This thesis examines the ideology and reality of fides in Roman international relations, using the conquest of Iberia as a case study. It seeks to show that despite the ideology, the self-belief in Rome’s cultural superiority and the competitive nature of the Roman state resulted in the disregard for the precepts of fides in martial diplomacy.
The first chapter looks at the role of fides in domestic and international society and examines how the ethical principle of fides developed into a nationalistic ideology. The second chapter investigates Roman conduct during the conquest of Iberia from the second Punic war until Tiberius Gracchus established a treaty with the Celtiberi in 178 BCE in light of this ideology. The final chapter reviews the reality of fides in Roman action in both Hispania Citerior and Hispania Ulterior during the Celtiberi and Lusitanian wars and the Roman quest for control.
This discussion ultimately seeks to provide an analysis of fides in international diplomatic affairs and a justification of Rome’s choice of action in the conquest of the Iberian Peninsula. It emerges that fides was a principle appealed to only when it served the ultimate goal of commanders and the Senate. However, when faced with the realities of war, fides was sacrificed for success and dominion.
