Corruption and the Public Display of Wealth

dc.contributor.author	Fabrizi, Simona
dc.contributor.author	Lippert, Steffen
dc.date.copyright	2012-06
dc.identifier.citation	Fabrizi, S., & Lippert, S. (2012). Corruption and the Public Display of Wealth (Economics Discussion Papers Series No. 1202). University of Otago. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10523/2338	en
dc.identifier.issn	1178-2293
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10523/2338
dc.description.abstract	We build a principal-agent-client model of corruption, allowing for heterogeneity in the value of public projects relative to the cost of monitoring their execution and for uncertainty of corruptors regarding the value of a project conducted. We derive the conditions under which officials with low-value projects have an incentive to signal their projects' type, and thereby facilitate their corruption, by means of public displays of wealth. While such public displays reduce the probability with which bribes are offered to officials conducting high-value projects, they increase the probability with which these officials accept bribes sufficiently to offset any positive effect.	en_NZ
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	en	en_NZ
dc.publisher	University of Otago	en_NZ
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Economics Discussion Papers Series	en_NZ
dc.relation.uri	http://www.business.otago.ac.nz/econ/research/discussionpapers/index.html	en_NZ
dc.subject	corruption	en_NZ
dc.subject	incentives	en_NZ
dc.subject	signaling	en_NZ
dc.subject	public displays of wealth	en_NZ
dc.title	Corruption and the Public Display of Wealth	en_NZ
dc.type	Discussion Paper	en_NZ
otago.school	Department of Economics	en_NZ
otago.openaccess	Open	en_NZ
otago.relation.number	1202	en_NZ