaggregating some of the effects that different ‘types’ of local engagement have on the efficacy of post-conflict police reform.

The first way that local ownership is further tested is through the inclusion of models with a control for executive engagement (Appendix A3.5). Overall, the results demonstrate the importance of executive engagement, as the coefficients concerning increased local actor engagement, civil society engagement, and police engagement lose their statistical significance when the engagement of the executive is included in the models. Conversely, executive engagement remains negative and statistically significant. That being said, the results are consistent with the theoretical story developed in Chapter 3, as the coefficients still indicate a negative relationship to violence against civilians. In addition, the descriptive results show that non-state one-sided violence is less likely to occur when actors in addition to the executive, have ownership of the reforms. For example, non-state one-sided violence occurs in approximately 10% of the years of observation with executive engagement only, though only 5% of the years of observation which have both executive and civil society engagement. Moreover, given that the variables pertaining to local actor engagement are also highly correlated, there may simply be not enough variation in the sample used in this study to precisely disaggregate the effects of local ownership ‘types’ on the efficacy of post-conflict police reform efforts. Nonetheless, they continue to demonstrate the importance of executive engagement, and the negative coefficients for the additional local ownership variables are negative as expected.

The second test of local ownership is completed using all four of the independent variables pertaining to local actor engagement in the models. The results shown in the Appendix (A3.6) show that there are some issues of multicollinearity with regards to the effects of the independent variables. The table shows that executive and police engagement are highly correlated\(^\text{70}\) in relation to one-sided violence by the state, as the coefficient for executive engagement is relatively large and negative, while the coefficient for police engagement is also large, albeit positive, even though it appeared the police engagement was correlated with reduced levels of state-based OSV in the initial analysis (Table 6.4.3).

\(^{70}\) This is also illustrated in the correlation matrix presented in the Appendix (A2).
The table also shows that civil society engagement is highly correlated with parliamentary engagement (and executive engagement to a lesser extent) when it comes to both non-state ones-sided violence and torture. For example, in the initial analysis (Table 6.4.4) police engagement in PCPR is shown to have a negative and statistically significant relationship to non-state one-sided violence. However, when all four of the local actors are included in the model, the coefficient for civil society becomes positive and no longer statistically significant. Conversely, the coefficient for parliamentary engagement remains negative but becomes statistically significant.

I have also included variance inflation factors (VIF) in the Appendix (A3.7), which show that the four independent variables used to examine the involvement of local actors are moderately correlated. Executive engagement has the lowest VIF of the four with regards to all of the dependent variables, meaning that is the least correlated with the other independent variables. Executive engagement is followed by police engagement and then civil society engagement. Parliamentary engagement appears to be the most correlated of the four local ownership independent variables.

**Regime Type/Level of Democracy**

As previously discussed, two additional measures of regime type are included. The first is a reduced version of the Polity2 score from the Polity IV Project (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers 2016). Instead of a 21-point scale, this version is based on a 3-point scale from 0-2 separating autocracies from incomplete or deficient democracies and more democratic regimes. The results when controlling for ‘regime2’, shown in the Appendix (A3.8), do not challenge the previously presented findings. The coefficients concerning female representation and its relationship to state-based OSV, and executive engagement and torture remain negative and statistically significant, while the coefficient regarding PCPR and non-state OSV remains positive and statistically significant. Moreover, the coefficient for community policing programs and their relationship to non-state OSV becomes statistically significant when the less-refined control for regime type is included.

The second additional measure of regime type that is used, a binary measure of democracy, is taken from the Quality of Government data (Dahlberg et al., 2017), which spans 1946-2010. The results when controlling for ‘regime3’ (Appendix A3.9) show no substantive changes from the previously reported results. Similar to the previously discussed table (A3.8), the coefficients of female representation and its relationship to OSV by the state, and executive engagement and its relationship to torture remain negative and statistically significant, and the coefficient concerning PCPR and non-state OSV remains positive and statistically significant. Again, the coefficient for community policing programs and their relationship to non-state OSV becomes statistically significant when the less-refined
control for regime type is included. These results are overall, largely supportive of the previously reported findings.

**Size of the UN Mission**
The final robustness check accounts for the size of the UN mission deployed. This is controlled for because we know from existing research that the more military and police forces the UN deploys to a peacekeeping mission, the less civilian casualties there will be (Hultman, Kathman & Wood, 2013)\(^7\) and well resourced missions may be more likely to implement broader local ownership.

The size of the UN Mission employed does not appear to have a substantial effect on the results, as the coefficients concerning executive and civil society engagement remain relatively unchanged (see, Appendix A3.1). Specifically, the coefficients regarding civil society engagement and non-state OSV, as well as executive engagement and torture, remain negative and statistically significant. And although the coefficient concerning executive engagement and one-sided violence by the state is no longer statistically significant when the size of the UN Mission is included as a control, the coefficient remains negative, which tells a consistent theoretical story. The size of the UN Mission itself does not appear to have a substantial effect on any of the dependent variables.

**6.7 Conclusions**
This chapter presents several noteworthy findings regarding the relationships between post-conflict police reform, external actor involvement, local ownership, policing programs, and the dependent variable: post-conflict peace. First, the results indicate that PCPR does not have a positive effect on post-conflict peace, and that ultimately the relationship between PCPR and peace is likely to be determined by other factors relating to the quality of the reforms, such as the local ownership of the reforms themselves. The impact of external actor involvement in PCPR is unclear, seeing that it does not have a statistically significant relationship to any of the dependent variables, regardless of whether the controls are included or not (Table 6.3.1). These results demonstrate that the involvement of external donors, such as the UN and the EU, is insufficient for improving peace in countries emerging from war.

\(^7\)This size of the UN Mission is coded using data from the IPI Peacekeeping Database (International Peace Institute, 2016). Each year of observation is coded with a number corresponding to the aggregated number of troops, police and observers (Perry, 2013).
In turning to the analyses on local ownership, executive engagement in post-conflict police reform is shown to be of key importance. Executive engagement is shown to be correlated with decreased state and non-state one-sided violence as well as the use of torture, results that lend support to existing research that claims that without executive engagement, reforms are less likely to be successful (Donais, 2009b; Nathan, 2008). The results concerning parliamentary engagement are more mixed. Though parliamentary engagement has a negative and statistically significant relationship with each of the dependent variables when analysed independently, the relationships are not statistically significant when the controls are included. This trend likely speaks to the fact that parliaments are often weak in post-conflict states, and their engagement in reform processes may not be sufficient for impacting the dependent variables. Moreover, the findings also suggest that parliaments tend to ‘get engaged’ by external donors later on in PCPR processes. Police engagement on the other hand, is correlated with reduced state and non-state one-sided violence. These results speak to the importance of policing personnel being engaged in the reform of their own institutions, ultimately making them more effective security providers and less likely to perpetrate violence against civilians. The significance of civil society engagement in PCPR is also shown (Table 6.4.4) to reduce the likelihood of one-sided violence by non-state actors. This finding highlights the role that civil society can play between the government and potential rebel groups, in creating alternatives to violent dispute resolution. Lastly, it appears that increased or improved local actor engagement in post-conflict police reform is associated with reduced state and non-state one-sided violence, findings that provide support for more comprehensive or broader forms of local ownership (see, e.g. Nathan, 2008).

The findings also illustrate that female representation programs are positively associated with post-conflict peace, as its relationship is negative and statistically significant with each of the dependent variables. These results are important seeing that they provide support to a growing body of literature that emphasizes the role of women in peacebuilding (Caprioli, 2005; Bacon, 2015). The results pertaining to community policing are mixed in comparison. While community policing programs appear to positively impact post-conflict peace when analysed independently, the effects are mitigated when female representation programs and the controls included in the models. As previously discussed, this may be due to the fact that community policing and female representation programs are highly correlated.

Chapter 7 presents the case study on the post-conflict police reform process in Kosovo, and the fieldwork findings. Following that, (Chapter 8) the results of the quantitative and qualitative analyses are discussed together and in relation to existing research and theories, which is proceeded by the conclusion of the thesis.
7. Post-conflict Police Reform in Kosovo

This chapter examines the results of the qualitative component of this research; the case study that looks at the impact of local ownership on Kosovo’s post-conflict police reform process. The inclusion of this case study allows for examination of the research question with first hand information provided by individuals who are either working on or within Kosovo’s PCPR process, or civilians who are experiencing the effects of local ownership and coexisting with the ‘reformed’ Kosovo Police. The goal of this case study is to explore the causal mechanisms linking local ownership of PCPR and post-conflict peace, in addition to gaining perspective on how practitioners and locals understand the term. In addition, the interviews allow me to explore other causal mechanisms that may link local ownership of PCPR to post-conflict peace. This chapter proceeds in two parts. First, brief summary of the 1998-1999 war between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA/PLK) and the Government of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia is provided. Second, the results from fieldwork completed between May and August 2014 are presented. The main findings from suggest that the engagement between external donors and local actors has shifted over time, as have the issues that their engagement has focused on. The results also show that there have been three main factors that have hindered the local ownership of Kosovo’s PCPR process: corruption, justice and impunity issues, and Kosovo’s socio-economic development. Finally, the results indicate that local ownership has positively impacted Kosovo’s police reform process. In discussing local ownership, respondents touched upon the improved relations between police and civilians, which many said led to improved security.

7.1 Background

This section provides a brief background of the post-conflict police reform process in Kosovo. I begin with a short introduction to the war in Kosovo between the KLA and the Government of FR Yugoslavia, highlighting some of the significant events that led to the war. I then discuss the security environment in Kosovo during the aftermath of the conflict, as well as some of the most pertinent security issues. Lastly, I review Kosovo’s post-conflict police reform program, and discuss some of the key external actors that have been involved.
Kosovo in the Twentieth Century

Many scholars point to the early twentieth century as a starting point for Kosovo’s recent insecurity. During the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) most of modern day Kosovo was taken by force from the Ottoman Empire by the Kingdom of Serbia. Following World War I there was a push to change the demographic makeup of Kosovo, and between 1918 and 1925 over 200,000 ethnic Albanians left Kosovo and 60,000 Montenegrins and Serbs emigrated to Kosovo (Bideleux, 1998; Bieber & Daskalovski, 2004).

The region fell under the control of Italian-occupied Albania for the bulk of WWII, and following the end of the war it became an autonomous province of Serbia within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Relations between the Albanian majority and Serbian minority in Kosovo appeared to stabilize during this time (Bekaj, 2010). However, there were instances of political repression and discriminate targeting of ethnic Albanians by the regime, events that are believed to have triggered the beginning of Kosovo’s resistance movement (Bekaj, 2010). Towards the end of 1968 there were several demonstrations in the capital of Pristina, marking the first instance where the public demanded greater human rights and freedoms, and increased funding for social services on a large scale (Bekaj, 2010). Some progress on these fronts was made in 1974 when Kosovo was declared a Socialist Autonomous Province within Serbia as part of the newly instated constitution, which gave the province comparable rights to the six republics of SFRY (Krieger, 2001).

After the death of Yugoslav leader Josip Tito in 1980, tensions between the six Republics re-emerged, and with Slobodan Milosevic’s rise to power, some of the rights and liberties that had been afforded to Kosovo were removed. In 1989, Milosevic officially stripped Kosovo of its autonomous status within Serbia, and imposed direct rule from Belgrade (O’Neill, 2002). Around the same time, Milosevic dismissed the vast majority of ethnic-Albanian state employees, further adding to the discontent between Albanians and Serbs. Milosevic justified these policy shifts by stating that they were done to protect the Serb minority living in Kosovo, and to deter further acts of resistance by Kosovo-Albanians (O’Neill, 2002). However, they only served to exacerbate the emerging ethno-nationalistic sentiment and general discontent, as well as highlight the prejudicial policies directed towards Kosovo Albanians. By 1991, Kosovo had the lowest literacy rate of all of the Yugoslav regions, and the highest rate of unemployment (Flere, 1991).

The late 1980’s and 1990’s also saw the rise to power of Ibrahim Rugova, an Albanian nationalist who helped found the Kosovo Democratic League (LDK). The rise of the LDK – which used nonviolent methods to advance its nationalist cause – sparked a dramatic shift
in Kosovo. Many ethnic Albanians began to avoid state run institutions, and instead sought to develop their own, including schools and medical facilities (O’Neill, 2002).

During the early 1990’s, the Balkan region also witnessed the wars of independence of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, and side effects of the region’s conflict history were evident in Kosovo prior to the outbreak of the war. For instance, during the talks leading up to the Dayton Peace Agreements (following the Bosnian War), many Kosovo-Albanians had hoped that the issue of Kosovo’s political status would also be addressed. It was not, and in 1996, the KLA (or UCK) detonated a series of bombs in Serbian refugee camps. In retaliation, Serbian forces began to crack down on the KLA, as well as ethnic Albanian civilians in the region (Derks-Normandin, 2014).

Prior to the outbreak of war, ethnic Serbs also dominated the bulk of public service positions in Kosovo, including its security institutions, effectively making Kosovo a police state (ICTY, 2002; Peake, 2004). Kosovo’s security institutions were also considered over-developed for ‘peacetime’ conditions. It has been argued that the “brutal and illegitimate” policing methods used by the Serbian dominated police served only to further advance the already existing wedge between Kosovo’s ethnic groups (Peake, 2004).

The War, 1998-1999
The armed conflict between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (present day Serbia) began in February 1998. The KLA, which was predominantly made up of ethnic Albanians, initiated the conflict with the goal of establishing an independent Kosovo. The war ended in June 1999 following several months of negotiations, which included (at various points) the United States, Russia, the European Union (EU), as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) intervention “Operation Allied Force”. The NATO intervention began in March 1999 and consisted of 77 days of air strikes, which targeted military bases, armament supplies, oil refineries and communications infrastructure (KFOR), though many civilian buildings in Belgrade were also destroyed (Pearlstein, 1999).

The conflict was officially terminated when a peace agreement between the Yugoslav government and KLA representative Hashim Thaçi was signed, along with Kosovo’s subsequent establishment as a United Nations’ administered territory under Security Council Resolution 1244 (United Nations, 1999). The Resolution gave the UN power over

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72 These pre-conflict conditions became key areas of consideration during both the post-conflict stabilization period as well as during the more formal implementation of the reform efforts (Caparini, 2008).
the executive, judiciary and the bureaucracy of Kosovo as an autonomous region of Yugoslavia (United Nations, 1999). Resolution 1244 also called for the establishment of a NATO peace enforcement mission (KFOR), which consisted of 50,000 troops at its outset.

Despite lasting for less than 18 months, the war was extremely destructive and resulted in the deaths of approximately 3000 people and the displacement of over 900,000 civilians, or 90% of Kosovo’s population at the time (Human Rights Watch, 2001).

**Conflict Aftermath**

The end of the conflict between the KLA and the government of FR Yugoslavia created a security vacuum in Kosovo (Derks-Normandin, 2014). The bulk of existing (Serbian) police officers fled the area, making the NATO force KFOR the de facto provider of security. In addition to the lack of functioning state security institutions, tensions between some of the ethnic groups remained high. The KLA used the period of insecurity to act as an independent law enforcement agency, and it began detaining persons it believed had collaborated with Serbian forces (O’Neill, 2012). There were also some reports of reprisal killings taking place, conducted by fringe elements within the KLA (Boyle, 2010). The KLA also forced thousands of ethnic Serbs, Roma, and other ethnic minorities to flee from their homes towards the end of 1999 (Derks-Normandin, 2014). In addition, many Serb-owned homes and businesses were destroyed and/or taken over by ethnic Albanians (O’Neill, 2012). The combination of the security vacuum and the poor economic conditions created a space for organised crime to flourish. Many individuals still believe that some members of Kosovo’s political elite are involved in criminal practices (Derks & Price, 2010).

Although its political status was not yet clear, Kosovo held its first ‘free and fair’ parliamentary elections in 2001, with the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) winning the majority of the seats, and Ibrahim Rugova being elected Kosovo’s first President (BBC, 2001). The Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), led by Hashim Thaçi, a prominent KLA leader, became the second largest party in Kosovo’s parliament (BBC, 2001).

Then, in 2004, there were ethnic clashes that began in Mitrovica and spread to other areas in Kosovo. During the clashes, eight people were killed and over 300 people were injured (BBC, 2004). Following the clashes, in 2005, Kosovo and Serbia entered into discussions – led by Special Envoy to the UN Secretary General, Martti Ahtisaari – regarding Kosovo’s political status. The talks took place over the course of two years, and ended with Ahtisaari recommending that Kosovo become an independent state (US Department of State, 2009). However, the UN Security Council never passed a resolution clarifying Kosovo’s
independence, largely due to Russia’s alliance with Serbia (Derks-Normandin, 2014). Then, using Athisaari’s proposal and recommendations as leverage, Kosovo’s Assembly unilaterally declared independence from Serbia on 17 February 2008. The move sparked outrage from Serbia and Russia, who to no avail, called for an immediate session of the UN Security Council to deem the move as illegal (BBC, 2008). As of 2016, more than 100 United Nations’ member states have recognized Kosovo’s sovereignty (US Department of State, 2016), and it has gained full membership in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

**Police Reform in Kosovo**

The process to create an entirely new police service in Kosovo (which began in 1999) fell to UNMIK as the administrative body, to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which was tasked as the “lead actor”, and more recently, to the European Union’s Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). During initial discussions on police reform, the KLA voiced its desire to effectively become the police. And while some in NATO believed that this would be a good mechanism for providing the to-be-disarmed KLA with some oversight and accountability, as well as a role in Kosovo’s post-conflict transition, it was eventually decided that a new police service would be created from scratch (Greene, Friedman and Bennet, 2012). The decision not to effectively reshape the KLA into the police was an important one. Given that the KLA was predominantly Albanian, it would have likely resulted in an ethnically unbalanced police service. The new recruitment system, which did allow for the inclusion of some former KLA members, also called for the recruitment of under-represented groups such as ethnic minorities and women (Greene, Friedman and Bennet, 2012). It was also decided that no individuals with criminal pasts, or a record of human rights abuses during the conflict would be permitted to serve in the newly created police. A cohort of international policing personnel carried out policing duties during the initial planning and implementation phase of Kosovo’s PCPR process, and prior to the recruitment and training of the first officers (Peake, 2004).

The initial training program for new police recruits, the first of which began in September 1999, lasted just under three months, though it soon became a more comprehensive forty week program with 20 weeks of classroom training and 20 weeks of field training (OSCE, 2005; Greene, Friedman and Bennet, 2012). The training had a specific emphasis on human rights, as well as modules that focused on democratic policing, ethics, multi-ethnic policing, and gender (Cady, 2003; Heinemann-Grüder & Grebenschikov, 2006). By the end of 2002, over 5,000 new officers had been trained, and the Kosovo Police Service outnumbered international police. The number of newly recruited and trained officers reached almost 7,000 by 2004 (Heinemann-Grüder & Grebenschikov, 2006). In terms of ethnic
representation, it was (at the time) 85% Albanian, 8% Serbian, and 7% was made up of additional ethnic minority groups (e.g. Turks). At present, the Kosovo Police has a similar ethnic makeup. Moreover, the Kosovo Police has a relatively strong representation of women at fifteen percent, though the target is 20% (OSCE, 2014).

Most recently the Kosovo Police (with support and some oversight from international donors) implemented its Strategic Development Plan, 2011-2015. The Plan focused on eight key objectives including the prevention and combatting of organised crime, and improving public safety and trust (Kosovo Police, 2011). Presently, the main ongoing tasks pertaining to the Kosovo Police involve monitoring and oversight to the Police Directorate and Police stations throughout Kosovo, and strengthening of Kosovo’s border security.

External Involvement
This section reviews the involvement of external donors in Kosovo’s post-conflict police reform process. The external donors discussed are the United Nations, the OSCE and European Union, as the main actors involved in Kosovo’s PCPR (Law, 2006; Brzoska & Heinemann-Grüder, 2006; KCSS, 2010).

The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK, was established following the cessation of hostilities between the KLA and the Government of Yugoslavia in 1999. It was initiated through UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which was adopted on 10 June 1999. Under Resolution 1244, UNMIK assumed administrative and executive control over Kosovo, marking the first time in history that the UN had taken on such a large role in post-conflict state formation (Friedrich, 2005). The scope of UNMIK’s initial mandate was to aid in the establishment of “provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo” (UNMIK). UNMIK deployed 4,500 international civilian police (CIVPOL) officers to establish and maintain law and order (Derks-Normandin, 2014).73

UNMIK’s mandate and staff size remained relatively unchanged until 2008, when Kosovo’s assembly declared independence, and UNMIK handed over some of its key rule of law related tasks (such as with regards to the police) to the European Union (UNMIK). In 2013, UNMIK’s personnel size was once again reduced in parallel to increased EU engagement in Kosovo, and improved diplomatic relations with Serbia (UNMIK). At present, UNMIK has a much smaller presence on the ground, and an annual budget of approximately US $36 million (UNMIK). UNMIK’s primary contribution to Kosovo’s

73 UNMIK’s policing counterpart was made up of individuals from over 50 countries, (Peake, 2004).
post-conflict police reform came in the form of “on-the-job training” for police officers, which was carried out by its CIVPOL component (Derks-Normandin, 2014: 12).

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) involvement in Kosovo began in October 1998 when it launched the Kosovo Verification Mission, under the auspices of UNSC Resolution 1199 (Eckhard, 2016). Though the verification mission was only meant to monitor the situation on the ground and report back to the OSCE and the UN Security Council, it is believed that having a presence on the ground from 1998 allowed the OSCE to more effectively begin its work the following year (Eckhard, 2016).

The OSCE’s role in Kosovo’s police reform process was mandated under UNSC Resolution 1244 in June 1999, and the organisation has maintained a significant presence in the region since. Within the UNMIK framework, the OSCE assumed broad responsibility for institution and democracy building, as well as human rights (OSCE, 2006). The OSCE was also tasked with the establishment of a police service, and as such, it is considered the lead actor of Kosovo’s police reform process (O’Neill, 2012).

In terms of Kosovo’s PCPR process, the OSCE was responsible for opening the Kosovo Police Service School in September 1999, and it was also tasked with providing the initial training of the Kosovo Police (Derks-Normandin, 2014). The OSCE has also been engaged in the development of Kosovo’s community policing program. At present, the OSCE’s main tasks include working with the Kosovo Police and the Ministry of Internal Affairs on crime prevention. This is done through advising on legislation, running training courses for law enforcement personnel, and working on policies regarding the reduction of corruption, drug trafficking, and hate crimes (Eckhard, 2016). The OSCE’s Mission in Kosovo also serves as an important oversight body for the Kosovo Police, and its maintenance of international human rights standards, in addition to advising the KP on issues such as the use of force, freedom of expression and assembly, and the protection of socially vulnerable groups (ibid).

The European Union has also had an active presence in Kosovo since the war ended. The engagement of the EU is significant due to Kosovo’s hope of joining the European Union (BBC, 2014), and also due to its status as the largest intergovernmental organisation in the region. Following Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008 the European Union launched its Rule of Law Mission, EULEX, tasked with operational responsibility in the area of rule of law (UNMIK). EULEX was designed to help support “judicial authorities

74 The Kosovo Police Service School has been renamed as the Kosovo Centre for Public Safety Education and Development.
and law enforcement agencies in the progress towards sustainability and increased accountability” and it is the largest civilian mission in EU history (EULEX, 2016; Gippert, 2016).  

**Kosovo at Present**

According to the UNDP (2016), the unemployment rate in Kosovo is over 35% (youth unemployment is 60%), and approximately 30% of the population lives in poverty. It is also recognized that Kosovo’s population “still faces an uphill struggle to escape the corrosive socio-economic impact of decades of neglect, mismanagement and discrimination” (UNDP, 2016). While the majority of Kosovo’s population is ethnically Albanian, there are eight other recognized ethnic groups. Ten of Kosovo’s thirty-eight municipalities have Serbian majorities (OSCE, 2015).

More recently, relations between Kosovo and Serbia have begun to normalize, and some trade between the two countries has been introduced. Much of this ‘normalization’ was initiated by the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations, also referred to as the Brussels Agreement, which was negotiated in April 2013 (UN, 2013). While the agreement has never formally come into effect, having not been ratified by Serbia’s Parliament, it has spelled out the political status of Kosovo’s Serbian majority municipalities, and was seen by many as a de facto recognition of Kosovo (International Crisis Group, 2013). While relations have been relatively calm and there has been little discontent, in January 2016, there were protests in Pristina following the signing of an accord giving ethnic Serbs increased powers of local governance (Reuters, 2016). Almost thirty people were injured during the clashes between demonstrators and police in an event that highlights the continued tensions between the two main ethnic groups.

**7.2 The Findings**

To examine perceptions of local ownership, its role in Kosovo’s post-conflict police reform process, and its implications for post-conflict peace, fieldwork was conducted in Kosovo between May and August 2014, during which twenty-three people were interviewed. Of them, seven were female and sixteen were male. Nine of the participants were from

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75 EULEX also performs a role in the justice sector by investigating and prosecuting cases pertaining to terrorism, war crimes, organised crime and property and privatization.

76 It is important to note that the scope of this study changed after the fieldwork was completed. This study was originally meant to focus on the local ownership of more comprehensive security sector reform processes. However, due to feasibility, the scope of the project changed to focus more specifically on post-conflict police reform.
external donor organisations,\textsuperscript{77} six were from the Kosovo Police (KP), and eight were from civil society. Of the participants from external donor organisations, seven were from intergovernmental organisations including the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and two were from embassies/consulates. With regards to the local security personnel, one of the participants was from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), one was an administrator in the Kosovo Police, and four were officers in the KP. Lastly, five of the participants from civil society worked for Kosovo-based NGO’s and think tanks, and three were civilian.

Snowball sampling (See, Cohen & Arieli, 2011) – which involves asking participants to suggest additional participants from within their own workplaces, work and social networks – was used to recruit the bulk of the participants. More specifically, interviewees from external donor organisations were recruited primarily via email, and by visiting local offices in Pristina and Mitrovica. These contacts were the point of entry. Although only occasionally successful, this method had the intended ‘snowball effect’ and more participants were gained via word of mouth (see, Vogt, 2005). Participants from the Kosovo Police were recruited primarily through talking with officers on the street, and by introducing the research project, interview questions and ethical considerations. Emails containing a brief overview of the research project, and the interview questions were also sent to various branches of the Kosovo Police and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. NGO participants were recruited initially through sending emails, and then by meeting with representatives in person. They were overall the easiest group to recruit from, and the snowballing method worked well with them. Lastly, civilian participants were recruited primarily through conversations with participants from NGO’s.

As discussed in Chapter 4, conducting interviews in post-conflict environments demands consideration of ethical issues (Brounéus, 2011), and it is the responsibility of the researcher to be cognisant of potential ethical issues throughout the duration of fieldwork.\textsuperscript{78} It was important to make clear and ensure the anonymity of all participants, especially given the sensitive nature of some of the discussion topics. All of the individuals interviewed did so voluntarily, and prior to the start of each interview, written consent was given by each of the participants. How the research would be used was also clarified, in line with the University of Otago’s Ethics Committee regulations.\textsuperscript{79} Each participant was also

\textsuperscript{77} Some of the participants from external donor organisations allowed me to identify their organisational affiliation, and I have done this where possible.
\textsuperscript{78} Ethics approval from the University of Otago’s Human Ethics Committee was received before fieldwork began.
\textsuperscript{79} Please see Chapter 4 for more information regarding the overall research design and ethical considerations.
told that they were free to stop the interview at any point, and to decline answering any of the questions.

It was also important to “do no harm” while conducting fieldwork, and to be fully conscious of the participants’ physical and emotional safety (Brounéus, 2011). It was paramount to ensure the participants’ security, and that they would not be taking on risks by participating in the project (Wood, 2006). Ensuring the anonymity of the participants in all aspects of the research, as well as the voluntary nature of their participation, was one aspect of this. In addition, all of the interviews were conducted in private office spaces or in public settings, based on the choice of the participant. Finally, it was important to only ask necessary, appropriate and non-harming questions during the interviews so as to not create psychological or emotional distress.

The interviews themselves focused on four main areas: the participants’ understanding of local ownership, the engagement that they had with different groups in relation to the police reform process, the impact of local ownership on Kosovo’s PCPR process, and factors that may have hindered the development of local ownership of PCPR in Kosovo.80

7.2.1 Defining Local Ownership
The interviews began with general questions on local ownership and its meaning. This was done so that when participants were later asked about how they perceived the relationships between local ownership, the success of the reforms, and post-conflict peace, that the meaning of local ownership would be explicit. It is difficult to analyse how local ownership may have impacted post-conflict peace without first understanding how local people and practitioners conceptualise local ownership. It was also important to first gauge how respondents conceptualised local ownership, seeing that one purpose of the fieldwork was to examine perceptions of local ownership and its role in Kosovo’s PCPR process.

As highlighted in Chapter 2, there is considerable debate how local ownership is conceptualised, what it looks like in practice, and its significance for post-conflict peacebuilding. Consequently, there are both minimalist and maximalist conceptualizations of local ownership (Donais, 2009a; Richmond, 2012), and the differences between the two largely relate to the contrast between more top-down views of post-conflict peacebuilding, and more communitarian and bottom-up views.81 Local ownership is also thought to be

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80 A full copy of the interview questions can be found in the Appendix (A4).
81 As previously discussed, the minimalist conceptualization of local ownership is based on the assumption that external donors drive reforms (with local ‘buy-in), while the maximalist conceptualization of local ownership emphasises that reforms must be designed and implemented by locals, with support from external donors (see, Bendix & Stanley 2008b; Nathan, 2007).
necessary for post-conflict efforts to positively impact peace and security (UN 2010: 9). However, local ownership is considered one of the most daunting challenges facing post-conflict peacebuilding, and there is a significant body of research that discusses the absence of local ownership as a primary reason for failed security reforms in particular (OECD, 2007; Nathan, 2007). To reiterate, local ownership is conceptualized as *the engagement of local actors – Vis à vis external actors – in the design, implementation and management of a post-conflict police reform programs.*

In turning back to the case study, two main trends emerged from the responses provided. First, many of the respondents – primarily those from external donor organisations – were cautious about defining local ownership. Second, many of the participants discussed local ownership as a process, and something that takes time to develop. In the following sections some of these themes and the differences and similarities between groups are highlighted using quotes from the interviews.

**The Meaning of Local Ownership**

Several of the participants from external donor organisations exercised caution when it came to discussing local ownership, acknowledging the difficulties that come with its conceptualization. Some of them felt that the term is problematic to use because as one participant stated, “other than actually just working with locals and giving them more power and decision-making abilities over the processes”, that it is difficult to formally and explicitly implement “ownership policies”. Another participant highlighted the issues concerning its conceptual fogginess when he stated that local ownership, “is tricky because it’s developed differently in each place” and that “it’s a bit messy to have real policy for (implementing it)”. Echoing that sentiment, another respondent said, “Things like ownership and trust and confidence… they’re hard to talk about because we can’t touch them, and even when one group says they have something like ownership, it doesn’t necessarily mean that others (in that group) will”.

The respondents from the Kosovo Police were also somewhat cautious when asked to define and conceptualise ‘local ownership’. However, based on the responses provided it appears that there is a strong sense of ownership and responsibility of the reforms implemented amongst them. For example, one of the female participants likened local

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82 Please refer to Chapter 3 for a more comprehensive look at how ‘local ownership’ is conceptualised.
83 Interview with a male embassy employee (2014).
84 Interview with a make intergovernmental organisation employee (2014).
85 Interview with a female intergovernmental organisation employee (2014).
ownership to having responsibility, saying, “we are all responsible for the good and bad of the police”, 86 and another stated, “the safety here is up to us, we have to be the ones protecting people and bringing justice to the criminals” 87.

Participants from civil society were generally less familiar with the term ‘local ownership’, and several of them articulated that they were unsure how it impacted them. One of the civilian interviewees highlighted this when she said that as far as she was concerned, local ownership is “not the most important for my family”. 88 This sentiment was further demonstrated in the response given by another participant who said that local ownership is “for the people in politics to talk about”. 89 The responses from civil society may highlight that security, and policing more explicitly, may not be a priority in Kosovo, and that other issues are more pressing for the average citizen. This observation could also signal that civilians have ownership of the police, and generally positive relations with them.

**Local Ownership Over Time**

The second trend that emerged from the first part of the interviews was that several participants talked about local ownership as a process, and something that develops over time. This came through in the responses from external donor personnel, and to a lesser extent, with the participants from the Kosovo Police; it did not come through in the responses from civil society. For example, one of the participants said that local ownership “isn’t something that just happens”, and that “it has to be cultivated through disagreements, some anger and frustration”. The respondent continued by saying that the development of local ownership is “the locals’ figuring out what works for them and what doesn’t”, 90 suggesting that there was a relatively broad of scope of engagement between local and external actors, and that local actors had the ability to shape the reform process. The response also provides some empirical support for this study’s conceptualization of local ownership, which is based on the engagement of local actors in the reform process. Another interviewee focused more on the development of trust and acceptance between institutions and civil society, stating:

“Local ownership (…) is when finally you are able to identify that people trust institutions to act for them, be that with the police or even just basic public

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86 Interview with a female Kosovo Police officer (2014).
87 Interview with a male Kosovo Police officer (2014).
88 Interview with a female civilian (2014).
89 Interview with a male civilian (2014).
90 Interview with a male intergovernmental organisation employee (2014).
services. It was not always the case here, but there has been a lot of progress, and it improves more each year.”

The above quote is seemingly more about local ownership of institutions, as opposed to ownership of the process of police reform itself. However, the response also reflects that ownership has developed over time. The same respondent continued by discussing the difficulties that come with talking about local ownership as it pertains to the context of Kosovo, asserting “We are talking about six years after independence and 15 years after the war, it’s not a long time really.” The participant further added, “(...) it takes time to build confidence and foster institutions that can function properly... and fairly”.

When reflecting on the role of local ownership in Kosovo, one participant noted, “Maybe it has to be done in a trickle-down type of way (from the elites in Government to civil society organisations to civil society itself), or at least that is how it’s worked here.” The participant further articulated, “You can’t work with everyone on every issue from the beginning. There have to be some strategic priorities that involve certain actors at different points.”

The significance of ‘time’ is also highlighted in the statistical part of the study. The full correlation matrix (Appendix, A2) indicates that the external donors first work with the executive, and then the police, the parliament, and then civil society.

An administrator within the Kosovo Police also discussed the temporal dimension of local ownership, and how with time, the KP has gained ownership over its work, saying, “It’s really not a question, we are running this process. It’s not the donors dictating policy, even if maybe they did 5-6 years ago. We make the decisions about the police and then implement them.” This response highlights how there was potentially less ownership early on in the process, and that it took some time to develop.

From the responses it appears that there have implicitly been two types of local ownership. The first being local ownership over the reform process, and the second being local ownership over the reformed institutions. It is plausible that local ownership is both, and that at first there must be local ownership of the process of PCPR, and that local ownership of the institutions develops as a result.

7.2.2 Local & External Engagement

The second part of the interviews focused on the engagement between actors. Questions were asked to ascertain the amount and type of engagement that local actors had with

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91 Interview with a male intergovernmental organisation employee (2014).
92 Interview with a male intergovernmental organisation employee (2014).
93 Interview with male Kosovo Police administrator (2014).
external donor personnel, and vice versa. Two key discoveries emerged from the responses; the first relates to changes in the amount of engagement between various actors over time, the second pertains to changes in the issues that their engagement focused on.

**The Amount of Engagement**

It appears that the engagement between external donor personnel and both the police and civil society has decreased over time. Several respondents from external donor organisations said that they had *less* engagement with both local security personnel and civil society than they did previously. One participant, who discussed how local ownership and local institutions have developed with time, and how internationals have subsequently taken ‘a step back’, highlighted this.

“There was just more to do before. Kosovo is a bit special because there was a lot of chaos after the war, so much had to be developed from the ground up, everything was uncertain with what the Serbs were going to do and the UN, and there were so many moving parts to grapple with. But as the structures and institutions develop there is effectively less for us to kind of ‘weigh in on’.”

This response again highlights the importance of ‘time’, previously identified in the first part of the interviews. Specifically, the response suggests that local ownership of institutions was low in the early stages of the reform process, while the ownership of the reform process itself was high, and that over time, the ownership of the institutions increased as a result.

Another participant mentioned how his engagement with local actors from the KP and the Government had shifted in recent years, saying “When I first started there were constant meetings. Now I have one meeting a week with one or two people from the Ministry (of Internal Affairs), and sometimes with my liaison at the (Kosovo Police) Inspectorate”. The participant continued by saying, “Before it was about telling them what was working and what was not. Now it’s them telling me how things are going… and we really just listen.”

This response again suggests that ownership over the reform process was relatively high initially, as evidenced by the high frequency of interaction between externals and the police, and that the local ownership of institutions developed as a result of the engagement between actors. These responses may illustrate that the relations between external donors and local personnel working on PCPR improved over time, and that capacity of the Ministry of

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94 Some of the respondents from external donor organisations also stated that their positions did not include engagement with civil society actors.
95 Interview with a female intergovernmental organisation employee (2014).
96 Interview with a male intergovernmental organisation employee (2014).
Affairs, the Inspectorate and the Kosovo Police have also improved. Both findings could result in the need for fewer or less frequent meetings.

Similarly, many of the civilian participants talked about having very little engagement with external donor personnel at any time during the reforms. One male participant said “they (donor personnel) were much more visible before”\(^97\), and another stated that internationals “used to be more in the community than they are now”.\(^98\) These responses may however reflect the large donor drawdowns in 2013 and 2014, as opposed to decreased engagement regarding the reform process. Moreover, the responses may also reflect successful local ownership of reformed institutions, requiring less external engagement in the process than before. Others expressed having some type of relationship with internationals, but not formally or in relation to policing and/or security issues.

Some of the participants from external donor organisations also compared their engagement with different local actors. One respondent from an external donor organisation stated, “the government is far and away the most significant”, and that “now it’s more important for the Government to be working with civil society, than it is for us.” The same respondent continued by discussing some of the issues that their work focused on:

“We’ve had the most dealings with the Ministries, the PM’s Office, and the Police. With respect to civil society, right now we mainly work with smaller groups and some pilot projects in Pristina… domestic violence prevention and reporting is one of the big ones at the moment.”\(^99\)

Though it does not discuss violence against civilians or human rights abuses explicitly, the above response highlights the importance of executive engagement in PCPR, and provides support for Hypothesis 1, which examines the role of executive ownership and its relationship to post-conflict peace.

**Issues of Engagement**

The second trend that emerged concerns the issues that the engagement between local and external actors focused on. From the responses provided it seems that there was more broad sweeping engagement between local and external actors during the earlier years of the reform effort, and that it has now shifted to more focused engagement on more select issues such as domestic violence, and minority rights. Overall, this appears to be a good

\(^{97}\) Interview with a male civilian (2014)  
\(^{98}\) Interview with a male civilian (2014)  
\(^{99}\) Interview with a male embassy employee (2014).
development, which not only shows that the rights and protection of vulnerable people is improving, but also that they have some ownership over the reforms of the security institutions. The change may also reflect why many respondents noted that the engagement between local and external actors has decreased over time. The shift in engagement was mentioned by one of the local NGO participants.

“We’ve had always involvement with our donors and the Government and police since we started. It’s different now than before though, what (the donors) seem to be interested in talking about and working on. When I first started it was only... us and the Serbs. Now we work more about the other minorities, like the Roma.”\textsuperscript{100}

In addition, several interviewees noted that the main reason for the changes in engagement is due to improvements in the capacity of the Kosovo Police, as well as the creation of the Police Inspectorate. This is a positive finding, and it may speak to successful local ownership early in Kosovo’s PCPR process. As these events transpired, it seems that local actors have taken more control over policing in general. For example, one participant from an external donor organisation said, “In the last five years there has been a huge improvement in the management of the police, they don’t need as much from us anymore, and they also know that we won’t be here forever.” The respondent continued by saying, “There has been so much work put into strengthening the police, mainly the human rights and accountability, and also with setting up the Inspectorate, and now the results are showing finally.”\textsuperscript{101}

When asked what engagement has looked like on the ground, interviewees from each of the three groups pointed primarily to the public awareness and information campaigns that have been implemented. The most discussed information campaigns were around traffic and vehicle laws such as speeding, seatbelts, and licensing and registration. One of the respondents provided an example:

“There was a point when the government and the UN decided that all of Kosovo would have to start using the same license plates, and this obviously makes a lot of sense. But the Serbs were a bit nervous about this because they thought that they would be given special license plates that would identify them (as Serbian) to the new police. It took some time, about eighteen months

\textsuperscript{100} Interview with a male NGO employee (2014).
\textsuperscript{101} Interview with a male intergovernmental organisation employee (2014).
of publicity and campaigns and community meetings with us and the police, but now it’s working.”

Another interviewee that mentioned the decreased engagement between local and external actors saying that it “(...) is because at first we had to build trust with them, the Government, the police, civilians, it took some time, and for some it’s still not there. But also the police have improved their training.”

Overall this part of the interviews highlighted that the engagement between external donor actors and civil society has decreased, while the engagement between the Kosovo Police and civil society has increased. In addition, this section has shown that while much of the engagement between local and external actors focused on broader issues of security in the beginning stages of the PCPR process, that it has evolved and now focuses more on minority rights and vulnerable populations. Furthermore, it appears that these changes took place as a result of the improved capacity of the Kosovo Police, and of increased trust and cooperation between the police and civil society. While not definitive, it is plausible that these results are representative of the fact that as local ownership developed, there was less need for external engagement.

7.2.3 Local Ownership & Reform Success

The third section of the interviews focused on how respondents perceived local ownership to have impacted the success of Kosovo’s post-conflict police reform process. While the responses are of course dependent on what participants understood local ownership to be, overall the majority of participants from each of the three groups spoke favourably about the effects of local ownership. This was an interesting finding given that many respondents exercised caution in defining and conceptualizing the term ‘local ownership’, as highlighted in the first part of the interviews.

In discussing its implications for Kosovo’s PCPR process, many participants from external donor organisations linked local ownership to factors such as the “consistent improvements in trust (in the police)” and stated that there are now “(...) less issues between the different ethnic groups and their dealings with police”. These trends were also seen in the interviews with local actors. One participant described the overall trend in improved policing by connecting local ownership to community policing, saying:

102 Interview with a male intergovernmental organisation employee (2014).
103 Interview with a female intergovernmental organisation employee (2014).
104 Interview with a male intergovernmental organisation employee (2014).
“The success of the police is really evident here, especially in the last 5 or 6 years. The crimes are down… people are coming forward to the police more. Community policing has helped with this. It’s made (the police) more involved, and it’s helped people be more involved also.”¹⁰⁵

Some of the respondents also mentioned how the absence of local ownership had impacted policing in Kosovo previously, and mentioned the improvements they have seen. For example, one of the respondents stated that local ownership “has been crucial for the success of the police here.” He followed up by asserting:

“Before I would say that a lot of Albanians feared (the police) because of the history and the war. And when you’re scared of the police, you’re not going to approach them on the street… you might be scared of being pulled over and having to pay a bribe. Now the police function more within the communities, and there is mutual respect.”¹⁰⁶

This response shows the significance of civil society ownership and that as theorized, it is important for there to be trust between civilians and the police (Perdan, 2008), which lowers the risk of civilians taking security into their own hands, and subsequently, reduces the potential threat to the state and the need to perpetrate violence against civilians.

Another respondent highlighted the impact of local ownership in a different way, saying that while it was not a priority at first, it became one over time. The participant also noted that as local ownership developed within communities and security improved, the police were able to focus their attention onto more specialized issues and developing skills in those areas.

“It was hard at first, for everyone after the war and for some time. But now… I have seen little shifts and ebbs and flows in the relationship of the police with some of the different groups, it has become better. And now there is with us and the police more of a focus on vulnerable groups and women’s access to justice. I think this will be the most important issue in the next years.”¹⁰⁷

Some of the participants also discussed variation in ownership between different actors, and the importance of civil society came through in these responses. One participant for instance said that, “The government is of course number one. But I would say civil society now plays

¹⁰⁵ Interview with a male NGO employee (2014).
¹⁰⁶ Interview with a male think tank employee (2014).
¹⁰⁷ Interview with a female intergovernmental organisation employee (2014).
a big part.” The respondent went on to point out that “There are some very strong groups like the KWN\textsuperscript{108}, who are doing some good oversight work and really working to promote women’s rights. The judiciary here is still a bit feeble in my opinion.”\textsuperscript{109} This response indicates the importance of civil society engagement in post-conflict police reform, notably for improving relations between the police and society, providing support for Hypothesis 6.

Although the majority of participants spoke positively, some provided more critical views of local ownership and its role in Kosovo’s PCPR. One respondent questioned the ability to gauge the role of local ownership at all, saying, “It’s hard to say what kind of impact it’s has had, or if there has been any, because we’re still here. There’s only so much ownership that they really can have right now, (...) as we’ve downsized it’s increased.” The respondent further noted: “I think it will be easier to assess once all of the missions have finished 10, 20 years down the road… maybe not even until a few years after that.”\textsuperscript{110} The above response again highlights the conceptualization of local ownership as ownership of institutions, which makes sense given that in theory, local ownership of a process should lead to local ownership of a ‘reformed’ institution in the long-term.

### 7.2.4 Hindrances to Local Ownership

The final part of the interviews focused on factors that the participants believed had hindered the development of local ownership, and/or the success of Kosovo’s police reform program. Three key findings emerged from the responses: the role of corruption, justice and impunity related issues, and socio-economic development.

There is distinct variation in the responses between the three groups. While the respondents from external donor organisations and civil society discussed both corruption and justice as well as socio-economic development issues, none of the respondents from the Kosovo Police discussed problems relating to corruption and/or justice. This trend may be the result of several factors. It is plausible that KP staff members do not believe there are corruption and justice issues in Kosovo, they may want to hide or not disclose their feelings regarding corruption and justice, or they may believe that issues such as socio-economic development, are more detrimental.

\textsuperscript{108} The KWN is made up of 106 women’s groups and organisations both in Kosovo and internationally that advocate for women’s rights including health, domestic violence and trafficking, and economic empowerment (KWN, 2016). It is also important to recognize that the KWN receives support from several international donors including the UNDP, UNIFEM and the OSCE.

\textsuperscript{109} Interview with a female intergovernmental organisation employee (2014).

\textsuperscript{110} Interview with a male embassy employee (2014).
Corruption

Seven of the nine interviewees from external donor organisations said that problems relating to corruption and justice are the biggest hindrances to local ownership, as well as the success of Kosovo’s overall security reform and stabilization efforts. One participant highlighted this trend in saying, “Corruption is everywhere, really. That’s not to say everyone in politics and the judges and police or wherever are corrupt, but it’s in every sector.” The respondent continued by saying “It’s a part of the system here more than anything, and it’s going to be very very difficult to clean up. I don’t think it’s something that (the international community) can really even tackle”\textsuperscript{111}.

One participant discussed how corruption has affected local ownership of the KP in particular, saying that because people know the police can be bribed, “there are no reasons for (people) to trust (the police)”, and moreover, that “it makes some people question if the police is going to act appropriately in all situations.”\textsuperscript{112}

Some of the participants also addressed the problem of political will, and asserted that many local politicians are unwilling to address corruption. One interviewee discussed the lack of political willingness to take on corruption as a side-effect of Kosovo’s clan affiliations, and another respondent went further, stating: “The norms and practices have to change in order for (Kosovo) to become really independent without all of the donor support. It won’t happen over night, or maybe not even in ten more years. It may take a generation or two”\textsuperscript{113}. This finding is in line with a report by the European Commission that highlights corruption as a serious issue in Kosovo, and states that Kosovo’s political class needs to demonstrate its political will by adopting a “zero tolerance” stance towards corruption (European Commission, 2014).\textsuperscript{114}

When asked for examples of corruption and how it has obstructed local ownership, respondents touched on similar examples; primarily noting the trafficking of goods and services, which some believe involves officers from the Kosovo Police. One respondent asserted, “Believe me, the illicit trafficking goes all the way up into the police and the Government at the very top levels”\textsuperscript{115}. This sentiment was echoed by a participant who said that the trafficking in Kosovo far outweighs other issues, and that “As soon as we’re talking about making money there is no problem with ethnicity or clans, all of the problems go

\textsuperscript{111} Interview with a female intergovernmental organisation employee (2014).
\textsuperscript{112} Interview with a male NGO employee (2014).
\textsuperscript{113} Interview with a male intergovernmental organisation employee (2014).
\textsuperscript{114} The report also notes that the anti-corruption strategy adopted by the government has failed to generate results due to the lack of political support (European Commission, 2014).
\textsuperscript{115} Interview with a male intergovernmental organisation employee (2014).
away. It happens with stolen cars, electronics, cigarettes.”

While the issue of trafficking may not appear to be directly related to local ownership, it speaks to the way that people – primarily international donor personnel – view some members within the Kosovo Police; namely the legitimacy of some KP officers as providers of security, and their role in society as part of the system meant to uphold the rule of law and not circumvent the law for personal gain.

Justice and Impunity

In addition to corruption, some of the respondents discussed justice and impunity-related issues as obstacles to the success of Kosovo’s security reforms. A respondent from the OSCE claimed “There are people (in Kosovo) who should be in jail, but they will never see the inside of a courtroom.” The interviewee continued by acknowledging that justice and impunity issues can lead too several additional problems, saying, “… this creates problems…if you have people getting away with crimes then it causes trust issues between the people on one side and the state one the other”.

Another respondent similarly noted:

“I think (justice and impunity) are tricky problems. Some people say we’re not doing enough to prosecute, and there some others who don’t want us to do anything. We’re damned if we do, damned if we don’t.”

A respondent from a Pristina-based think tank expanded on that sentiment and also touched on the ethnic dimension that flavours some of the justice and impunity issues that hamper local ownership of the reforms as well as the KP more generally, saying, “Because of what’s happened, I would say that you have a good portion of the population…the Serbs… that feel that they haven’t had justice from the war.” The interviewee continued by saying “these kinds of resentment do not go away. Sure some people forget, but if the problems aren’t dealt with the animosity remains and kind of bubbles.”

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116 Interview with a female intergovernmental organisation employee (2014).
117 Some reports on Kosovo Police involvement in trafficking have been released following the completion of the fieldwork (see, e.g. Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 2015; Kosovar Centre for Security Policy, 2015).
118 Post-conflict justice is relatively well researched within the general field of peace and conflict studies, and while it is somewhat prevalent in the DDR literature (see, Sriram and Herman, 2009), it has only recently been considered in relation to security sector reform (see, Jarstad, 2013).
119 A report by Freedom House (2016) acknowledges that improvements in judicial freedom, and in the judiciary’s ability and willingness to arrest and prosecute high-level individuals, improved slightly during 2015 and 2016.
120 Interview with a male intergovernmental organisation employee (2014).
121 Interview with a female intergovernmental organisation employee (2014).
122 Interview with a male think tank employee (2014).
**Socio-Economic Development**

Kosovo’s lack of social and economic development also appears to have hampered the development of local ownership and the success of its security reforms. One of the participants expressed how the lack of development has impacted not only the police, but also Kosovo’s greater development.

“The economic situation here is a huge problem for not only the security reforms, but for everything. They are not really able to use their natural resources, and the political uncertainty has made everything more difficult with investment. When you couple that with the massive unemployment, it becomes almost overwhelming.”

Another interviewee related Kosovo’s economic situation to its dependency on the international community, stating: “Most people probably don’t realise how reliant (Kosovo) is on aid. It is in many ways quite unstable without it”. One of the civilian interviewees summed up the economic and social issues in Kosovo in discussing the impact it has on daily life.

“How should we care about the police and the internationals when there are no jobs? My sons cannot find work. That is the real big problem here in Kosovo. This is my home, but there is nothing for (my sons) to have better lives here.”

**7.3 Conclusion**

This chapter has presented the results of the case study, which explored the perceived effects of local ownership on Kosovo’s post-conflict police reform process. The results are driven by interview data from external donor organisation personnel, staff members of the Kosovo Police and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, local NGO and think tank personnel, and civilians. The main findings suggest that the engagement between external donors and local actors has decreased over time. It also seems that the issues that the engagement between local and external actors focused on has also changed, being more comprehensive and broad-sweeping during the initial stages of the reform process, and now focusing more on vulnerable populations and minority rights. The majority of the participant’s also viewed

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123 Interview with a female intergovernmental organisation employee (2014).
124 A 2014 report by Saferworld acknowledges that Kosovo and its’ citizens remains largely dependent on external donors and their support for the provision of security.
125 Interview with a male intergovernmental organisation employee (2014).
126 Interview with a female civilian (2014).
local ownership has being an important factor for the success of Kosovo’s post-conflict police reform process, primarily discussing the role of the executive engagement. Many of the participants also discussed the significance of time in relation to the development of ownership, a finding that is supported by the statistical portion of this study. The results also indicate that there have been three main hindering factors to the local ownership of Kosovo’s PCPR process: corruption, justice and impunity issues, and Kosovo’s socio-economic development. Overall, Kosovo represents a relatively strong case through which to examine the effects of local ownership given the lack of functioning security institutions in the aftermath of the armed conflict, as well as the large and long-term donor engagement.

The following chapter, the analysis and conclusion, brings together the results from the quantitative and qualitative results of this study, linking them to existing research and theory. It also discusses some of the limitations of this study, and highlights some avenues for future research.
8. Discussion & Conclusions

The overall aim of this study has been to provide new empirical and theoretical knowledge concerning local ownership and its implications for the success of post-conflict police reform. During the past twenty-five years police reform has become one of the most often-implemented components of post-conflict peacebuilding and stabilization processes. Though it is carried out independently in some instances (e.g. South Africa), it most often includes considerable involvement from external donors such as intergovernmental organisations and coalitions of states. Based on existing research it appears that the track record of post-conflict police reform has been mixed at best, with failed attempts at PCPR seemingly more common than success stories (see, O’Neil, 2005; Nathan, 2007).

In accounting for the failings of post-conflict police reform, namely when there is external actor involvement, much of the scholarship points to issues relating to local ownership, or a lack thereof. It is argued that when donors push through reforms without sufficient engagement from local counterparts, it creates a lack of ownership over the reform processes, as well as the ‘reformed’ institutions. In turn, the absence of local ownership leads to illegitimate and incapable institutions, such as the police, that are unable to maintain the rule of law and promote the development of post-conflict peace and security. Conversely, it has also been contended that post-conflict states may be better off as a result of external donor involvement in reform processes (Kurtenbach & Wulf, 2012), regardless of ownership. Without rigorous and systematic empirical research on PCPR and local ownership, however, it is difficult to adjudicate between these positions and understand the implications of local ownership for post-conflict peacebuilding efforts (Donais, 2009b). To address these dilemmas, the central research question of this study has been: How does the local ownership of post-conflict police reform impact post-conflict peace?

Chapter 3 drew from several strands of existing research to develop new conceptualizations of post-conflict police reform, local ownership, local actors, and local-external engagement. In particular, the chapter presented a new conceptualization of local ownership, which focuses on the breadth of local actors that are engaged in
PCPR processes. The chapter also presented the theoretical framework that links the local ownership of post-conflict police reform to post-conflict peace. Chapter 4 described the overall research approach, which combined quantitative and qualitative methods. Specifically, Chapter 4 discussed the operationalizations of the variables, and the collection and analysis of new global data on post-conflict police reform and local ownership. This chapter also discussed how engagement is operationalized, based on the breadth of local engagement in PCPR. The chapter also discussed the qualitative evidence, which was gathered via fieldwork in Kosovo, to investigate the effects of local ownership on its post-conflict police reform process. Chapters 5 and 6 presented the results of the statistical analyses, while Chapter 7 reviewed and discussed the results from the fieldwork in Kosovo.

This final chapter is structured as follows. The first part summarises and discusses the main findings of the study, specifically focusing on post-conflict police reform, local ownership, and the included policing components. It also relates the findings to existing literature and to the overarching research question, as well as to some potential policy implications where applicable. The second part of the chapter outlines the main contributions that this study makes to the fields of local ownership, post-conflict police reform, and the gender-violence link. The third part of this chapter outlines some of the implications of the study’s research design, and also identifies several avenues for future research.

### 8.1 Main Findings
Before beginning the more in-depth discussion of the main findings, it is important to first review the results of the hypothesis testing done in the quantitative part of the study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Claim</th>
<th>Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1</td>
<td>Post-conflict police reform does not impact post-conflict peace.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2</td>
<td>External actor involvement in post-conflict police reform positively impacts post-conflict peace</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3</td>
<td>Executive engagement in post-conflict police reform positively impacts post-conflict peace.</td>
<td>Yes (strong support)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H4</td>
<td>Parliamentary engagement in post-conflict police reform does not impact post-conflict peace.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H5</td>
<td>Police engagement in post-conflict police reform</td>
<td>Yes (mixed support)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
positive impacts peace.

| H6 | Civil society engagement in post-conflict police reform positively impacts post-conflict peace. | Yes (weak support) |
| H7 | Increased local actor engagement in post-conflict police reform positively impacts post-conflict peace | Yes (mixed support) |
| H8 | Community policing programs positively impact post-conflict peace | No |
| H9 | Female representation programs positively impact post-conflict peace | Yes (strong support) |

### Post-Conflict Police Reform

Overall, the results demonstrate that the implementation of PCPR alone is insufficient for accounting for improved post-conflict peace, and that other factors or components relating to post-conflict police reform are likely important. This finding is in line with existing research on post-conflict police reform (see, Donais, 2005; Padurariu, 2014), security sector reform (see, Jarstad, 2013; Law, 2006), and peacebuilding (see, Donais, 2012). Specifically, the findings show that when ongoing and completed PCPR are looked at together, non-state OSV actually increases, as compared to post-conflict states that do not implement PCPR. This is unexpected seeing that PCPR is carried out with the goal of improving post-conflict security (den Heyer, 2010). This result also contradicts existing theories that tout the importance of police reform for (re) establishing rule of law and human security (O’Neil, 2005; Goldsmith, 2005). However, the finding gives credence to some of the existing case studies that highlight the failings of PCPR (see, e.g. Mendelson-Forman, 2006).

These results could be driven by the fact that not all PCPR programs are the same. It is possible that some PCPR programs increase insecurity by creating commitment problems if they are not adequately funded, and operate without local ownership. Alternatively, better-funded and more long-term PCPR programs that have ‘higher levels’ of local actor engagement may have a positive effect on peace. However, since the effects of both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ PCPR are aggregated together, it may be resulting in a nil effect.

It is also noteworthy that the results concerning non-state OSV change when only completed years of post-conflict police reform are included in the analysis, as opposed to when both ongoing and completed years are included. Specifically, the results show an unclear relationship between completed PCPR and non-state one-sided violence. This shift may be due to the insecurity and volatility that often exists during the immediate aftermath of armed conflict, when PCPR are being implemented (Hänggi, 2004; Ball &
Hendrickson, 2009). It is also plausible that when post-conflict police reform programs are announced to the public, that non-state groups will be more likely to use one-sided violence in the short term in order to strengthen their position within the state or to gain concessions.

**External Actor Involvement**

This section focuses on the results concerning external donor involvement in post-conflict police reform. As previously mentioned, this analysis was carried out as a means of considering how external actor involvement in general shapes the outcomes of post-conflict police reform processes, and post-conflict peace. It also serves as a necessary precursor for analysing the implications of local ownership, seeing that issues of ownership arise as a result of external involvement.

Overall, the findings point to an unclear relationship between external involvement in PCPR and post-conflict peace. Upon consideration of the results pertaining explicitly to external involvement (Table 6.3.1), none of the coefficients are statistically significant. Based on those findings, and all else being equal, it does not appear that the involvement of external actors in post-conflict police reform positively effects post-conflict peace. These results are unanticipated given that external donor donors are so frequently involved in PCPR (see, Blume, 2008; Figure 5.2.1), and because the role of external donors is to help develop legitimate, capable and sustainable police services (Law, 2006; Martin & Wilson, 2008). These findings are however in line with some of the existing research on police reform (and SSR), which asserts that reforms that are not designed and implemented by local actors are less likely to be successful due to their lack of local ownership (see, e.g. Nathan, 2007 & 2008; Donais, 2008). However, it is worth noting that the results pertaining to local ownership all intrinsically entail the involvement of external actors. As such, external actor involvement can be seen as important – and having an overall positive effect on post-conflict peace – under the conditions of hypotheses 3, 5, 6 and 7.

In conclusion, the findings show that external actor involvement in post-conflict police reform does not have a positive effect on post-conflict peace, all else being equal. This result may demonstrate that the mere engagement of external actors in peacebuilding efforts is not sufficient for improving peace and stability and post-conflict countries, and that other factors are required for post-conflict peace to improve. For instance, there are limits on what external actors can hope to achieve during the implementation of post-conflict peacebuilding activities. One of these constraints is the consent and collaboration of key local actors, which are examined in the following section.
Local Ownership
The main findings of this study pertain to local ownership of externally driven post-conflict police reform programs. Hypotheses 3-7 of the quantitative study, as well as the fieldwork in Kosovo, examined the impact of local ownership, and its implications for post-conflict police reform and peace. The findings are discussed in the sections that follow.

Executive Ownership
Much of the existing literature considers the executive to be the most significant local actor when it comes to local ownership and peacebuilding, an assertion based on the argument that executive engagement ensures a minimum degree of national input and oversight, and also limits the ability of donors to ‘impose’ unsuitable reforms (Jackson, 2011; Scheye, 2005). The significance of executive engagement is also somewhat expected given that the executive is the key decision making body in most states and an institution with the capability to use violence against civilians in the post-conflict period. Moreover, as the institution responsible for governance and administration, the executive is ultimately tasked with deciding whether or not to implement PCPR, as well as the scope of external donor engagement in said reforms.

Overall, the findings illustrate that executive ownership, as measured by its engagement in post-conflict police reform, has a relatively strong relationship to post-conflict peace. More pointedly, the results show that executive engagement in PCPR is correlated with reduced state and non-state one-sided violence, and torture. These results provide support for existing case study research that discusses the significance of the executive ownership for PCPR, as well as the implications of not having it (see, Bøås & Stig, 2010; Loden, 2005).

The significance of executive ownership is further supported by the findings from the fieldwork in Kosovo. Many participants stated that the executive was the most important actor when it came to local ownership, and also with regards to Kosovo’s PCPR process more generally. Based on the responses, it was also found that as executive ownership of the reform processed improved, other types of ownership (e.g. civil society) developed. Moreover, it appears that as executive ownership over the reform process and the KP was strengthened, reforms were able to focus on more specialized facets of policing, such as minority rights and domestic violence.
Parliamentary Ownership
Based on the results in Chapter 6, it appears that parliamentary ownership, as measured by parliamentary engagement in PCPR, does not impact post-conflict peace. These results can be explained by the fact that in many post-conflict countries, parliaments are relatively weak and poorly functioning (OECD DAC, 2008). In such circumstances parliaments are unable to work as a bridge between the state and society, or to provide sufficient oversight over state security institutions (UNDP, 2006). This is most often the case in post-conflict settings where parliaments are not representative of society, or where they are weak in relation to the executive and lack the ability to influence the reforms and provide transparency and oversight.

Similar results came through in the fieldwork results (Chapter 7). While not explicitly discussed, none of the participants discussed Kosovo’s parliament or parliamentary engagement, in relation to the PCPR process or local ownership. This is noticeable considering that the participants discussed all of the other local actors included in the statistical portion of the study. While not an explicit or overt finding, this omission may highlight the relative weakness of Kosovo’s parliament, and also serve as an explanation for its lack of engagement in the PCPR process. It may also highlight an existing peacebuilding dilemma in that if donors assume that a parliament is weak, they may be less likely to work with it on security planning and reforms. However, this would only serve to maintain the relative weakness of the legislature. Therefore, these findings may in fact highlight the need for increased resources to be used for strengthening the capacity of parliament as an oversight mechanism and forum for debate within PCPR programs.

Police Ownership
Police ownership of the reform process is argued to be of fundamental importance. This assertion is primarily based on the fact that police are the key providers of security in most countries, and they have a direct relationship to the maintenance of internal stability and the rule of law. Police are also the most likely and able institution to violently reject a reform process, and to engage in violence and human rights abuses against civilians (Holm, 2000). That being said, existing research informs us that not all PCPR efforts have actually engaged the police, and that these failings may have contributed to poorly functioning and unsustainable reform processes (Ebo, 2005; Perdan, 2008).

While there is very little existing research that considers the engagement or ownership of the police with regards to PCPR, the results of this study illustrate that police ownership of post-conflict police reform has a relatively positive effect on post-conflict peace.
Specifically, police ownership of PCPR – measured as the engagement of police – is associated with decreased state and non-state one-sided violence. These findings are valuable given that police are one of the most likely and able bodies that can engage in violence against civilians (Holm, 2000), especially when they are lacking proper training and oversight.

The case study provides additional support for the importance of police ownership of PCPR. Many respondents, including those from the KP, discussed the engagement of the Kosovo Police as a key determinant for the overall success of the reform effort. The bulk of the respondents from the Kosovo Police and the Ministry of Internal Affairs also spoke about the development of ownership over time, and through their engagement with external donors in the reform process. It may be easy to overlook or assume the ownership of police with regards to a police reform process; however these findings, in combination with existing theory, highlight the importance of engagement with police personnel for creating more accountable, legitimate and capable post-conflict police.

**Civil Society Ownership**

There is a growing body of literature highlighting the importance of civil society engagement or ownership in post-conflict peacebuilding (see, Pouligny, 2012; Anderson & Olson, 2003; Bender, 2011). It is argued that civil society is generally more progressive than political elites, and that it serves as a vital instrument of input and oversight over reform efforts (Barnes & Albrecht, 2008). Specifically, it is argued that civil society ownership provides people with a voice to help protect their own human rights, and also enables them to deter the use of one-sided violence (Hultman, 2012a).

The findings suggest that overall, civil society ownership of PCPR has a positive relationship to post-conflict peace. Specifically, the results show that civil society engagement is associated with lower levels of OSV by non-state actors, as compared to post-conflict police reform processes without civil society engagement, a finding that is of particular interest when situated in relation to existing research. This result can be explained by existing theories that describe civil society as a de facto ‘bridge’ between the state, its security institutions, and potential rebel groups (Belloni, 2001). As Davenport (2007a) contends, civil society ownership enables individuals and organisations to have more opportunities to express themselves with regards to their security needs, which subsequently reduces the need for coercive violence to be used. This result also provides support for existing research by Nilsson (2012), who finds that civil society involvement in peacebuilding increases the durability of peace, as well as Barnes (2009) who asserts that civil society engagement increases awareness regarding
the costs of armed conflict, and encourages engagement between potentially antagonistic groups.

**Increased Local Ownership**
The findings also show that increased local ownership, as measured by the number of local actors engagement in PCPR, has a positive relationship to post-conflict peace. While the results relating to human rights are inconclusive, those concerning one-sided violence by the state and one-sided violence by non-state illustrate a relatively strong relationship. I examined increased (or improved) local ownership because much of the existing research considers it important for the success and sustainability of post-conflict security reforms, such as of the police (Nathan, 2007; Donais, 2008; UN, 2008; OECD DAC, 2008).

While participants were not asked about increased or improved local ownership as part of the case study, the results from the fieldwork in post-conflict Kosovo are also useful for exploring the relationship between improved local ownership of PCPR and post-conflict peace. This is especially true given that participants from all three of the groups interviewed (external donor personnel, local security personnel and civil society) emphasized that they believed local ownership had played a role in the success of Kosovo’s PCPR effort. I also found that local ownership takes time to develop. Several participants discussed that the executive ownership was most important, but then as that was strengthened, that other forms of ownership developed over time. These findings in particular lend considerable empirical support to existing research suggestive of the importance of increased local ownership, which includes a broader cross-section of local actors (Nathan, 2007; Donais, 2012).

**Engagement Between Actors**
Overall, it appears that the engagement between external donor personnel and personnel from the Kosovo Police and civil society was more extensive during the beginning stages of the reform process. Specifically, that the local ownership over the process was high, while the ownership of the actual institutions was low. Subsequently, it seems that with time, that local ownership of the institution (the KP) developed, and that as a result, less engagement between actors was required. In addition, during the early stages of the reform process it appears that the engagement between actors focused on broad sweeping issues relating to the reforms and the provision of security. However, as local ownership developed and the KP gained more trust and legitimacy, the issues of engagement became more specialized to deal with the rights of ethnic minorities, vulnerable populations, and domestic violence.
These results are significant because they detail the development of local ownership over time, and the changes that take place not only with regards to the amount of engagement between actors, but also the types of issues that their engagement focuses on. It also highlights a potentially more nuanced perspective of local ownership, separating local ownership of a reform process, from more long-term local ownership of a ‘reformed’ institution, with the former being potentially necessary for the latter.

Hindrances to Local Ownership

Another significant finding that emerged from fieldwork in Kosovo relates to factors that have hindered the development of local ownership of its PCPR process. The three main issues that were identified are: corruption, justice and impunity issues, and economic development. Although I cannot speak to the generalizability of these findings seeing as they are from a single case study of one post-conflict police reform process, they do however lend some support to existing research within the fields of post-conflict police reform and peacebuilding. There is for example a significant amount of existing research that touches on corruption as a limitation to the development of post-conflict peace and stability (see e.g., Rose-Ackerman, 2008; Cheng & Zaum, 2012; Lindberg & Orjuela, 2014127), and there is a small amount of literature that includes corruption in relation to local ownership and the reform of state security institutions (see, Nathan, 2007; Donais, 2012; Kappler & Lemay-Hébert, 2015). These findings illustrate a link between corruption and how people view state security institutions, namely the legitimacy and capacity of the Kosovo Police as security providers. Issues relating to post-conflict justice are also well documented within existing scholarship, and the findings of this study lend credence to those studies that purport the importance of justice for post-conflict peacebuilding, as opposed to something that can be shuffled down the list of priorities (see, Thiessen, 2015). Finally, the relationship between security and development in post-conflict settings has also been acknowledged in some existing research (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005; Kozul-Wright & Fortunato, 2011). And while many of the participants did not link socio-economic issues to local ownership explicitly, it appears that issues relating to unemployment and the lack of development have played a role in how people view Kosovo’s overall peacebuilding process, as well as the presence of external donors. It is also worth noting that the relationship between economic development and each of the four types of local ownership came through in the statistical portion of this study as well (see, Chapter 6.).

127 Lindberg & Orjuela (2014) look at how corruption impacts the engagement between local and external actors in post-conflict societies.
**Community Policing**

The results pertaining to community policing programs are somewhat inconclusive given that none of the coefficients regarding to post-conflict peace are statistically significant when additional variables are included in the analyses. Based purely on the statistical analysis, it can be inferred that the implementation of community policing programs does not have a positive effect on post-conflict peace. This is unexpected given that community-policing programs have been increasingly implemented throughout the past two decades, most often with the purpose of improving community-police relations, and reducing crime (Denney & Kassaye, 2013). By increasing trust in the police, it is further argued that community policing reduces the need for civilians to take up arms to maintain their own security (Charley & McCormack, 2011). Alternatively, the results concerning community policing line up with some of the existing case study literature, which has found that community policing in post-conflict societies has not been as impactful as expected (Rao, 2013).

It is also worth noting that the results relating to community policing could be driven by other factors. First, it should be acknowledged that the analysis of community policing was in comparison to female representation programs, and the two are highly correlated. However, additional tests excluding female representation programs largely reiterate the results shown in Chapter 6, that community policing does not have a positive effect on post-conflict peace (See, Appendix Table A3.1).

**Female Representation**

According to former United Nations’ Secretary General Kofi Annan (2006), “The world is . . . starting to grasp that there is no policy more effective (in promoting development, health, and education) than the empowerment of women and girls. And I would venture that no policy is more important in preventing conflict, or in achieving reconciliation after a conflict has ended”. I included an analysis of female representation programs (in the police) for three key reasons. First, existing research tells us that women often face heightened insecurity in conflict and post-conflict environments (Human Security Report, 2012; Klot, 2007). Second, there is a growing body of literature arguing that the inclusion of women and gender equality in peacebuilding efforts positively impacts the prospects of peace (Human Security Report, 2012; UN OHCHR, 2014; Bacon, 2015). Third, and perhaps most important for this study, is that increasing the representation of women in a given police service is an explicit means of increasing the ownership of women in the reform process, as well as the ‘reformed’ institution. Existing research tells us that women are more likely to come forward and report crimes to female police officers (True, 2013). It has also been found that when policing programs overlook
women’s security, it compromises their sustainability and success (UNDP, 2007). Finally, more gender equal and representative societies also have less violence (Caprioli, 2000; Bjarnegård et al., 2015).

Overall, the results (Tables 6.11 and 6.12) show that female representation programs, positively impact post-conflict peace. The results hold across all four of the dependent variables: state and non-state one-sided violence, extrajudicial killings, and torture. This finding is significant seeing that women are largely underrepresented in state security institutions globally (Young, 2015). This finding also provides further support for the importance of gender equality in post-conflict peacebuilding efforts, and corroborates existing research by Caprioli (2000) and Bjarnegård et al. (2015), who argue that more gender equal societies have less violence.

8.2 Contributions
As identified in Chapter 2 there have been several notable gaps within the existing research on post-conflict police reform and local ownership. Specifically, there was a distinct lack of large-N comparative research on both subjects. Using a novel framework, conceptualization and operationalization of post-conflict police reform and local ownership, this study makes three primary contributions to existing research.

Post-conflict Police Reform
Most of the existing research on post-conflict police reform is single case study orientated, tends to focus on best practices (Mani, 1999; Celador, 2005) and ‘lessons learned’ (Mani, 1999; Celador, 2005; Neild, 2001; Call, 2002), or focuses on specific aspects of reform processes (Dinnen & Peake, 2013; Charley & M’Cormack, 2012). An additional portion of the existing research is situated within more comprehensive studies on SSR, such as those by Peake and Scheye (2008), Jackson (2011), and Knight (2009). And while there are also a small number of small-N comparative studies on police reform, as discussed in Chapter 2, much of this literature is not systematic and is instead based on authors’ interpretations (see, Rauch & Van der Spuy, 2006). These shortcomings have led to several scholars acknowledging the absence of systematic data on the topic (Call, 2002; Loh, 2010; Ansorg, Haass & Strasheim, 2016).

This study has made several contributions to the existing research on post-conflict police reform. First and foremost, this study includes some of the first large-N global data on post-conflict police reform. Moreover, this study represents the first known large-N global study that examines the implications of post-conflict police reform efforts for post-conflict peace. As a result, this study is foundational for understanding, empirically,
the efficacy of PCPR in general and over time, and as compared to post-conflict countries that do not implement PCPR. Original data on the involvement of external actors in PCPR was also collected, which subsequently enabled this study to explore the implications of their involvement in post-conflict police reform.

**Local Ownership**

This research contributes to improving the understanding of local ownership as it relates to post-conflict police reform. This study has reconceptualised the term local ownership and established a transparent and replicable conceptualization and operationalization of local ownership that allows for comparison over time and across cases. Specifically, this study has focuses on one aspect of local ownership, the breadth of local actor engagement in PCPR. This is an important contribution given the conceptual opaqueness that has previously surrounded the term (see, Nathan, 2007; Donais, 2009b; Richmond, 2012). This study has also developed four different types of local ownership based on the engagement of local actors in reform processes, and collected original data on each of them. This is significant given that until now there has been little effort to measure and compare local ownership across reform efforts. This research also serves to demonstrate that local ownership can be studied with both quantitative and qualitative methods; a mixed-methods approach has not been used in previous studies. The findings of this study contribute to our understanding of local ownership in several ways. Most notably by showing the particular importance of executive ownership of post-conflict police reform for reducing state and non-state one-sided violence, and torture. This study also highlights that police ownership of PCPR is effective for reducing one-sided violence by both state and non-state actors, while civil society ownership is shown to have a significant effect on reducing non-state OSV. These findings demonstrate the importance of local ownership for post-conflict police reform, and may plausibly speak to the significance of local ownership in relation to more comprehensive SSR processes, as well as peacebuilding more generally. In addition, the qualitative component of this study highlights the importance of time for the development of local ownership, and has shed light on three factors that have hindered the development of local ownership in the case of post-conflict Kosovo: corruption, justice and impunity issues, and socio-economic development.

**Gender Representation**

This study makes an important contribution to the existing research on gender and gender equality in peacebuilding. While there are existing large-N studies that look at violence against women and sexual and gender based violence during conflict, this represents one of the first statistical studies that considers the role of women and female representation in particular, in peacebuilding. As a result, it adds significantly to the existing research
on women’s involvement and gender equality as it pertains to post-conflict stabilization and peacebuilding.

8.3 Implications of the Research Design

The research design and methodology used in this study have some implications for the generalizability and significance of the findings. Some of these limitations have been discussed previously in Chapter 4, while others have been noted in the analysis of the quantitative and qualitative material in Chapters 5-8. This section focuses on four areas that warrant attention with regards to their implications for the study’s generalizability and contributions. This section also highlights several avenues for future research.

Post-conflict Police Reform

While there is a reasonable amount of existing research on post-conflict police reform, as well as security sector reform more broadly (see for example, Neild, 2001; Call, 2002; Mani, 1999; Celador, 2005), this study is one of the first large-N examinations of the subject, and the first that considers the implications of police reform and its implementation in post-conflict states. Being an introductory analysis, this study also presents several avenues for future research. First, the scope of this study spans 1989-2014. However it would be interesting to investigate whether the implementation of PCPR and its effects on post-conflict peace has improved over time. Seeing that PCPR is a relatively new tool of post-conflict peacebuilding, and recognizing that its prevalence has increased over the past twenty-five years (see, Figure 5.1.1), it is plausible that there has been a degree of operational learning ‘on the job’, and that practitioners have over time, developed salient best practices for implementing reform programs. Second, it would be worth investigating whether the impact of post-conflict police reform varies by region. Europe and Africa have for instance, had the highest rates of post-conflict police reform, while considerably fewer PCPR processes have been carried out in the Americas and Asia. However, it is possible that police reform is more successful in some regions than in others. Third, although not feasible in this study due to resource and time constraints, future research on post-conflict police reform would benefit from further disaggregating between the components of PCPR. This study is limited by the fact that it considers PCPR as a homogenous entity, and does not allow for variation across different programs. For instance, it may be that PCPR processes that focus on oversight and human rights are more successful than those that have a greater emphasis on training and capacity enhancement.

128 See Chapter’s 3 and 4 for the conceptualization and operationalization of ‘post-conflict police reform’.
**External Involvement**

For practicality and feasibility, external donor actors have been considered as a homogenous group within the quantitative component of this study. However, a vast number and type of actors and organisations engage in post-conflict police reform processes. Moreover, not all external actors are created equally. As previously discussed, some external actors have higher budgets and technical resources available to them. Certain external actors also have greater levels of expertise and experience participating in PCPR. As a result of these factors, it is possible that certain external actors will be better able to facilitate local ownership and/or successful of post-conflict police reform processes, and in turn, have a greater impact on post-conflict peace. Future research should therefore look to disaggregate external actor type. For instance, it would be worthwhile examining empirically if more experienced PCPR practitioners (e.g. the EU) can deliver better results, or if having a regional organisation that is geographically invested in the outcomes of a reform process are more successful.

**Local Ownership**

Local ownership takes shape under a variety of different contexts and conditions, and there is a much larger and more complex number of local actors that could have been considered and examined in this study, which focuses on the breadth of engagement. One example of a local actor that could have been included – and represents an area for future research to discover – is non-state groups such as ex-combatants. Although this study considers ex-combatants in relation to disarmament demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programs, it does not account for whether they are engaged in post-conflict police reform processes in particular. The role of non-state actors in post-conflict peacebuilding is also an area of growing research interest (see, e.g. Ebo, 2007; Hofmann & Schneckener, 2011). In addition, some of the local actors that are included in this study could have been further disaggregated. For instance, it would have been theoretically and substantively appealing to further disaggregate ‘civil society’, and to perhaps also consider the ownership of ethnic minorities or vulnerable populations in particular. This disaggregation of civil society in particular presents an area for future research to examine, especially given the growing importance placed on civil society engagement in peacebuilding (see, Nilsson, 2012). Finally, seeing that this study made a conceptual and operational distinction by focusing on the breadth of local actor engagement, as one aspect of local ownership, future research would benefit from further scrutinizing the implications of the depth of engagement. This could be done for instance by adding qualitative measures to this data.
Female Representation

The findings pertaining to female representation programs are some of the most theoretically and empirically important of this study. Future research would benefit considerably from examining the effects of female representation qualitatively. This would naturally help us to better understand the causal mechanisms that link the representation of women (in this case regarding PCPR) to post-conflict peace. This study is also limited in that it does not account for the role and responsibilities that women have with regards to a post-conflict police service, it only considers whether there were programs aimed at increasing their representation. It would be substantively interesting to see if whether having women in administrative roles in a police service has different implications for post-conflict policing than for example, increasing the representation of women in higher officer ranks.

8.4 Final Conclusions

This research has endeavoured to improve the understanding of local ownership as it pertains to post-conflict police reform, and its implications for post-conflict peace. It has done so in two ways. First, this study has presented and analysed new global data on post-conflict police reform programs from 1989-2014. It has also presented new global data on four unique types of local ownership, based on the engagement of local actors in post-conflict police reform processes. In doing so, this study has also provided an original conceptualization of local ownership based on the breadth of local actors that are engaged in PCPR processes. It has also provided new conceptualizations for ‘local actors’, and local-external actor engagement. Second, this study has empirically examined – via fieldwork – the effects of local ownership on post-conflict police reform in Kosovo, the results of which are based on interviews with twenty-three people.

The results from the quantitative analysis show that the executive, and its ownership of PCPR, plays a significant role in the development of post-conflict peace. Specifically, executive ownership decreases state and non-state one-sided violence as well as torture. The ownership of reforms by the police and civil society are also shown to have a positive effect on post-conflict peace. Police ownership is shown to decrease one-sided violence by both state and non-state actors, while civil society ownership decreases one-sided violence by non-state actors. In addition, increased or improved local ownership is shown to decrease both state and non-state one-sided violence. Conversely,

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129 This is similar to the operationalizations of the four types of local ownership, as it is not a measure of the quality or depth of female representation, though it does inform us that there were female representation programs.
parliamentary ownership of PCPR does not appear to have a strong effect on post-conflict peace.

The case study results also highlight the significance of local ownership of PCPR to the achievement of post-conflict peace. The findings show that there is variation across local actors regarding the ownership of the reform processes, as well as the ‘reformed’ institutions themselves. Moreover, the findings show that when ownership of a reform process is high, that ownership over the reformed institution can develop over time. The case study also shows that there are several conflict-related factors that can hinder the development of local ownership. Those identified are corruption, justice and impunity, and socio-economic development.

This is the first study to examine local ownership of post-conflict police reform using large-N global data. It has also considered the implications of local ownership for Kosovo’s post-conflict police reform process in particular, conveying the experiences and perceptions of external donor personnel involved in the reform process, as well as members of the Kosovo Police, and civil society. It is my hope that by providing systematic large-N research in combination with insight from the field, that the importance of local ownership will become of greater importance and priority for external donors and governments of states implementing post-conflict reforms.
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Appendix

A1.1 Variable List

Dependent Variables

*State-based One-sided Violence*
Each year of observation is coded with a value directly corresponding to the total number of deaths that occurred because of one-sided violence by the state. The variable is coded using data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED), version 4.0 (Sundberg & Melander, 2013).

*Non-state One-sided Violence*
Each year of observation is coded with a value that directly corresponds to the total number of deaths because of all OSV events perpetrated by non-state actors. The variable is coded using data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED), version 4.0 (Sundberg & Melander, 2013).

*Extrajudicial Killings*
Each post-conflict year of observation is coded with a value ranging from ‘0’ to ‘2’, corresponding to the intensity at which extrajudicial killings took place. A value of ‘0’ means that extrajudicial killings were either not used or not reported, a value of ‘1’ means that extrajudicial killings occurred infrequently, and a value of ‘2’ means that extrajudicial killings took place frequently. The variable is coded using data from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset (Cingranelli, Richards & Clay, 2014).

*Torture*
Each post-conflict year of observation is coded with a value ranging from ‘0’ to ‘2’, corresponding to the intensity at which torture took place. A value of ‘0’ means that torture was either not used or not reported, a value of ‘1’ means that torture occurred infrequently, and a value of ‘2’ means that torture took place frequently. The variable is coded using data from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset (Cingranelli, Richards & Clay, 2014).

Independent Variables
All of the independent variables included (as well as the DDR control variable) are author coded. They are coded using secondary source material such as reports from governmental organizations (e.g. the United Nations and the European Union), non-governmental organizations, think tanks and advocacy groups (e.g. International Crisis Group) and academic articles.\(^\text{130}\) Some of most frequently used sources were reports

\(^{130}\) The coding of the control variable ‘DDR’ used the same type of source material.
from the UN Documents Library, which houses reports from the Security Council and Secretaries General, as well as from UN agencies including the UNDP. Several publications from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), which publishes reports on ongoing governance and SSR programs, were also consulted.

Post-conflict Police Reform (PCPR)
To be coded as having a PCPR process, there must be evidence that there was a national program with the aim of reforming, reconstructing, or creating a new police service, with the goals of improving police capacity to provide internal security and maintain human rights. It can be a standalone program or part of a larger security sector reform, peacebuilding or stabilization process. It can also be implemented with or without the involvement of external actors. The program must include institutional reforms, such as changes to monitoring and oversight, vetting and recruitment, and community relations, as well as tactical reforms, which include changes to education and training, the allocation of resources and equipment, and infrastructure development.

The variable is coded in two ways. The first considers both ongoing and completed years of PCPR together. Each year of observation is coded dichotomously and with a value of ‘1’ if there was either an ongoing or completed PCPR process, and with a value of ‘0’ otherwise. The second considers only completed years of PCPR. Each year of observation is coded dichotomously and with a value of ‘1’ if there was a completed PCPR process, and with a value of ‘0’ otherwise.

External Involvement
Three criteria are required for a party to be considered an external actor. First, the actor must be external to the state. It cannot be an internal state-based actor or a non-state actor based in the state. Second, the actor must be an international or regional governmental organisation, or a single, bilateral or group of foreign states. Third, the actor’s mandate must include the provision of security sector, or police reform more explicitly. Actors and organizations that do not have mandated or operational expertise in police/security reforms, such as religious actors and some aid organizations, are excluded.

Each year of observation is coded dichotomously, and with a value of ‘1’ if there was external involvement in the post-conflict police reform process, and with a value of ‘0’ otherwise. External involvement is not coded in post-conflict country years in which there is no PCPR.

Executive Ownership
Two criteria are required to be coded as having executive ownership. First, there must be evidence showing that the executive (of the host state) had decision-making power over the reforms being implemented. Second, there must be evidence that there was regular and formalized interaction between the executive and the external donor actors involved in the reform process.
Each year of observation is coded dichotomously, and with a value of ‘1’ if there was executive ownership of the post-conflict police reform process during that year, and with a value of ‘0’ otherwise.

Parliamentary Ownership
To be coded as having parliamentary ownership there must be evidence that the parliament of the host state was engaged in decision-making and oversight of the reform process. Parliamentary engagement can also be evidenced through the undertaking of research projects relating to the police or the reform process, and joint conferences and workshops with external donors regarding the implementation of the reforms.

Each year of observation is coded dichotomously, and with a value of ‘1’ if there was parliamentary ownership of the post-conflict police reform process during that year, and with a value of ‘0’ otherwise.

Police Ownership
To be coded as having police ownership, there must be evidence that the police service was involved in the planning for the reform process, and in the development of national policing and security policies. Police involvement in PCPR is evidenced by consultation with police representatives during the reform process. This can include consultations regarding the mandate and oversight of the police, and more technical aspects such as uniforms and investigative techniques. Policing and security planning takes place through the creation of joint security apparatuses between external security providers and the police.

Each year of observation is coded dichotomously, and with a value of ‘1’ if there was police ownership of the post-conflict police reform process during that year, and with a value of ‘0’ otherwise.

Civil society Ownership
Two criteria must be met. First, there must be evidence of the provision of support from external donors to existing civil society organizations (CSO’s), or for the creation of new CSO’s, that focus on police oversight, human rights, or the rights of marginalized groups in relation to security. Second, there must be evidence of civil society participation in public forums regarding the implementation of PCPR. Civil society engagement can also take place through the completion of needs based assessments and public security surveys.

Each year of observation is coded dichotomously, and with a value of ‘1’ if there was civil society ownership of the post-conflict police reform process during that year, and with a value of ‘0’ otherwise.

Increased local Ownership
This variable is included in order to consider variation in local ownership. Each year of observation is coded with a value between 0-4, corresponding to the number of local
actors (the executive, parliament, the police, and civil society) that were engaged in PCPR during that year.

Community policing
To be considered as having community policing, there must be evidence of a national program with the explicit goal of improving community-police relations, and dedicated policing staff who work on community policing. Regional or local community policing programs are excluded in order to ensure that only expansive community policing programs are included. External involvement is not required for community policing.

Each year of observation is coded dichotomously, with a value of ‘1’ if there was a functioning national community-policing program and with a value of ‘0’ otherwise.

Female representation
To be considered as having a female representation program, there must be evidence of an ongoing national program aimed at increasing the representation of women in the police service. This excludes ‘gender sensitive policing programs’ if they did not include provisions for increasing the representation of women in the police. The female representation program must aim to increase the representation of women within officer roles in the police, and it may also aim to increase the representation of women within administrative and civilian roles. External involvement is not required.

Each year of observation is coded dichotomously, with a value of ‘1’ if there was an ongoing national program aimed at increasing the representation of women in the police service, or with a value of ‘0’ otherwise.

Control Variables

Regime Type
Each year of observation is coded with a value ranging from +10 to -10. The value +10 represents a regime that is strongly democratic and the value -10 represents a regime that is strongly autocratic (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers, 2016). The variable is coded with data from the Polity IV Project: Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2015 (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers 2016).

GDP
Each year of observation is coded with a value that directly corresponds to the country of observation’s GDP per capita (logged). The variable is coded with data from the World Bank (2015a).

GDP Growth/decline
Each year of observation is coded with a value that directly corresponds to its “annual percentage growth rate of GDP” (World Bank, 2015b). The variable is coded with data from the World Bank (2015b).
Conflict Intensity
Each year of observation is coded with a value corresponding to the “best estimate” of the total number of battle-related deaths that occurred during the conflict episode before the cessation of hostilities. The variable is coded with data from the UCDP Battle-related Deaths Dataset v.5-2015 (UCDP, 2015; Pettersson, 2014).

Conflict End-Type
Each year of observation is coded dichotomously, value of ‘1’ when the conflict cessation occurs as a result of a peace or ceasefire agreement, and with a value of ‘0’ otherwise. The variable is coded using data from the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset v.2-2015, 1946-2013 (Kreutz, 2010).

Duration of Peace
Each year of observation is coded with a value that directly corresponds to the number of years since the final year of intra-state armed conflict. It is a count of the number of ‘peace years’. The variable is coded using data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2015 (Gleditsch et al., 2002).

UN Mission
Each year of observation is coded dichotomously, and with a value of ‘1’ if there was an ongoing UN mission, and with a value of ‘0’ otherwise. The variable is coded using data from the IPI Peacekeeping Database (International Peace Institute, 2016).

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
To be considered as having DDR, the country must have had a national DDR program, as opposed to a regional or pilot program. It must also have included either a reintegration or a reininsertion program, in addition to both disarmament and demobilization.

Each year of observation is coded with a value of ‘0’ if there was no DDR program, with a value of ‘1’ if there was an ongoing DDR program, and with a value of ‘2’ if the DDR program was complete. The variable is coded based on the same sources used for the coding of the independent variables.

Size of the UN Mission*131
Each year of observation is coded with a number corresponding to the aggregated number of troops, police and observers. The variable is coded using data from the IPI Peacekeeping Database (International Peace Institute, 2016).

Year of Observation*
Each year of observation is coded with the number corresponding to the year of observation. For example, 2013 is coded with the value “2013”.

131 * Indicates that the variable was used as an additional robustness check.
Regime2*
Regime2 is a reduced version of the Polity2 score from the Polity IV Project (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers 2016). Instead of a 21-point scale, Regime2 is based on a 3-point scale from 0-2 separating autocracies from incomplete or deficient democracies and more democratic regimes.

Regime3*
Regime3 is a binary measure of democracy coding using data from the Quality of Government data (Dahlberg et al., 2017), which spans 1946-2010. Each year of observation is coded with a value of ‘1’ if the regime was democratic and with a value of ‘0’ otherwise.

A1.2 Quantitative Analysis Outline
This section provides a brief overview of the quantitative analysis. As previously discussed in Chapters 4 and 6, four dependent variables are used to measure post-conflict peace: one-sided violence by the state and non-state actors, extrajudicial killings and torture. The analyses pertaining to state and non-state one-sided violence use negative binomial regression models, while ordered logistic regression models are used to examine extrajudicial killings and torture. Standard errors in each of the models are clustered by country, and the robust standard errors are shown in parentheses below the coefficients. All of the models were completed using STATA 14.1, and CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg & King 2003) was used to produce marginal effects and predicted probabilities for selected relationships. The confidence intervals for each are shown in parentheses. All of the predicted probabilities and marginal effects presented were obtained by holding regime type, GDP, GDP growth, conflict intensity and peace duration at their median values, and by maintaining that the conflict ended as a result of a cease-fire/peace agreement, that there was a UN mission, and that there was a DDR program.

A2. Full Correlation Matrix

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<th>Police</th>
<th>Civil Society</th>
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<td>Duration of Peace</td>
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A3. Supplementary Tables
As discussed in Chapter 6, several additional tables are included in order to test the robustness of some of the previously presented results. Due to the large amount of models included in this study and the number of robustness checks used, only a select number of statistical models – those that represent some of the strongest and most substantively interesting findings of the quantitative study – are presented below. The majority of the supplementary tables include the original model (as presented in Chapter 6) as well as the updated model with a ‘*’ used for distinction. The only exceptions to this pertain to the results using country-fixed effects and the results with lagged control variables, whereby all of the models (with controls) presented in Chapter 6 have been re-done.

A3.1 – Results using country-fixed effects

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<td>(0.834)</td>
<td>(0.560)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
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| Completed PCPR |
|---------------|-----------------|---------------|------------------------|---------|
| -0.022        | -0.048*         | 0.047*        | -0.036                 | -0.015* |
| (0.019)       | (0.021)         | (0.020)       | (0.021)                | (0.007) |

| Regime (t-I) |
|--------------|---------------|---------------|------------------------|---------|
| -0.034       | -0.019        | -0.078        | -0.021                 | -0.060  |
| (0.084)      | (0.097)       | (0.107)       | (0.129)                | (0.039) |

| GDP (logged) (t-I) |
|-------------------|---------------|---------------|------------------------|---------|
| -0.005            | 0.004         | -0.010        | -0.007                 | 0.004   |
| (0.005)           | (0.005)       | (0.008)       | (0.008)                | (0.002) |

| Conflict Intensity (t-I) |
|--------------------------|---------------|---------------|------------------------|---------|
| -0.000                   | -0.000        | -0.000        | -0.000                 | 0.000   |
| (0.000)                  | (0.000)       | (0.000)       | (0.000)                | (0.000) |

| Peace Agreement (t-I) |
|-----------------------|---------------|---------------|------------------------|---------|
| -0.063                 | -0.199        | -0.263        | -0.282                 | -0.049  |
| (0.191)                | (0.220)       | (0.211)       | (0.239)                | (0.069) |

| Duration of Peace (T-I) |
|-------------------------|---------------|---------------|------------------------|---------|
| -0.049*                 | -0.040        | -0.123**      | -0.142**               | -0.002  |
| (0.019)                 | (0.021)       | (0.028)       | (0.033)                | (0.005) |

| UN (t-I) |
|----------|---------------|---------------|------------------------|---------|
| 0.195    | 0.226         | 0.033         | 0.226                  | 0.028   |
| (0.204)  | (0.239)       | (0.240)       | (0.310)                | (0.074) |

| DDR (t-I) |
|----------|---------------|---------------|------------------------|---------|
| 0.034    | 0.127         | -0.358**      | -0.334*                | -0.039  |
| (0.110)  | (0.118)       | (0.133)       | (0.143)                | (0.042) |

| Constant |
|----------|---------------|---------------|------------------------|---------|
| 2.292**  | 1.966**       | 1.166         | 1.441                  | .732**  |
| (0.544)  | (0.611)       | (.681)        | (.800)                 | (.253)  |

| N Obs. |
|--------|---------------|---------------|------------------------|---------|
| 517    | 383           | 506           | 377                    | 786     |

| N Groups |
|----------|---------------|---------------|------------------------|---------|
| 29       | 27            | 27            | 26                     | 53      |

*p < .05. **p < .01.
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\*p < .05. **p < .01.

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* N Obs. 63 63 57 57 107 107 107
* N Groups 7 7 6 6 15 15 15

* p < .05. ** p < .01.

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* N Obs. 63 57 107 107
* N Groups 7 6 15 15

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*p < .05. **p < .01.

A3.2 - Results with a control for the ‘year’ of observation

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<td>Model</td>
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<td>52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police</td>
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<td>-2.166* (1.008)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>-4.511** (1.293)</td>
<td>-4.542** (1.626)</td>
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<td>Executive</td>
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<td>Regime</td>
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<td>.135 (.147)</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
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<td>-.000 (.000)</td>
<td>.000 (.000)</td>
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<td>-.011 (.342)</td>
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*p < .05. **p < .01.
A3.3 - Results with a control for the dependent variable (lagged)

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<td>(.797)</td>
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<td>(.048)</td>
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*p < .05. **p < .01.

A3.4 - Results with lagged control variables

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<th>Torture</th>
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<td>(.421)</td>
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<td>-.007</td>
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*p < .05. **p < .01.
### Intensity (T-1)

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<th>.099 (.616)</th>
<th>.599 (.726)</th>
<th>1.046 (.712)</th>
<th>.559 (.367)</th>
<th>.400 (.413)</th>
<th>.770 (.359)</th>
<th>.757* (.378)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Duration of Peace (T-1)</td>
<td>-.074 (.046)</td>
<td>-.008 (.055)</td>
<td>-.103** (.036)</td>
<td>-.091* (.042)</td>
<td>.073** (.022)</td>
<td>.072** (.024)</td>
<td>-.027 (.027)</td>
<td>-.012 (.029)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN (T-1)</td>
<td>.463 (.618)</td>
<td>1.239 (.757)</td>
<td>-.193 (.364)</td>
<td>.285 (.673)</td>
<td>.122 (.341)</td>
<td>.766 (.422)</td>
<td>-.085 (.427)</td>
<td>.852 (.505)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR (T-1)</td>
<td>-.620 (.381)</td>
<td>-.037 (.492)</td>
<td>1.182** (.395)</td>
<td>-.687 (.476)</td>
<td>-.046 (.227)</td>
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<td>9.078** (2.103)</td>
<td>7.931** (2.277)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>797</td>
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<td>632</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>632</td>
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</table>

*p < .05. **p < .01.

---

### State-based OSV

| External Involvement | -.849 (1.558) | -.093 (1.331) | -.651 (.856) | -.860 (.491) |
| Regime (T-1) | .072 (.137) | .417 (.191) | -.107 (.098) | -.086 (.158) |
| GDP (T-1) | -.595 (.465) | -.1047 (.840) | -.387 (.717) | -.367 (.532) |
| GDP Growth (T-1) | -.153* (.071) | -.372 (.136) | .000 (.048) | .001 (.040) |
| Conflict Intensity (T-1) | -.000 (.000) | -.000 (.000) | .000 (.000) | -.000 (.000) |
| Peace Agreement (T-1) | 1.467 (1.256) | 2.239 (1.476) | -.659 (.771) | -.436 (.829) |
| Duration of Peace (T-1) | -.321** (.070) | -.169 (.131) | .011 (.062) | -.002 (.078) |
| UN (T-1) | -.533 (.439) | -.679 (.829) | -.721 (.541) | 1.311* (.608) |
| DDR (T-1) | -1.138 (.582) | -3.257 (.701) | -.649 (.472) | -1.493 (.443) |
| Constant | 8.298* (4.209) | 12.480** (6.007) |
| N | 275 | 275 | 202 | 202 |

*p < .05. **p < .01.

---

### Executive

| Executive | -3.863** (.998) | -6.008** (2.526) | -2.498* (1.182) | -2.569* (1.061) |
| Parl | -1.722 (1.625) | .5181** (1.773) | -.779 (.772) | -1.344* (.648) |
| Regime (T-1) | -.072 (.159) | -.107 (.337) | .109 (.482) | -.045 (.166) |
| GDP (T-1) | -2.297** (.552) | -2.626 (.623) | -.550 (.937) | -.1496 (.801) |
| GDP Growth (T-1) | .065 (.094) | .080 (.185) | -.711 (.198) | .045 (.135) |
| Conflict | -.000 (.000) | -.000 (.000) | -.000 (.000) | -.000* (.000) |

*p < .05. **p < .01.
<table>
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<th>Intensity of Peace (T-I)</th>
<th>Peace Agreement (T-I)</th>
<th>Duration of Peace (T-I)</th>
<th>UN DDR (T-I)</th>
<th>DDR (T-I)</th>
<th>Constant</th>
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<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
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<td>Regime</td>
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<td>(.127)</td>
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<th>Torture</th>
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* N = 156

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<th>Torture</th>
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N = 990

*p < .05. **p < .01.

### A3.5 - Results controlling for Executive Engagement

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230
### A3.6 - Results including all four types of local ownership

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* p < .05. ** p < .01.
### A3.7 – Variance Inflation Factors

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### A3.8 – Results with Regime2 control

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|                      | 1.533           | 1.105         | 2.649   |
|                      | (1.256)         | (1.015)       | (1.996) |

N: 990

*p < .05, **p < .01.
### A3.9 – Results with Regime3 control

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*p < .05. **p < .01.

### A3.10 – Results with a control for the size of the UN mission

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*p < .05. **p < .01.
### A3.11 – Results for Community Policing (excluding Female Representation)

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N 159 159 159 159 109 109

*p < .05. **p < .01.

### A4. Interview Questions

#### Questions for External Donor Personnel

How would you define local ownership? What do you believe/understand local ownership to be?

How is/was your relationship and level of interaction with local security personnel from the police and justice sectors?
How is/was your relationship and level of interaction with Kosovar civilians in relation to your work with security institutions?

Do you believe that your organisation worked with an explicit goal to create or foster local ownership in regards to its work in strengthening Kosovo’s security institutions?

Do you believe that there are differences between the policies that your organisation espouses in terms of creating local ownership, and how it is actually done on the ground?

What do you believe your organisation achieved in terms of fostering/creating local ownership in its work on strengthening Kosovo’s security institutions?

How would you assess the impact ‘local ownership’ in the changes of Kosovo’s security institutions?

Having worked with security institutions in Kosovo, do you believe that local ownership plays (or has played) a role in their development and strengthening?

If you do not believe that local ownership has played a role, why is that?

Questions for Local Security Personnel

How do you define local ownership? What do you believe/understand local ownership to be?

How is/was your relationship and level of interaction with staff from international organisations?

How is/was your relationship and level of interaction with Kosovar civilians in relation to the security sector reform process? How often did/do you interact with them and on which issues?

Have you noticed any differences in interaction with ethnic groups? Women?

Do you believe that your organisation/security institution worked external actors and civilians with an explicit goal to create or foster local ownership?

If yes, which types of strategies or tactics did your organisation/institution employ to foster local ownership?

Do you believe that your organisation/institution had a say in the types of reforms that were carried out and how they were implemented?
How would you assess the ‘local ownership’ of Kosovo’s security sector reform process overall?

Having been a part of the security sector reform process in Kosovo, do you believe that local ownership plays a role in its success? And in what ways?

If you do not believe that local ownership has played a role in Kosovo’s security sector reform process, why is that?

**Questions for Civilian Participants**

How do you define local ownership? What do you believe/understand local ownership to be?

How is/was your relationship and level of interaction with staff from international organisations (such as the UN, NATO and the OSCE)? How often did/do you interact and on which issues?

How is/was your relationship and level of interaction with local security sector personnel? How often did/do you interact, and on which issues?

Do you believe that Kosovar civilians have had a say/influence in the types of reforms that were carried out and how they were implemented?

Do you believe that the influence of Kosovar civilians on the SSR process varied during the planning, implementation and management phases?

Do you believe that international organisations worked to foster/create local ownership?

How would you assess the ‘local ownership’ of Kosovo’s security sector reform process overall?

Having witnessed the security sector reform process in Kosovo, do you believe that local ownership plays a role in its success?

If you do not believe that local ownership has played a role in Kosovo’s security sector reform process, why is that?